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Abstract
During the early part of the period 1914-1941 
Japan regarded Southeast Asia simply as a supplier of 
raw materials and a consumer of manufactures. It was 
only in the 1930s that Southeast Asia became economically 
vital to Japan, as tension between Japan and the Western 
powers increased. In particular Japan feared the suspension 
of exports from the West and from European colonies 
in Asia.
After 19 31 Japan had a considerable balance of payments 
deficit with regard to the West. Consequently Japan 
attempted to extend her political and economic influence 
in Southeast Asia in order to reduce her dependence on 
Western supplies and markets. However, this created 
tension between Japan and the West as the economies 
of Southeast Asia were closely integrated with the 
economies of the Western world. Though Japan succeeded 
in the 1930s in penetrating these Asian markets to a 
considerable extent, she was unable to reduce her trade 
deficit with the West or to create a self-sufficiency 
area in Asia. Japan further increased her economic 
expansion into Southeast Asia, but this merely aggravated 
her already strained relationship with the West.
In addition, during this period the Japanese 
business community, the Zaibatsu, which had close links 
with the Army, attempted to establish the "Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." This was to provide an environment 
free of Western influence, in which the Zaibatsu could 
protect and develop their economic interests. Ultimately 
this led to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 19 41 
and the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia.
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Introduction
There has been a considerable amount of historical 
research on the Japanese economy by both Eastern and 
Western scholars. Most of the research has concentrated 
on the period after 1868 and has been concerned either 
with Japan's domestic development or its relations 
with other states, principally the U.S.A., Europe and 
East Asiaf1^
During the Meiji Restoration, and particularly 
after the Japanese victories in the Sino-Japanese War 
in 1895 and the Japan-Russian War in 1905, Japanese 
industrial development was very rapid. Japanese 
interests in the Far East - especially China (including 
Taiwan) and Korea - and Southeast Asia expanded. 
Thereafter, the Far East and later Southeast Asia 
gradually became, along with the U.S.A., the principal 
markets for Japanese manufactured goods, and important 
sources for the supply of industrial and agricultural 
raw materials to Japan. Japanese trade with Asia was 
particularly important during the inter-war period.
This situation was reflected in academic interests. 
During the inter-war years numerous books and articles 
appeared dealing with Japan and Asia. However, the
(2 )
economic relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia 
has still scarcely been considered by scholars.^This 
might be due to various reasons. Presumably, one 
important reason is that Southeast Asia has made a 
smaller contribution to the economic development and 
reconstruction of Japan, than that of the U.S.A., China 
(including Manchuria, Hong Kong, Kwantung and Taiwan), 
Korea or even India. Secondly, Japanese ideology has 
been occupied with the thought of "Seiyo Suhai, Toyo 
Besshi" (fcfive respect to the Western world and regard 
with contempt the Eastern world). Western sciences and
languages have been widely studied and absorbed by the 
Japanese, but thQse from the East have been largely 
ignored. Thirdly, the Japanese occupation of Southeast 
Asia may have made the Japanese reluctant to study the 
affairs of those countries. Lastly, Southeast Asia 
has not had a particularly close cultural, pdlitical 
or economic relationship with Japan compared to that 
with China and Korea.
Southeast Asia has many different cultures, languages 
and races. Although it attracted the attention of some 
Japanese poets, novelists, politicians, and later the 
Navy, in the period prior to the First World War, it 
did not become an important "regional community" for 
Japan. After the Manchurian Incident in 19 31 and 
particularly after the China Incident of 19 37, Japan's 
war economy was greatly influenced and fatally damaged 
by a shortage of raw materials from the U.S.A. and 
from European colonies in the East. Thereafter, as 
a matter of national policy, Southeast Asia was formally 
included in the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. Trade with Southeast Asia started to gain any 
importance only during the period which covered the 
First World War and the World economic collapse of 1929- 
31. Southeast Asia became even more important to Japan 
during the China Incident and Pacific War. Before this, 
Southeast Asia was more or less ignored by Japanese 
economists as well as by the Japanese government.
The Present State of Knowledge:- Nawa's 3-link thesis 
and subsequent writers.
A particularly valuable analysis of the development
of the Japanese domestic and external economy was first
outlined by Professor Toitsu Nawa in his book: Nihon 
Bosekigyo to Genmen Mondai Kenkyu (The Japanese Textile 
Industry and the Problem of Raw Cotton) published in 19 37.
Professor Nawa drew attention to the dependence 
of the Japanese economy on the World market in terms 
of a 3-link thesis.
The First Link: Raw silk was exported to the U.S.A.
in return for raw cotton and machinery. Raw silk is
the only commodity (besides some marine products) that 
Japan can export as a genuine Japanese article produced 
with labour from the land. Therefore, it is a suitable 
starting point for analysing the structure of Japanese 
foreign trade. As a luxury, raw silk was predominantly 
exported to the U.S.A. • Japan had to import raw cotton 
from the U.S.A. as the raw material for cotton cloth 
which was exported in the second link. Furthermore, 
imports from the U.S.A. of crude oil, machinery and 
engines, scrap iron and pulp were essential to Japan.
The Second Link: Cotton goods were exported to 
the British Empire (British Malaya, the Straits Settle­
ments, Australia, British India and Canada) in exchange 
for industrial raw materials (iron, pig iron, nonferrous 
metals, aluminium raw rubber, wool and cotton). It 
appeared that Japan had the upperhand, the situation 
seeming to be that of an advanced industrial economy 
trading with backward agricultural economies; however, 
Japan had to face intense competition from the Cotton 
industry of Lancashire and the political power of the 
British Empire.
The Third Link: Machinery and miscellaneous 
commodities were exported to Manchuria and China 
(including Kwantung Province and Hong Kong - the so-called 
Yen-bloc) in exchange for food and raw materials.
Japan tried to construct privileged markets and extend 
both political and economic influence in this third link.
Japan tried to avoid conflicts with both the U.S.A. 
and the British Empire, as this would disrupt the 
entire mechanism of the Japanese economy. Expansion 
in the Yen-bloc, through the establishment of a war 
economy, meant that Japan first had to import large 
quantities of machinery and heavy industrial raw materials 
from the U.S.A and the British Empire? And in order to 
achieve this she had to increase exports of raw silk 
mostly to the U.S.A. and cotton goods mostly to the 
British Empire. Therefore, the Japanese economy became 
increasingly dependent upon the U.S.A. and the British 
Empire. In addition, expansion in the third link 
invited friction with the Western Powers and faced 
resistance from the Asian nations.
Professor Nawa's 3-link thesis has several 
methodological defects, (a) It fails to analyse fully 
the role of the old colonies of Korea and Formosa 
which were" the major member countries of the third 
link. This made it difficult to understand fully the 
importance of the role of the third link. In particular, 
the thesis failed to establish the importance of 
cheap food imports from the colonies in restraining 
the Japanese wage level. (b) He placed too much emphasis 
on Japan's shortage of raw materials. (c) The thesis 
did not consider changes in the Japanese industrial 
structure and in particular the increase in exports of 
heavy and chemical industrial products after 1931.
(d) The significance of the markets of Southeast Asia, 
which played an important role in Japanese industrialization,
was not made clear. (e) No attempt was made to describe 
the historical evolution of these trading patterns.^ 
However, Nawa's analysis of the relationship between 
the Japanese economic structure and Japanese foreign
/£\
trade has been widely used in Japanese academic circles.
Suprisingly, Japanese trade with Southeast Asia 
during the inter-war period has been almost totally 
neglected by Japanese writersMoreover few Western 
writers have considered this problem except N.S. Ginsburg, 
(Japanese Prewar Trade and Shipping in the Oriental 
Triangle, Chicago, 19 49), J.D. Phillips (F.V. Field ed.,
An Economic Survey of the Pacific Area, Part II, Foreign 
Trade, by Phillips, 1971) , G.C. Allen,(^Japan1 s Economic 
Expansion, 1965, XII), J.C. Le C l a i r Japan1s Trade with 
the Netherlands Indies, Foreign Affairs, January 1937) and 
investigations conducted by U.S. Tariff Commission and 
U.S. Department of State. But in the majority of cases, 
these analyses have been rather superficial
The Purpose of This Study
This study will attempt to examine the importance 
to Japan of Southeast Asian trade in the inter-war years. 
This study will firstly examine the economic and trade 
structure of Japan with especial reference to her 
dependence on Southeast Asian markets and raw materials. 
Secondly, Japan's economic expansion into Southeast 
Asia and its encroachment upon Western interests.
Thirdly Western pressure, particularly through their 
Southeast Asian dominions, forced Japan to consider 
the use of political and then military measures to 
secure her Southeast Asian markets and supplies of 
industrial and agricultural raw materials. Fourthly, 
military control over civilian government in Japan in 
the late 19 30's led to the Pacific War which in essence 
aimed to break the Western economic blockade and to 
protect Japanese interests in Southeast Asia.
It is hoped to develop and extend Professor Nawa's 
3-link thesis along the lines mentioned above, and to 
give from this analysis an explanation for the 
outbreak of the Pacific War.
Structure of the Study
This study is divided into five sections.
Section One
Japanese Economic Structure and Foreign Trade, examines 
Japan's shortage of natural resources, her dependence 
on imports and, because of her small domestic market, 
her dependence on an expanding export trade. This 
Section also examines the importance of Southeast Asia 
as a source of raw materials for Japan.
Section Two
Characteristics and Structure of Japanese Foreign Trade, 
examines firstly Japan's foreign trade (merchandise 
and invisible trade) in the period 1914-41. Japan's 
merchandise trade deficit was striking but was offset 
overwhelmingly by an invisible trade surplus up to 19 37.
The China Incident jeopardized Japan's invisible trade, 
and created an enormous adverse balance between 1937-41. 
Japan's total international trade deficit was covered by 
not only an invisible trade surplus but also by foreign 
investment in Japan. Secondly the foreign trade of 
Japan was predominantly concentrated in Asia and the 
U.S.A.. The merchandise trade balance with Southeast Asia, 
the U.S.A. and Europe was adverse to Japan in the period 
1914-41. Japan's excess of exports over imports in Asia 
as a whole was almost offset by the trade deficit with 
Europe. Thirdly Japan's exports of semi-finished 
manufactures diminished drastically during this period 
while her exports of finished manufactures increased 
remarkably. The former was due largely to the immense 
decrease in raw silk exports (predominantly exported 
to the U.S.A.) while the latter was due mainly to the 
immense increase of cotton tissues' exports (overwhelmingly 
exported to Asian countries - China, India and the 
Netherlands Indies). The decrease in raw silk exports
greatly affected Japan's trade income while the 
increase in cotton tissue exports deepened Japan's 
dependence on Western machinery and foreign 
particularly American - cotton supplies.
Section Three
The Development of the Japanese Spinning Industry and 
the Restriction of Exports of Cotton Goods to Southeast 
Asia, demonstrates firstly that the import trade of 
Southeast Asia consisted mainly of consumer goods 
(particularly cotton goods). Japan tried to import 
more raw cotton from India and China but due to the 
following reasons she was unsuccessful. (a) The Indian 
spinning industry increasingly consumed Indian raw 
cotton supplies, (b) raw cotton produced in China was 
increasingly consumed by the Chinese spinning industry 
and by the Japanese spinning industry in China,
(c) Japan had to import more cotton from America in order 
to make better-quality cotton goods and so compete with 
Indian and Chinese products. On the other hand Japan 
tried to produce some machinery domestically as well as 
import machines from Germany rather than from England 
and America. However,as Japan's heavy industry was based 
largely on munitions production and as Germany was 
totally involved in war in Europe, Japan was unable to 
reduce the dependence on American supplies. Secondly, 
apart from struggling to increase domestic machinery 
production, Japan tried to increase self-sufficiency by 
importing raw cotton from the Yen-bloc and later from 
the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". Attempts 
were also made to increase cotton cultivation in these 
areas. This was unsuccessful as raw cotton produced 
inside the Co-Prosperity Sphere could never satisfy all 
Japan's domestic needs. Thirdly, exports of cotton 
goods to Asian markets were subject to stiff competition. 
The Japanese spinning industry not only had to compete 
with Western producers in Asian markets, but also had
to compete with Chinese and Indian cotton supplies.
In addition Japan's exports of cotton goods to Southeast 
Asia were seriously restricted by discriminatory customs 
duties, tariff barriers and anti-Japanese campaigns.
Section Four
The Acquisition of Important Raw Materials from 
Southeast Asia, examines how Japan tried to secure 
imports of rubber, iron ore and oil from the region.
The Japanese Zaibatsu had tremendous interests in 
Southeast Asia and when the Western Powers imposed trade 
embargoes on Japan, the Japanese military authorities 
cooperated with the Zaibatsu to expand into the area.
Section Five
The Japanese Southward Advance, analyses firstly Japanese 
Army and Navy support for research organizations and 
institutes studying contemporary Southeast Asia, in 
preparation for a move into the region. Secondly, 
the implementation of Japan's Southern policy, through 
expansion into French Indo-China and Thailand. Finally 
the decision to fight against America in the Pacific in 
order to establish the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere."
For the purposes of this sttidy, the inter-war 
years are divided into six periods, i.e. 1914-1918 
(First World War), 1919-192 3 (post-war economic collapse), 
1924-1928 (economic recovery), 1929-1931 (world-wide 
economic crisis), 19 32-19 36 (economic recovery) and 
1937-1941 (the China Incident to the Pacific war).
In support of statements of a more general nature, this 
study includes a large volume of statistical evidence 
from Japanese governmental and private institutions, which 
has, until now, been unavailable to Western scholars.
Notes:
^Major references are: Kiyoshi Matsui (ed.),
Kindai Nihon Boeki-Shi (Trade History of Modem Japan) ,
1959, vols. I, II and IV; Chugoku Kenkyu-Syo Boeki 
Iinkai, Ajia Boeki no Tenbo (A Prospect of Asian Trade), 
1948; Y.Akamatsu, Toa Boeki no Rekishl-teki Ruikei 
(Historical Patterns of East Asian Trade), 1942; Saburo 
Orai, Shigen no Nai Nihon to Sekai (Without Natural 
Resources of Japan and the World), 1975; Mitsuhaya 
Kajinishi (ed.), Nihon Kelzai-shi Taikei (An Outline of 
Japanese History), Modern, vol II, Gaikoku Boeki no 
Hatten to Shihon no Yushutsu (The Development of Foreign 
Trade and the Export of Capital) by Tomoichi Mizunuma,
Akira Hara, Nicchu Senso ki-no Kokusai Shushi (Inter­
national Balance During the Sino-Japanese War Period) 19 72, 
(1), (2) and (3); Ichiro Nakanishi, Kinyushutsu 
Saikinshi Igo no Boeki » Kawasei Mondai (Trade and 
Foreign Exchange Problems after the Reapplication of 
the Gold Embargo), 196 8; J.B.Cohen, Japan's Economy in 
War and Reconstruction, 1949; E.B.Schumpeter (ed.),
The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 19 30-40; 19 40* 
G.C.Allen, Japan's Economic Recovery,1958; W.W. Lockwoodr 
Trade and Trade Rivalry Between the United States and 
Japan, 19 36; W.W. Lockwood, The Economic Development 
of Japan, Growth and Structural Change, 186 8-19 38,
195 4; Kazushi Ohkawa, The Growth Rate of the Japanese 
Economy since 1878, 195 7; Kazushi Ohkawa & Henry Rosovsky, 
Japanese Economic Growth, 19 73; Shigeru Uyehara, The 
Industry and Trade of Japan, 19 36; L.Klein and Kazushi 
Ohkawa, Economic Growth. The Japanese Experience 
Since the Meiji Era, 1968; Tokyo Association For Liberty 
of Trading, A Brief Analysis of Japan's Foreign Trade,
1935; U.S. Department of State, The Place of Foreign 
Trade in the Japanese Economy, 19 46; United States,
Tariff Commission, Recent Developments in the Foreign 
Trade of Japan, Particularly in Relation to Trade With
the United States, Report No. 105, Second Series, 19 36; 
United States, Tariff Commission, The Japanese Cotton 
Industry and Trade, Recent Development and Future Outlook, 
1921; H.G.Moulton, Japan; An Economic and Financial 
Appraisal, 1931. etc., etc..
W  Professor Hall notes that "the name South-East Asia 
came into general use for the first time in 1943 when 
the Allied Organization, South-East Asia Command, was 
formed to direct operations against the Japanese in the 
area. Previously, no single name had been applied to 
the whole area, and those normally given to its major 
divisions, such as Further India, the Indo-Chinese Pen­
insula, the Indian Archipelago, the Nanyang, have caused 
much misunderstanding by associating them with one or 
both of its great neighbours." (An introduction by 
D.G.E.Hall in Atlas of South-East Asia, 1964, P.3).
For the Japanese, "South-East Asia" was not a firm 
geographical concept until the Second World War. The term 
"Southeast Asia" began to appear in Japanese official 
documents from 2 3 July 19 40 when the Japanese Cabinet 
Planning Board enacted, Nanpo Shisaku Yoko (An) (An Out­
line of Southern Policy) (A Draft). Before that time 
the Japanese called the group of countries, including China 
Korea and some islands situated to the south of Japan, as 
Nanyo Syokoku (countries in the South Sea), Nanyo Syoto 
(Islands in the South Sea) or Nanyo (the South Sea) .
From a geographical point of view, Ginsburg suggested that 
for the Japanese "Southeast Asia is less a geographic 
region than a convenient term .... the Western boundary 
of the area terminates somewhere in New Guinea and excludes 
the islands of the Southwestern Pacific." (N.S.Ginsburg, 
Japanese Prewar Trade and Shipping in the Oriental Triangle 
1949, P.152).
However, as the economic relationship between
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Japan and these Southern countries became closer, 
the concept of "Southeast Asia" became clearer. At 
present the Japanese understand that Southeast Asia 
consists of Asean (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, i.e. the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore and Indonesia) plus Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia 
India, Burma and others.
For the purpose of this study, Southeast Asia 
includes the Philippines, French Indo-China, Thailand,
British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. Burma
is excluded from this study simply because her trade
with Japan was not particularly important and because
most of her economic statistics are not separately
reported but are included with India in Japanese publications.
During the inter-war and war years, publications 
dealing with the natural resources of Southeast Asia 
and suggesting that Japan had to explore these sources 
were innumerable. For example, Seiichi Kojima, Toa 
Keizai-ron (On East Aslan Economies) , 19 41; Toshio 
Narasaki, Gaikoku Boeki no Riron to Mondai (A Theory 
and Problem of Foreign Trade), 1941; Kameyoshi Takahashi,
Nihon Kogyo Hatten-ron (On Japan's Industrial Development), 
Yoshihiko Taniguchi, Nanpo Gomu Shigen to Sono Taisaku 
(Rubber Resources in the South and its Policy), in T5a 
Keizai Ronso, 1942; Toshiyoshi Okabe, Nanpo Senyi 
Genryo To Seisan ni Tsuite (The Production of Fibre 
Materials in the South), in Toa Keizai Ronso/19 42;
Ebikawa, Toa Shigen-ron (On East Asian Resources), 19 41; 
Naohiko Masuda, Sekai Syokuminchi no Shigen to Keizai 
(Resources and Economies of the World Colonies), 19 38;
Ken Sawada, Taiheiyo Shigen-ron (The Resources in the 
Pacific) , 1940; Sangyo Tokei Kenkyu-sho , On Southern 
Resources, 1940 and Hisa Aki, Chilki Keizai Riron (A 
Theory on Regional Economies), 1940. etc..
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(4) This analysis was also outlined in his books:
(a) Nihon Shihonshugi To Boeki Mondai (Japanese 
Capitalism and the Problem of Trade), 1946 and 19 48;
(b) Nihon Boseki-gyo no Shiteki Bunseki (A Historical 
Analysis of the Japanese Textile Industry), 1948 and
(c) Nihon Nl Okeru Genmen Mondai To Gaikoku Boeki 
(Raw Materials Problems and Foreign Trade in Japan) 
in Nihon No Shangyo Kakumel (Japan's Industrial 
Revolution), edited by Rekishi Kagaku Kyogikai, 19 77.
See Kazuichoro Ono, Japanese Capitalism and 
Foreign Trade 19 45-19 70 (1), in the Kyoto University 
Economic Review, April-October 19 77
(6) Typical analyses, using Nawa's 3-link thesis 
are, for example Kiyoshi Matsui, Nihon Boeki-ron 
(Trade of Japan), 1954; Kiyoshi Matsui (ed.), Kindai 
Nihon Boeki-shi (Trade History of Modem Japan I,II 
and III), 1963; Masaharu Yoshimura, Nihon Boeki-ron 
(On Japan*s Trade), 19 4 8; Tomoichi Mizunuma, Gaikoku 
Boeki No Hatten To Shihon No Yushutsu (The Development 
of Foreign Trade and Export of Capital), 19 75; Kazuichiro 
Ono, Japanese Capitalism and Foreign Trade 1945-70,
I and II, 1977; Kenzo Yukizawa, Kokusai Keizaigaku 
Zyosetsu (An Introduction of International Economy), 1957; 
Kenzo Yukizawa, Nihon Boeki No Chokl Tokei (The Long 
Term Statistics of Japan's Trade)> 19 78; Mikio Sugino,
Sankansetsu-ron no Saikento ( A Re-examination of the 
3-link thesis) in Keizai Ronso, 1976; Masayoshi 
Tsurumi, Nihon Boeki Kozo-ron no Bunseki Shikaku (An 
Analysis of the Structure of Japan's Trade), I & II, 
in Sekai Keizai Hyoron, May and June 19 73, etc.
However, see Kiyoshi Matsui, Nihon Keizai To 
Nanyo Boeki (The Japanese Economy and South Sea Trade) 
in Toa Keizai Ronso, 1942; Mitsubishi Economic Research 
Bureau, Japanese Trade and Industry, Present and Future, 19 36.
Section One
Japanese Economic Structure and Foreign Trade
It is widely agreed among economists, statesmen 
and the Japanese people in general, that foreign 
trade is essential to Japanese economic development.
It has been emphasized from all points of view and 
can easily be seen from most Japanese Government 
publications [2^
Why then should it be necessary to examine the 
Japanese economy through its foreign trade? The 
purpose of this section is to analyse the Japanese 
economic structure during the inter-war period and 
in particular the Japanese economic relationship 
with Southeast Asia.
Part 1. Shortage of Domestic Natural Resources.
Before examining Japan's shortage of domestic 
natural resources, it is necessary to examine the 
densities of population and land utilization in Japan.
(A) Relative Densities of Population.
The population of Japan increased from 52 million
in 1914 to about 64 million in 1930. It climbed
to 71.6 million in 1941. In other words, population
(3)increased 37.6% during the period 1914-41.
From Table 1, we can see that in approximately 
1936 Japan was the most crowded country not only 
in Asia but in the whole world, with a population 
density of 184 to the square kilometer, i.e. 2.5 
times and 2 3 times as high as the population density 
of Europe (excluding the U.S.S.R.), and of North and 
Central America respectively.
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England, Wales and the Netherlands have a 
"total density" (density in terms of total land 
area) greater than that of Japan. However in 
"arable density" (density in terms of available 
arable land), Japan led all the rest (see columns
(3) and (4) of Table 2).
In Japan, agricultural land was used mainly 
for the production of high calorie-value crops, 
such as rice, which yielded relatively more 
calories per unit of land area than any other 
crops.
Non-agricultural land was used extensively 
for forestry!4  ^Nevertheless, proportionately less 
land in Japan was cultivated than in England and 
Wales, France, Germany, U.S., Netherlands or 
Italy. Germany, France and Italy were industrialized 
countries where about 40% of the land was cultivated.
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(B) Shortage of Industrial Raw Materials.
The steel industry is the most important 
heavy industry of an industrialized country. Indeed 
it is possible to judge the stage of development of 
an industrialized country by examining the quantity 
of its steel production.
The most important bottleneck in the Japanese 
war economy (1931-45) was the very low level of 
iron and steel production^ From Table 3 we can 
examine steel production in Japan compared with 
that in the five Great Powers. Up to 1937, steel 
production in Japan was unable to compare with that 
of other industrialized countries. In 1929,
Japanese steel production was 2.3 million tons, but 
by 1940 it had increased to 6.9 million tons. 
Nevertheless, in 1940 it was only 52% of production 
in the U.K., 32% of that in Germany and 11% of 
that in the U.S.A.
Japan had to import a large quantity of scrap 
iron and pig iron to meet her domestic needs.
In 1935, imports of scrap and old iron were 1.69 
million tons and of pig iron 0.96 million tons.
The total of these imports was much greater than 
that of pig iron production (at 1.9 million tons) 
in Japan proper during the same yearl6^
Pig iron production in Japan during the 
inter-war period was also extremely low, compared 
with that of U.S.A., U.K., Germany and France. 
Although Japanese output increased from 0.25 million 
tons in 1913 to 3.66 million tons in 1940, in 
this last year it was still only 44% Of that of the 
U.K., 26% of that of Germany and only 9% of that 
of the U.S.A. (See Table 4).
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In producing pig iron, Japan had to import 
large quantities of iron ore from Malaya, China 
and the Philippines. Iron ore consumption in 
Japan was highly in excess of her domestic ore 
production.^7) Domestic ore production in 1931,
1937 and 1941 amounted to only 11%, 15% and 
18% of ore consumption. Iron ore production 
in Japan could not be compared with that of the 
other industrialized countries. (See Table 5).
Known and estimated reserves of iron ore 
in Japan were 80 million tons, which was 0.1% 
of the World's total reserves. It was only 
slightly greater than U.S. iron ore production 
in 1929. This iron ore reserve was not only 
smaller than the reserves of the Netherland 
Indies (1,000 million tons) but also smaller 
than those of the Philippines (850 million tons). 
Known and estimated reserves of iron ore in Japan 
were just over 1% of the U.K.'s reserves, and 
less than 1% of those of both Germany and the U.S.A.. 
Table 6 shows this.
Table 6
A Comparison of iron ore reserves of five 
industrialized countries and others (million ton).
Japan 80 (0.1)
U.S.A. 10,500 (17.3
U.K. 5,907 (9.8)
Germany 1,300 (2.1)
France 8,160 (13.5
Philippines 850 (1.4)
Netherland Indies 1,000 (1.7)
Total (including all others) 60,560 (100%
Source: Toa Kenkyu-sho, Sekai Kosan Tokei
(Statistics of Mineral Production of the 
World), 1942.
Most Japanese mines were small and the ore 
was low-grade. The average home island ore had 
an iron content of only 45%^ .8) In 1935, Japan 
proper had to use 4.17 9 million tons of iron ore 
to produce only 0.533 million tons of pig iron. 
Together with imports of pig iron from Korea this 
gave a total of 0.775 million tons. Japan had
to import 3.404 million tons of pig iron from
(9)
abroad. Prior to the imposition of the trade 
embargo in 1941, Malaya and the Philippines were 
the principal suppliers of ore. In 1937 they 
supplied 51% of total iron ore imports. Korea, 
Manchuria and China together supplied 21%.
By 1940, Malaya and the Philippines were supplying 
57%, and the share provided by China, Manchuria 
and Korea had risen to 29%. With the imposition 
of the trade embargo in 1941, China (including 
Hainan Island) became the largest supplier of 
iron ore to Japan, providing 50% of total imports 
in 1941.
The basic restraint on the development of 
Japan's steel industry was not only that she had
to import iron ore and scrap iron, but also that
(10)
she had limited coal resources.
Although coal resources in Japan were 
slightly greater than those in France, they were 
almost negligible as compared with those of the
U.S.A., the U.K. and Germany (See Table 7). The
(11)
productivity of the coal industry in Japan proper 
was very low (See Table 8) and the conditions of
i . . (12)coal mining poor.
In Japan, most of the coal was used in the 
industrial sector. Domestic use was very rare.
In the years 1937-41, coal was used mainly in
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iron and steel, chemicals, electrical power
(13)production and the railroad industries. 
Unfortunately, Japan possessed no anthracite, 
and lacked coking coal and high-grade lignite 
for her pig iron and steel industries.
Therefore she had to import these materials from 
North China-Inner Mongolia, Karafuto (Japanese 
Saghalien), Korea, Manchuria and Indo-China.
Another important material for Japan's 
industry and war economy was oil. Japan's out­
put in 1941 was 1,941,000 barrels of crude oil, 
or less than 0.1% of the world's total output.
By way of contrast, the U.S.A. produced 1.4 
billion barrels in 1941, over 700 times as much 
as Japan. Japan's 1941 production from wells 
and synthetic plants was less than 12% of her 
peacetime requirements. She relied almost 
entirely upon imported oil, four-fifths of which 
came from the U.S.A. A futher 10% came from 
the Netherlands East Indies and the remainder
came from such widely diverse sources as Mexico,
_ , , _ . (14)Bahrein and Romania.
Besides the above mentioned raw materials, 
nickel, cobalt and bauxite were not mined 
domestically in Japan, and antimony, mercury, 
manganese, tinf tungsten, molybdenum and 
chromium had to be imported in large quantities. 
Non-metallic minerals produced in Japan in 
sufficient quantities to meet domestic require­
ments included abrasives, bentonite, low-grade 
diatomite, low-grade gypsum, iodine, limestone, 
sulphur and low-grade talc. Non-metallic minerals 
which had to be imported in large quantities were 
borate, bromine, magnesite, phosphate rock, potash 
salt and nitrates. Natural fibres, such as cotton,
wool, flax, ramie and jute, were entirely supplied 
(15)
from imports. In Table 9 the degree of Japan's 
dependence on imports of selected key raw materials 
is summarized.
Table 9
Japan's Degree of Dependency* on Imports of 
Selected Key Raw Materials, 1929, 1933, 1934 
(In Percentages).
Year 1929 1933 1934
Cotton (in the seed). 
Cotton (ginned) 99.96 99.97 99.98
Wool 100.00 100.00 100.00
Other vegetable fibres 85.08 86.05 86.43
Rubber and resin 100.00 100.00 100.00
Oil yielding materials 69.53 63.33 64.54
Pulp 39.54 78.41 71.63
Oil and petroleum 77.27 88.41 99.74
Phosphate rock 100.00 100.00 100.00
Coal 14.88 15.79 16.12
Pig iron 70.32 74.52 58.17
Other iron 43.03 26.49 20.94
Other metal 37.04 34.39 45.75
Source: K. Takahashi, Nihon Kogyo Hatten Ron 
(A Theory on Japan's Industrial 
Development), Tokyo, 1936, P. 304.
*The degree of dependency is expressed here as:
_____________ PngO-rts---------  100
Domestic production + imports
Part 2. Comparatively small Domestic Market
Leading to the Necessity to Export.
It is now necessary to examine the total importance 
of the export trade to Japan's economy in the period 
under consideration.
(A) The "Dispute On Japanese Capitalism"!16^
In the early years of Show a (i.e. the later 
half of the 1920's), after the so-called "Dispute on 
Japanese Capitalism", there was, a consensus of 
opinion among Marxist academics in Japan from which 
emerged an analysis of Japan's shortage of domestic 
natural resources and an analysis of her small domestic
market. The latter was analysed particularly by Ryosei
(17)Kobayashi. Kobayashi stressed that the small domestic 
market had as its root cause two factors - first a low 
consumption of consumer goods due to the exploitation 
of labourers and peasants and second, a low consumption 
of capital goods due to the importance of light over 
heavy industry. Kobayashi's analysis of Japan's small 
domestic market was summarized by subsequent Japanese 
writers: the semi-feudal character of Japanese 
agriculture with its high rate of farm rent and low 
wages meant a low demand for home produced goods; 
therefore Japan was dependent on foreign markets to 
sell her excess production.
Kobayashi was later criticized as his analysis 
rested mainly on the proposal that "low consumption 
of consumer goods resulted in a small domestic market".
In other words, he ignored the factor of "low consumption 
of capital goods resulted in a small domestic market".
In fact, there was a complete dichotomy of opinion 
between Kobayashi and other Marxist academics; the 
former had said that only exports were important, while 
the latter had s&id that only imports were important.
However, Moritaro Yamada and Masaharu Yoshimura 
argued in 19 34 and in 19 48 respectively about Japan's 
small domestic market from the point of view of low 
consumption of consumer goods and capital goods, 
also explaining the importance of the role of both 
imports and exports. They emphasized that there had 
been an imbalance in the development of Japan's 
economy and more specifically that Japan's heavy 
industry (mostly the munitions industry) and the spinning 
industry depended almost entirely on foreign machinery 
and engines. They also argued that Japan's domestic 
market could not absorb the full production of these 
industries and therefore th&t it had become essential
( i ft)to find foreign markets.
Toitsu Nawa supported Yamada's analysis. He 
stressed in 19 37 that due to the undeveloped state of 
heavy industry, Japan had to export consumer goods 
(mostly textile goods) in exchange for raw materials 
and machinery. Japan's economy depended on foreign
trade and he drew a simplified model of Japan's trade
(19)structure. This was his 3-link thesis.
(B) Reasons for a Small Domestic Market.
During the period 1888-189 8, because of the low 
price of rice and low industrial wages, industries had 
to expand into foreign markets. In the Taisho era 
especially after World War I, agricultural productivity 
and the living standards of the peasants improved. 
Consequently Japan's domestic market expanded. In 
the Showa era, and in particular in 1929-31, a period 
of World economic crisis, the domestic market contracted 
and after 19 32, Japan had to dump her commodities overseas.
In the following analysis, I will concentrate 
on the following two problems.
(a) Low Consumption of Consumer Goods Due to 
"Exploitation" of the Labour Force.
Historically, Japan implanted modern industries 
when her agricultural system was still based on semi- 
feudal production. Agricultural production was severely 
limited by this semi-feudal production system and 
therefore Japan had to import large quantities of 
agricultural products in order to meet the needs of 
her rapidly developing industries. Consequently, 
with this unfavourable trade balance, Japan had to 
improve her agricultural and industrial productivity 
in order to compete in the international market.
Low wages and technical improvements seemed to be 
the two most important weapons for promoting Japan's 
foreign trade. However we are not in this thesis going 
to discuss the part played by technical improvements.
Both Professors M. Yamada and K. Matsui concluded 
in 19 34 and in 1959 respectively that labour costs in 
Japan were lower than those in Indiai20 ^Their analyses
were widely quoted and expanded to explain the situation 
in the Taisho era and even in the Showa era. Subsequent 
writers suggested that firstly, real wages in Japan rose 
from mid 1910; secondly real wages in Japan were lower
than in India; thirdly real wages in Japan were lower
(21)
than in other industrial countries. (see table 10).
Table 10.
International Position of Japanese Wages - 
An International Comparison of Pre-war Cotton Spinning 
Wages. (Index: Japan = 100. 19 32 second half)
Hourly wages 
per person
Wages per pound 
of cotton y a m
The United States 1139 628
England 603 414
Germany 762 549
India 148 458
J apan 100 100
Source: M.Yoshimura, Nihon Boeki Seisaku
(Trade Policy of Japan), 1956, P.228.
(b) Low Consumption of Capital Goods Due to the 
Importance of Light Industry.
The size of the domestic market is determined by 
demand for consumer goods and capital goods. In order 
to explain why Japan had a small domestic market, we 
must also examine demand for capital goods.
Lack of coordination between the various sectors 
of production led to imbalances between various sorts 
of goods; Japan therefore had to make use of foreign 
markets to get rid of the resultant excesses. In
addition, to solve the problem of an unfavourable 
trade balance, Japan had to expand her foreign markets 
mainly in consumer goods. This is the first reason.
The second reason is that the main demand for capital 
goods from heavy industries came from the armaments 
industry. But the domestic market did not expand 
with the development of the armament industry because 
heavy industries were unable to meet the increase in 
demand. This was the case up to the mid 19 30's.
As is evident from Table 11, light industry was 
predominant during the period 1913-30, but was overtaken 
by heavy industry after 1935, The development of basic 
industries (heavy industries), such as steel and machine 
tool production was substantial in the 19 30's, and 
had therefore started to meet the increase in home 
demand as outlined above, thereby enabling the expansion 
of the domestic capital goods market. (It should be 
noted that despite the increase in supply of capital 
goods, demand for them was still greater than could be 
supplied domestically). However the rapid development 
of the armaments industry did not fully prevent these 
basic industries from contributing to other sectors 
of the domestic economy.
Table 11.
A Tendency to Heavy Industrialization 
(A Composition of an amount of Production)
Year 1913 1925 1930 19 35 1940
Light industry 56.3 58.9 50. 8 32.4 19.8
Heavy industry 20.6 24.9 32.3 52.7 70.0
Others 23.1 16.2 16.9 14.9 20.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: "Economist" 5th November, 1955.
P art 3. The Importance of Southeast Asia as a
Source of Raw Materials.
In terms of total Japanese foreign trade.
Southeast Asia was not as important as China, U.S.A 
or even India. However Japan depended on Southeast 
Asia for several commodities which were virtually 
indispensable to the Japanese economy. In addition 
Southeast Asian raw materials became crucial to Japan 
when conflict between Japan and the Western countries 
increased, and particularly when the latter imposed 
trade embargoes on her.
The motive for establishing the China-Manchuria 
bloc, the Far Eastern Economic bloc and later the 
"Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was essentially 
to expand imports into Japan of industrial raw materials 
from China and Southeast Asia. This increase in 
imports of industrial raw materials was designed from 
the economic standpoint of reducing Japan's enormous 
trade deficit with America and Europe. Japan tridd 
to expand exports of cotton goods to, and imports of 
raw materials from Asia in order to correct this 
trade deficit. Also a deterioration in relations with 
America and Britain could result in the suspension of 
exports of Japanese cotton goods to America and Britain. 
The Western economies would not be harmed for they 
consumed only small quantities of consumer goods from 
Japan. The suspension of exports of raw silk to 
America would affect the American silk industry, but 
it would also severely damage the Japanese economy as 
America was the largest consumer of Japanese raw silk. 
However, if America and Europe suspended exports of
industrial raw materials to Japan, the Japanese economy
(22)would be severely damaged. Therefore Japan planned 
to reduce dependence on the West for raw materials, 
particularly after the Manchurian Incident in 19 31
Second, Japan tried during the war to restrict 
exports of some raw materials from Southeast Asia to 
the West. Japan stressed on 20th November, 19 41, that 
the Japanese occupation forces in the Southern region 
"will establish controls over foreign trade and foreign 
exchange operations; they will especially prevent the 
flow to the enemy of certain vital materials, such as 
oil, tin, rubber, tungsten, cinchona, etc." i23*In 
addition, Japan realized that if she controlled the 
production of chrome, manganese ore, antimony and 
tungsten, she could seriously weaken the Western Powers, 
for America and Great Britain depended essentially on 
Southeast Asia for these materials. ^24^
In general, Japanese Southern expansion was designed 
to counter the effects of the Western economic blockade.
It can be shown by reference to the documents in the 
following paragraph that, whilst the Western Powers 
were putting economic pressure on her, Japan was eager 
to establish a self-sufficiency area to include 
Southeast Asia.
(a) Japan stressed on 2nd October, 1939, that 
she would take steps to guarantee imports of raw materials 
from the Southern region (i.e. Hong Kong, French Indo­
china, Thailand, British Malaya, the Straits Settlements, 
the Netherlands East Indies, British Borneo, the 
Philippines and Burma). At that time imports from 
the Southern region amounted to 15% (in value) of 
Japan's total imports. These included more than 70% 
of tin, crude rubber, bauxite, maize, Manila hemp, 
chrome, timber and anthracite imports; between 10% 
and 50% of iron ore, manganese ore, tungsten ore, 
nickel ore, copper ore, lead ore, zinc ore and petroleum 
imports; and 10% of scrap iron, lead and industrial 
salt imports. The countries of origin were as follows:
Scrap iron, nickel ore 
*Manganese ore 
Iron ore
Copper ore 
*Tin
*Bauxite 
Petroleum 
Manila hemp
The Netherlands East Indies
The Straits Settlements
British Malaya, French Indo-China 
the Philippines
The Philippines
The Straits Settlements
The Netherlands East Indies, 
the Straits Settlements
The Netherlands East Indies, 
British Borneo, British Malaya
The Philippines, Burma
*The Straits Settlements were not actually producers 
but were outlets for the production from British Malaya.
Japan stressed that in order to acquire these raw 
materials from Southeast Asia, she would regard the 
Southern region as a complementary area of the Empire 
and would attempt to pull these countries into her 
economic orbit. She further stressed that Japanese
economic penetration into the Southern region would
(25)
involve "military and political ambitions".
(b) Following the German successes in Europe in 
April-June 1940, Japan's southward ideology became more 
pronounced. Japan stressed on 23rd July, 1940, that 
through diplomatic efforts,but more particularly by 
military operations, she was eager to establish under 
her control an East Asian economic sphere including 
the Southern region. She called for the "clearance" 
of Western influences from the region. Furthermore, 
detailed policies were drawn up towards establishing 
this self-sufficiency bloc. Firstly, there was to be 
a Southern development plan consisting of a programme 
to increase production in Southeast Asia and a programme 
dealing with resources, trade, transport and Japanese 
immigrants into Southeast Asia. Secondly, a system 
was to be established for supplying raw materials to
Japan from Southeast Asia and for cooperation with 
Japanese enterprises. Thirdly, trade restrictions 
between Japan and the Southern region were to be abolished 
in order to encourage Japanese trade expansion.
Fourthly,Japanese Southern commercial organizations 
were to be consolidated in order to improve economic 
cooperation with the region. Fifthly, Japanese 
southern shipping services were to be expanded in 
order to reduce dependence on the West and to establish 
an East Asian transport network. The Netherlands 
East Indies was regarded by Japan as the most important 
supplier of raw materials, Japan stressed that she
should import more petroleum, tin, bauxite, industrial
(26)
salt and crude rubber from the Indies.
(c) Japan realized that when America, Great 
Britain and the Netherlands imposed trade embargoes 
against her, she must secure raw materials from the 
Southern region, particularly from the Netherlands Indies. 
Japan estimated in 1941 that she could import the 
following raw materials each month from the Southern 
region after military occupation. The estimates are
given in tons.
Ci) Nickel ore 6,000
Cii) Tin 12,000
Ciii) Bauxite 17,000
Civ) Crude Rubber 17,000
Cv) Cassava root, honey 15,000
tvi) Copra, palm oil 13,000
Cvii) Sisal 3,000
(viii) Maize 20,000
tix) Industrial salt 7,000
(x) Sugar 20,000
When the Southern military operations commenced, 
petroleum was to be obtained from the occupied' territories 
as follows;
Petroleum; in litres.
Borneo (the Navy)
Cthe Army) 
Sumatra (.Southern Part) 
(.Northern Part)
Total
1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year
200.000 600,000 1,500,000
100.000 400,000 1,000,000
  750,000 1,400,000
  250,000 600,000
300,000 2,000,000 4,500,000
Petroleum benzine Cunit: litre)
1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year
The Netherlands Indies 140,000 290,000
Japan argued that she must import the above 
raw materials from the Southern region if she was
Cd) The Cabinet Planning Board realized on 
2nd August, 1940, that war against America and 
Great Britain, or even economic blockade by the 
West, would be fatal to Japan. With this in mind 
the problem of raw material supplies was seriously 
considered by the Government. In August 1940, a 
series of emergency plans were enacted by the Cabinet 
Planning Board under the Armyfs instructions. Japan 
feared that her Resources Mobilization Plan would be 
thwarted if the supply of raw materials was halted.
The Southern region was regarded by Japan in this 
period as the most important supplier of raw materials. 
This is made clear by reference to Tables 12 and 13. 
These two Tables indicate that the resources of the 
Southern region were closely investigated by both 
the Government and by civilian institutions. The 
possible volume of exports of selected raw materials 
to Japan was estimated. The Netherlands Indies 
and British Malaya were to be the most important 
raw material suppliers in Southeast Asia for Japan.
(21)to continue the war.
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Imports of petroleum from the Indies were to be
4.- i n - 1  (28)particularly crucial.
On 6th September, 19 41, an Imperial Conference 
was held in Tokyo. Japan was by now certain that
war against the U.S.A, Great Britain and the
Netherlands was inevitable. However, the conference 
participants expressed a desire to avoid a prolonged 
war, as they knew that Japan had limited resources.
In particular the Director of the Planning Board, 
Suzuki, argued that as a result of the economic 
blockade imposed by the U.S.A. and Great Britain, 
Japan's national power was declining day by day. 
However, if important areas in the South were to fall 
into Japan's hands, then within three or four months, 
Japan could obtain oil, bauxite, nickel, crude rubber 
and tin. Within two years Japan would be able to 
exploit these sources to the full/29^
In December 19 41, the Cabinet Planning Board 
declared that supplies of rice must be obtained from 
French Indo-China and Thailand,oil from the Netherlands 
Indies, iron ore from French Indo-China, nickel 
from the occupied territories in the South and crude 
rubber from Thailand and French Indo - China. The 
Board further argued that "unless the amount of crude 
rubber procured from French Indo-China and Thailand 
is increased, or a supply of over 20,000 tons 
(.crude rubber) is secured from the Netherlands 
Indies, the shortage will have a great effect upon 
domestic industry and especially upon the progress 
of military preparations". With regard to tin, it 
argued that "unless a supply of about 10,000 tons 
annually is procured from Thailand and French Indo- 
China, not only would it be inpossible to meet 
national requirements, but even peacetime military 
preparations would come to a standstill. After two
years of war, present stock piles would be completely 
depleted". With regard to copper, "supplies on 
hand will soon be cut in half if the present trend 
continues. Thus, it will be necessary to develop 
sources in the Philippines for supplies of copper". 
With regard to lead, " if the present situation 
continues, the supply will be halved. If more lead 
can be obtained from Burma, the supply will be
sufficient". Cobalt, must be procured from the
(30)
Netherlands Indies.
59.
Notes on Section One
One typical example of this group is the 
influential economist Ichiro Nakayama who argues 
that "theoretically, the only way forward for the 
Japanese economy is to seek the expansion of foreign 
trade". "The problem of the domestic economy, to 
be more precise, the problem of overpopulation, can 
only be solved by foreign trade. In other words, 
the domestic problem can only be solved as a problem 
of the world". - Ichiro Nakayama, Nihon Keizai 
no Kao (The Face of the Japanese Economy), Nihon 
Hyoron-sha, 195 3, P.122.
Another influential Japanese economist argues 
that "....the reason why we consider trade as 
essential is because the industrial production and 
national income of Japan expand together with trade" .—  
Keinosuke Baba, Nihon no Boeki (The Trade of Japan), 
from, Nihon no Keizai (Japan*s Economic Position) by 
Yuzo Morita and others, illustrated with graphs 
and tables, 19 53, P.114.
^  For instance, Tsilsho-Hakusyo argues that 
".... tif Japan) does not depend on trade, domestic 
production and employment will be reduced and its 
economic circle will become extremely small, 
eventually, national life cannot even be maintained 
at a reasonable level." - Tsusho Hakusyo ( A Commercial 
White Paper), 1949, P.7.
(3) See ZZZGJTJ, P.372.
(4) Kyung-Mo Huh, Japan*s Trade in Asia,
N.Y., 1966, P.6 .
(5)
Jerome B, Cohen, Japan*s Economy in War 
and Reconstruction, 19 49, N.Y, , P.114, " To
produce her special steels Japan had to import
nickel from Britain, Canada, the Celebes, New Caledonia, 
etc., tungsten from China, South America and Thailand, 
cobalt from Burma, molybdenum and vanadium from the 
United States and Peru, chromium from the Philippines 
and manganese from India", - Ibid., P.114.
^  Toitsu Nawa, Nihon ni Okeru Genryo Mondai 
to Gaikoku Boeki (Raw Material Problems and Foreign 
Trade in Japan) in Nihon no Sangyo Kakumei (The Industrial 
Revolution of Japan) by Rekishi Kagaku Kyogikai, 19 77, P.228.
^  See also Jerome B.Cohen, op. cit., PP.115-116.
^  Chinese ore had a 60% iron content, whereas 
Korean ore even at its best reached only 5 4%; Malayan 
and Philippines ore both had an iron content of 60%*—
Ibid.,P.117.
^  Toitsu Nawa, op. cit., P.228.
(10) Ibid., P.230.
In Japan, the productivity of a coal miner 
was, at best, only 75% of that of an English miner. In 
1929 , production per miner in the U.K. in a bituminous 
mine was 949.7 tons annually, whereas in Japan it was 
only 106 tons annually. —  Ibid., P.231.
(12)' As Professor Cohen argues " the coal mines
of Kyushu were the oldest and had been worked for centuries.
The seams were thin and sharply inclined and many of
the mines were deep and necessitated continuous pumping.
Due to the depth and the poor ventilation, temperatures
in the mines were very high. Safety standards and 
measures were primitive by American comparison. The 
newer mines of Hokkaido were better engineered but 
had great gas hazards and the very low winter temperatures
imposed a serious seasonal handicap. " —  Jerome B. Cohen, 
op. cit., PP. 161-162.
1^3 ^ See Ibid., P. 170, Table 25
(14) Ibid, PP. 133-134.
(15) Kyung-mo Huh, op. cit., P.8 .
For an introduction to the debate over 
theoretical analyses of Japan's social, political 
and economic structure, see Hirotake Koyama,
Nihon Shihon Shugi Ronso-shi (A History of the Controversies 
Centred Around Japanese Capitalism, vols. I & II),
1953, in particular "the controversies on market 
theory" in vol. II, chapter 4, section 3.
See Ryosei Kobayashi, Kotsu Kikan no 
Hattatsu to Naigai Shizyo no Keisei = Tenkai (The 
Development of Traffic Facilities and the Formation =
Progress of Domestic and Foreign Markets) in 
Nihon Shihonshugi Hattatsu-shi Koza (Studies on 
Developmental History of Japanese Capitalism) and 
later in Nihon Sangyo no Kosei (The Constitution 
of Japanese Industries).
See Moritaro Yamada, Nihon Shihonshugi 
Bunseki (An Analysis of Japanese Capitalism), 1934 
and Masaharu Yoshimura, Nihon Boeki-Ron (Japan's 
Foreign Trade), 1948. Yoshimura also considered 
Japan's small domestic market a result of low 
public consumption in his later work, Nihon Boeki 
Seisaku (The Trade Policy of Japan), 1956.
(19) - - -See Toitsu Nawa, Nihon Bosekigyo to
Genmen Mondai Kenkyu (The Japanese Textile Industry 
and the Problem of Raw Cotton), 1937 and Nihon
Shihon Shugi to Boeki Mondai (Japanese Capitalism 
and the Problem of Trade), 1946 and 1948. For 
further discussion of the "Dispute on Japanese 
Capitalism", see Fukuzyu Unno, Boeki (Foreign 
Trade) in Toshio Furushima and Yoshio Ando ed., 
Ryutsu-shi (A Circulating History), 1975;
Ziro Hanazima, Boeki (Foreign Trade) in Hiromi 
Arisawa etc., ed., Nihon Shihon Shugi Kenkyu 
Nyumon (A Study of Japanese Capitalism), 1957;
Tomoichi Mizunuma, Gaikoku Boeki no Hatten to 
Shihon no Yushutsu (The Development of Foreign 
Trade and Export of Capital) in Mitsuhaya Kazinishi, 
ed., Nihon Keizaishi Taikei 6 , Kindai 2 (An Outline 
of Japanese Economic History 6 , Modern 2).
See K. Matsui, A Trade History of Modern 
Japan, 1959, PP. 8-9 and M. Yamada, Nihon Shihonshugi 
Bunseki (An Analysis on Japanese Capitalism), 1934,
P.24.
(21) See also Kiyoshi Kojima, op. cit. , PP. 9 
and 13. Professor Miyohei Shinohara also argued 
that at the beginning of the 1930s, due to extremely 
low wages in Japan and the depreciation of the Yen, 
Japan's cotton industry held sway over the world.—  
Miyohei Shinohara, Nihon Keizai no Seicho to 
Zunkan (Growth and Cycle of Japanese Economy),
Tokyo, 1961, PP. 297-
(2 2 )According to Langer and Gleason, a rupture 
of the economic relationship between Japan and 
America might well have been disastrous for the 
Japanese. —  See W.L. Langer & S.E. Gleason,
The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940, 1952, P.148.
(23) - - - -
See Nanpo Senryo-chi Gyosei Zisshi Yoko
(The Essentials of Policy Regarding the Administration
of the Occupied Areas in the Southern Region), 
in NKSG, Supplementary Document, P. 587;
Nobutaka Ike, op. cit., P. 252.
2^4 ^ NKSG, P. 587; Nobutaka Ike, op. cit.,
P. 252.
(25) -See Teikoku Hitsuyo Shigen no Kaigai
Toku-ni Nanpo Syochi-iki ni Okeru Kakuho Hosaku 
(A Policy of Ensuring the Necessary Resources 
of the Empire from Overseas, particularly from 
the Southern Region) in GSS, vol. 43, (-)
Economics, PP. 172-176.
/or \ — | _
See Nanpo Shisaku Yoko, An (An Outline 
of Southern Policy, A Draft) in Ibid, PP. XlVii-1.
This Outline was enacted by the Cabinet Planning 
Board on 23 July 1940. It was the first policy 
statement from the Board which dealt solely with 
the Southern region. This Outline greatly 
influenced a series of later documents enacted 
by the Government. This Outline was far more 
detailed than the earlier Southern policy enactment,
"A Policy of Ensuring the Necessary Resources of 
the Empire from Overseas, particularly from the 
Southern Region". However, the basic idea of 
expanding the Empire's "political and economic 
orbit" into the Southern region remained unchanged.
(27)
See T0 3 0  Naikaku no Kaisen Chokuzen 
Butteki Kokuryoku Handan (Estimate by the Tojo 
Cabinet of Japan's National Strength in Raw Materials 
at the Outbreak of the Greater East Asia War) in 
Ibid, PP. 133-155. This document is part of 
Kikusaburo Okada's article, Kaisenzen no Butteki 
Kokuryoku to Tai Bei-ei Senso Ketsui (Japan's 
National Strength in Raw Materials and Decision 
of war against America and Great Britain at the
Outbreak of the Greater East Asia War). Okada 
served in the Resources Bureau in 1935 and 
later participated in compiling the "Second 
National Mobilization Plan". He then became 
a member of the War Preparations Division of the 
Department of War and was later promoted to 
Chief of the Division. - Ibid., P. Xli.
(28) _ _
See Okyu Butsudo Keikaku Shi-an
(An Emergency Plan for Resource Mobilization)
(A Tentative Plan) in Ibid, PP. 535-563.
(29) See Nobutaka Ike, op. cit., P. 148.
See the "Estimate of Japanese National 
Strength at the Outbreak of the Greater East 
Asia War" in USSBS, vol. VII, Japan's Struggle 
to End the War (Pacific Report ^ 2), U.S.A., 
1976, PP. 14-16.
Section Two
Characteristics and Structure of Japanese Foreign 
Trade, 1914-41.
The aim of this Section is to examine the structure 
of Japanese foreign trade during the period 1914-41.
In doing this we will illustrate first that Japanese 
foreign trade had created an enormous trade deficit, 
second that this deficit derived from unfavourable trade 
with the Western countries and Southeast Asia which far 
outweighed favourable trade with China, and third we 
will detail the elements which comprised trade with the 
West. We will show that imports of raw cotton, machinery 
and other raw materials from the West (mainly from 
America) surpassed exports of raw silk from Japan to 
those countries.
This trade imbalance indicated that Japan was heavily 
dependent on the West. Consequently a series of efforts 
in the inter-war years to re-align trade became an 
important task of the Japanese Government.
Part 1, Brief Summary of Japanese Foreign Trade.
During the period 1914-41, Japan had a trade 
deficit except in the years 1915, 1935 and 1938-40. 
This is shown in Table 14.
Table 14 Balance of Japanese Foreign Trade
Period Thousand Yen
1 . 1914 — 4,635
2. 1915 r- 1918 + 1,408,048
3. 1919 - 1934 - 3,689,358
4. 1935 + 26,837
5. 1936 - 1937 - 678,465
6. 1938 - 1940 + 888,066
7. 1941 - 247,700
Total excess of imports 
for the years 1914-41 - 2,256,196
Sources: Computed from NBS. 1975.
Note: (a) Does not include exports to and imports from 
Korea and Taiwan. It does, however, include exports 
to and imports from the "Yen-bloc” (Manchuria, North 
China and Kwantung Leased Territory). Unless otherwise 
stated, this explanation is omitted from the following 
tables•
From this, it can be seen that over the period 
1914-41 as a whole, imports exceeded exports by 
2,256 million Yen.
(i) The period 1914-18.
Considering Japanese merchandise and invisible 
trade as a whole, the First World War years were the 
golden age of Japanese international trade. Between 
1914 and 1918, exports and imports of merchandise
from and to Japan increased 3.3 and 2,8 times respectively; 
her receipts and payments on invisible trade (current 
items only) increased 6.1 and 2.1 times respectively.
Japan changed from a debtor nation to a creditor nation 
with a total favourable current balance (merchandise 
trade and invisible trade) of 2,788 million Yen over 
the period 1914-18.
The outbreak of the First World War at first 
worsened the economic position of Japan. The interruption 
of foreign exchange markets and marine transportation 
forced Japan to cease trading with foreign countries.
Prices of exported commodities and stock quotations fell, 
those of imported commodities and war supplies rose.
The Japanese Government eventually promulgated a regulation 
of rice prices (Beika Chosetsu Rei) in January 1915 
and established the first Imperial Silk Company (Daiichiji 
Teikoku Sanshi Kabushiki-gaisha) in March the same year, 
in order to prevent the continued decline in rice and 
raw silk prices.
But exports increased tremendously after June 1915. 
Marine transportation also expanded. The Japanese economy 
developed at a remarkable speed. This was due to the 
following reasons. First, the European countries;and 
later America,were economically and politically distracted 
by the war and in particular were diverted from normal 
international trade. Japan not only benefitted from 
increased trade in Oriental markets which were thrown 
open to Japanese manufactured exports, but also found 
a large and urgent demand for Japanese goods and shipping 
services from the belligerent powers.
British exports to her Asian colonies declined 
sharply; after 1913 and remained low during the period 
1916-18. They recovered only from 1919^(see Table 15). 
This gave Japan an excellent opportunity of export her
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cotton manufactures to Asian markets and she built up 
a powerful trading position in these areas during 
this period.*2^
Japan’s exports, particularly of war supplies, 
to the belligerent powers were remarkable. Table 16 
shows Japan’s exports (mostly war supplies) to Russia, 
During the period 1913-18, exports to Russia increased 
4.4 times. Exports (mostly raw silk) to the United 
States also increased tremendously during this war 
period (See Table 17),
Table 17
Total Value of Imports of the United States
Total value of 
imports (A)
Total value of 
imports from Japan 
(B)
CD
N
1914 1,894 106 5.6
1915 1,674 108 6.5
1916 2,198 182 8.3
1917 2,659 253 9.5
1918 2,946 302 10.3
Source: K.Matsui, op, cit.. P.24
Invisible trade improved simultaneously with 
merchandise trade after 1915. During the period 1914- 
18, due largely to increases in freight receipts, 
government receipts, insurance, investments and services, 
the invisible trade balance was roughly 1,400 million Yen 
in favour of Japan.
Shipping rates and the costs of chartered vessels 
increased substantially. The Japanese shipbuilding 
industry developed significantly. These changes were 
due principally to the rising world demand for marine 
transportation and the loss of vessels by the Allied 
Powers due to the German submarine attacks.
Furthermore, the Japanese government introduced
(3)a series of acts which stimulated the rapid development 
of Japan’s domestic industries and her foreign tradei4^
(ii) The periods 1919-23 and 1924-28.
From May-June 1919 to March 1920, there was an 
economic boom in J a pan.^ The gold embargo in America 
from June 1919, increased exports of raw silk and silks 
to America, and increased exports of cotton goods to 
China, each temporarily stimulated the export trade of 
Japan. Domestically, the Hara Cabinet (Finance Minister 
Takahashi) followed an inflationary policy and increased 
the credit of the Bank of Japan which stimulated rises 
in commodity prices. Furthermore, the rationalisation 
and concentration of industrial enterprises were 
encouraged and increases in tariffs were introduced 
in order to protect domestic industries. The cumulative 
effect of these policies was to stimulate Japan’s 
export trade and strengthen her international 
competitive powerl6*
The post-war boom collapsed in Japan in March 1920. 
Japan suffered through a decline in exports, brought 
about by the return of the European powers (particularly 
Britain and Germany) to their pre-war markets and 
severe competition from the United States, and through 
a substantial increase in imports brought about by 
increased demand for machinery needed to improve Japanese 
competitiveness with respect to other industrialized 
countries.
There were further problems - a declining demand
for uiar supplies from the Allied Powers, a boycott 
movement against Japanese commodities in China, stagnation 
in the export of cotton goods to Asia due to the development 
of the Chinese and Indian spinning industries, immense 
increases in foodstuff imports due to the neglect of 
agricultural production, and increases in imports of 
construction materials following the disastrous Kanto 
Earthquakei7) All of these factors combined to worsen 
the international trade balance of Japan.
Prices of Japan’s important exports, cotton goods 
and raw silk, dropped markedly. Decreased total exports 
and increased total imports were the major features of 
Japanese trade during the period 1920-23. Also receipts 
from invisible trade fell (decreased receipts from 
freight and government earnings from abroad were the 
major reasons). Consequently there was a serious adverse 
total current balance of Japan’s merchandise and invisible 
trade.
After the Kanto Earthquake in 1923, the Government 
began to allow the Yen to fall and also raised tariffs.
The former was to stimulate exports and the latter was 
to restrict imports.
By the end of 1925, the Yen had depreciated by almost 
20^i8  ^The decline in exchange was accompanied by a striking 
rise in exports which totalled 2,305 million Yen in 1925, 
a level which was not to be reached again until 1935.
Imports were practically stationary, and consequently, 
the trade deficit disappeared.
In addition in 1925 the Kato Walca.tSU.Kl Cabinet 
(Finance Minister Hamaguchi) enacted the Important 
Export Industries Association Bill and the Export 
Association Act and thoroughly amended the Fixed Tariff 
Act the following year in order to restrain imports and 
encourage exports.
Nevertheless, due to the sharp rise in the exchange 
rate in 1926, exports of raw silk and silks from Japan 
to America declined after the end of 1926. Exports to 
China also declined sharply due to the anti-Japanese 
movement and a heavy fall in the silver exchange in 
China. An unfavourable balance of trade for Japan 
appeared again in 1926.
A bank panic occurred in 1927 and foreign trade 
suffered severely by the wide fluctuations in the 
exchange rate. The total value of Japan’s foreign 
trade was maintained during the years 1926-28 at an 
average level of 4,200 million Yen; but both exports 
and imports had declined as compared to the year 1925.
(iii) The period 1929-31.
The World depression began to bite after the 
Wall Street Crash in October 1929. Japan suffered 
particularly seriously after April 1930. The Hamaguchi 
Cabinet (Finance Minister Inoue) was formed in July 
1929. It decided that greater exchange stability and 
prestige should be sought through a return to the gold 
standard at the old parity. It prepared to undertake 
whatever measures of retrenchment were necessary to 
secure this end. Accordingly, government expenditure 
was cut, the national debt was consolidated, a more 
active exchange policy was introduced, and industry was 
encouraged to cut costs through rationalization. As 
a result of these measures, foreign exchange holdings 
increased from about 83 million Yen in July 1929 to 300 
million Yen at the end of the following November. The 
exchange rate and exports rose and the international 
balance was slightly improved.
Japan’s import surplus decreased significantly 
during the period 1929-30. Indeed import surplus 
in 1929 was the smallest since 1919. Moreover Japan’s 
total current balance of merchandise and invisible 
trade came into surplus for the first time since 1920.
Receipts from investments and services and freight 
always contributed greatly to the balance of Japanese 
invisible trade during the 1920!s.
However, during this post-war decade, imports always 
exceeded exports in Japanese merchandise trade. When 
finance minister Inoue lifted the gold embargo in January 
1 9 3 0 ^  raw silk prices and stocks had already started 
to fall. There was a major outflow of gold and foreign 
exchange reserves.. By August 1930, the reserves of 
the Bank of Japan were only 860 million Yen, the lowest 
since 1919. During the period from the lifting of the 
gold embargo in January 1930 and its reapplication in 
December 1931, more than 708 million Yen of reserves 
were lost.
England, a major world financial centre, abandoned 
the gold standard in September 1931. The gold standard 
c o l l a p s e d T h r o u g h  the Yokohama Specie Bank the 
Japanese government bought foreign exchange and tried 
to limit buying of dollars with Yen. But all attempts 
to stem the outflow of exchange failed.
Meanwhile, there was agricultural panic in Japan 
as the prices of raw silk and rice fell precipitously.
Raw silk exports to America had decreased tremendously 
so causing a sudden dramatic drop in pricesii:Lfeoth 
exports and imports of merchandise decreased substantially 
in 1931, and the balance of invisible trade was reduced 
from 187 million Yen in 1929 to only 83 million Yen 
in 1931. An adverse balance of payments of 5 million 
Yen re-emerged in 1931. Receipts from abrodd - from 
marine freight, insurance and government investments - 
decreased sharply. This was the most conspicuous 
feature of Japanese invisible trade during the world 
economic crisis.^2)
75.
(iv) The period 1932-36*
As soon as Inukai came to power in December 1931, 
the gold embargo was reapplied. In 1932 the Japanese 
exchange rate dropped precipitously (20%) against the 
U.S. dollar. This gave fresh impetus to the growth 
and diversification of Japanese industry and foreign trade. 
Japan actually increased the value of its trade after 
the abandonment of the gold standard, while international 
trade as a whole was comparatively stagnant.<13)
However, in 1933 America too abandoned the gold 
standard and depreciated the dollar exchange by buying 
gold. The Japanese Yen rose rapidly against the Dollar 
from March 1933 forcing the Japanese government to 
re-align the Yen with sterling after November the 
same year. Until 1939 the exchange rate was 1 Yen to 
1 Shilling and 2 Pence. This realignment was due to 
the fact that the British currency was more stable than 
the U.S. dollar. Moreover Japanese exports to America 
had diminished due to the immense falls in raw silk 
exports. In contrast Japanese exports to the British 
Empire increased due to substantial increases in the 
export of cotton goods.
Both Japanese exports and imports increased from 
1932 to 1937. But the rapid increase of exports did 
not reverse the unfavourable trade balance, except 
in 1935 when Japan had a surplus of 26 million Yen 
in her merchandise trade. On the contrary, the fall 
in the exchange led to a rise in the prices of indispen­
sable imported raw materials and machinery, and so 
reinforced the deterioration of the trade balance.^14)
In order to prevent capital flight, exchange speculation 
and a sharp decline in the yen relative to the dollar, 
the Saito Cabinet (Finance Minister Takahashi) promulgated 
the Capital Flight Prevention Act in June 1932 and the
Foreign Exchange Control Act in March 1933. Consequently 
the exchange rate was maintained at 28-29 per 100 Yen 
for the period 1934-38 (See Table 18).
Table 18.
Exchanoe Rate Toward American Dollars (Per 100 Yen)
Highest Lowest Average
1928 48- 44 J 46^
1929 49- 43f 46.070
1930 49§ 49- 49.367
1931 49| 344 48.871
1932 3?i 19? 28.120
1933 314 20i 25.227
1934 30f 2Qi 29.511
1935 294 27£ 28.570
1936 29± 28i 28.951
1937 294 28i 28.813
1938 294 27- 28.496
Source: MIHSKT, P.320
Exports almost doubled from 1,410 million Yen in 
1932 to 2,693 million Yen in 1936. But imports increased 
even more substantially from 1,431 million Yen to 2,764 
million Yen during the same period. This total adverse 
balance (230 million Yen) during the period 1932-36 
was, as in previous years, covered by invisible trade 
earnings. Receipts of investments and services, and 
freight contributed greatly to the invisible trade 
surplus.
Substantial increases in government payments to 
abroad during this period, were particularly important. 
Through the Bank of Japan, in June 1932 the Japanese 
Government issued bonds amounting to 500 million Yen 
to meet the expenses of the Manchurian Incident. 
Furthermore, the Government decided in October 1932 
to issue another bond amounting to 900 million Yen.
Therefore* it is clear that government expenditure from 
the beginning of the 1930fs was enormous.
In addition, investments in and exports to Manchuria 
increased substantially in the 1930*s. These, of course, 
contributed little to the acquisition of foreign currency. 
This was particularly important during the period 1937-41. 
Exports to the Yen-bloc (especially to Manchuria and 
North China) did little to improve the Japanese trade 
balance. The Manchurian currency (Yen) was linked to 
the Japanese Yen in November 1935. The North China 
administration issued notes, through Chugoku Rengo 
Junbi Ginko (the Chinese Incorporated Bank) from March 
1938. These notes were linked to the Japanese Yen.
Japanese military scrips were used in Central and South 
China during the period of the Japanese occupation 
and most private and government transactions were settled 
in the Japanese currency. By 1938, Kwantung Province, 
Manchuria and China were formed into a Yen-bloc and 
their local currencies, were each linked to the Japanese 
Yen. In short, trade with the Yen-bloc was not settled 
in foreign currencies.
Investments in Manchuria in this period increased 
rapidly due largely to railway development and heavy 
industrial construction under the Five-Year Plans of the 
Manchurian Industrial Development policy. (See Table 19). 
Undoubtedly, investments in Manchuria greatly increased 
the Japanese government’s payments overseas.
Exports to Manchuria consisted largely of capital 
goods - building materials and machinery - and only a 
small portion consisted of consumer goods. Exports of 
capital goods to Manchuria were by no means a capital 
investment and because of the economic backwardness of 
Manchuria, Japanese investments there were not particularly 
productive. Furthermore, the immense increase in Japanese
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exports to Manchuria imposed a great strain on the 
Japanese trade balance during the period 1932&41.
Eventually the Japanese government was forced to 
restrict exports to Manchuria and to attempt to expand 
trade with the non-Yen bloc.^15^
(v) The period 1937-»41.
The expansion of exports was pursued by the Government 
during the period 1932-36. But imports were favoured 
during the period 1937-41, for imports from the Yen-bloc 
did not require foreign currency. The reason for expanding 
exports was to acquirs foreign exchange, and so be able 
to import raw materials for the Japanese processing 
industries and thus, in turn, stimulate the export trade. 
Japan suffered shortages of foreign currency particularly 
in the years 1937-41, as her invisible trade in 1937 
showed an adverse balance for the first time since 1915.
This adverse balance on invisibles created an enormous 
overall deficit.
The China Incident expanded the government's 
expenditure greatly. Furthermore, investments in 
China imposed a heavy burden on the Japanese Government.
In 1938 Japanese capital investment, amounting to 1,709 
million Yen, was concentrated in the spinning industry, 
banks, commerce, transport and communications (See Table 20). 
In addition, loans extended by Japan to China's civilian 
industries, central government and local government, 
amounted to 129.1 million Yen 867.1 million Yen and 
24.8 Million Yen respectively in 1938. Total Japanese 
investment in 1938 amounted to 2773.6 million Yen 
(including 43.2 million Yen under "others”). This 
was greater than the investment in 1936 by 787.4 million 
Yen.^16)
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Therefore, acquisition of foreign currency became 
a "supreme order" of the Japanese Government during this 
period. Exports to the Yen-bloc were restricted whilst 
exports to non-Yen areas were encouraged. But exports 
to the Yen-bloc could not be effectively restricted 
due partly to Japanese military involvement in those 
areas and partly to rises in commodity prices which 
attracted^Japanese exports in the Yen bloc. Exports 
to outside the Yen-bloc, contrary to expectations, 
decreased substantially. This was principally the result 
of import restriction imposed by the British Empire 
and the boycotts of Japanese goods in Southeast Asia.
Domestically, the shortage of raw materials 
limited Japan’s export trade. The use of limited 
foreign currency reserves to import raw materials for 
the exporting industries, and the export of commodities 
to outside the Yen-bloc were the most urgent requirements 
of the Japanese Government. The task of the Konoe 
Cabinet was to give preference to the import of raw 
materials and commodities which were indispensable to 
strategic industries and to the war effort.
The Cabinet was also determined to expand exports 
in order to secure essential foreign currency. Many 
Acts were promulgated and later abandoned in 1937 and 
in 1938 due to failurei17  ^All these Acts attempted to 
restrict exports to the Yen-bloc, to reverse the adverse 
trade balance and to strengthen the war economy.
By controlling commodity prices in Japan in 1939, 
the quantity of exports to the Yen-bloc was restrained 
under the Export Adjustment Act. Japan adjusted commodity 
prices between Japan and the Yen-bloc in accordance 
with the Trade Adjustment Act of September 1940 in order 
to restrict the flow of Japanese commodities to the 
colonies. This series of restrictions caused a general 
shortage of commodities in the Yen-bloc and therefore
increased commodity prices enormously.
In July 1941 America, England and the Netherlands 
East Indies froze Japanese assets abroad in order to 
apply pressure against Japanese expansion in Asiai18^
Japan’s foreign trade was essentially restricted to 
the Yen-bloc. Trade outside the Yen-bloc stopped 
almost completely.
Conclusion: During the period 1914-41, Japan’s 
trade deficit was striking but up to 1937 was offset 
by an invisible surplus. However, the China Incident 
jeopardised Japan’s invisible trade and created an 
adverse balance on both visible and invisible account 
of 3,923 million Yen during the period 1937-41. Clearly, 
during the period 1914-41, the total adverse balance of 
merchandise and invisible trade, i.e. 1,571 million 
Yen, was not fully offset by the export of gold. There 
was substantial foreign investment in Japan through the 
foreign purchase of government securities, domestic 
bonds, local government securities and corporate bonds. 
Total foreign investment in Japan during the period 
1914-41 was 52,995 million Yen and about three quarters 
of this comprised central government securities. (See 
Table 21). If local government securities are included 
the figure rises to more than 83% of total foreign 
investment in Japan in the period 1914-41.
Naturally, only a part of the receipts of foreign 
investment in Japan was used to cover Japan’s international 
payments deficit. The major part was used by Japan 
herself for further foreign investment and loans to 
third markets, particularly to Manchuria and North China^19)
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Part 2 . The Geographical Distribution of Japanese 
Foreign Trade.
Japan was the only major industrial country in 
Asia, yet it largely lacked vital natural resources and 
raw materials. This compelled Japan to import large 
quantities of raw materials for her export industries 
and to exploit foreign markets for her manufactures.
Japanfs trade was widely distributed throughout 
Asia, America, and Europe, but was predominantly 
concentrated in Asia and the U.S.A. The U.S.A was 
the most important single national source of imports 
and market for Japan. However, if we consider a whole 
region, Asia surpassed North America throughout most of 
the period under consideration. Furthermore, if we 
consider the factors of geographical position and the 
political, later military, influence of Japan in Asia, 
then markets and sources of supply in this area were 
decisively more important to Japan. Japanese foreign 
trade with Asia was particularly important during the 
years of the First World War, of the World economic 
crisis in 1929-31 and of the China Incident in 1937.
China was the most important single national 
source of imports and market for Japan in Asia. India 
and the Netherlands East Indies were the two most important 
areas after China. In general, during the inter-war 
period, Japan*s merchandise trade with India was either 
stagnant or declined while that with Southeast Asia was 
either stationary or increased. Trade with Southeast 
Asia became particularly important to Japanfs economy 
from the time of the Manchurian Incident in 1931.
Imports from European countries to Japan were generally 
greater than exports during the period 1914-41. Trade 
with Europe had been very important before the First 
World War and particularly during the early stages of
Japan’s economic modernization. But trade with Europe 
diminished substantially during the inter-war period.
Despite severe trade disruption during the period of 
the First World War, exports to and imports from Europe 
amounted to 1Q% and 11%> of total Japanese exports and 
imports. During the 1920fs the former declined to less 
than 8% while the latter increased to more than 17%,
However, during the 1930fs both exports to and imports 
from European countries were lower than they had been 
in the previous decade.
Trade with South America, Africa and Oceania was 
on a much smaller scale than that with Asia, the U.S.A. 
and Europe in the earlier part of the inter-war period. 
Nevertheless, the former areas were potential markets 
and sources of raw materials and although trade with 
them was stagnant in the 1920’s in the 1920*s it developed 
to an unprecedented levtel and even surpassed that with 
Europe.
(i) The period 1914-18.
During this period, while the countries of Europe 
were involved in war, political crises and economic 
upheavals, Japan’s exports to them were maintained at 
18% of her total exports valued20) This was due to the 
need for war supplies and consumer goods on the part of 
the belligerent powers. But in contrast, imports from 
Europe decreased substantially due to the destruction 
of production facilities and an inadequate supply of 
shipping. Trade between European countries and their 
colonies in Asia was also severely interrupted by the 
war. This gave Japan a considerable opportunity to 
export cotton and miscellaneous goods to other Asian 
countries, and to import industrial raw materials in return.
Both exports to and imports from Asia accounted fcnr 
approximately 50% of Japan’s total merchandise trade 
during this period. Southeast Asia and India contributed
greatly to this increased trade for Japan.
As America was not involved in the War until 1917, 
exports of raw silk and silW to the U.S.A and imports 
in return of cotton, machinery and iron and steel, 
increased strikingly. America replaced India as Japan’s 
source of raw cotton and Europe in exports of machinery 
and steel to Japan. This caused major increases in 
exports from America to Japan during this period. The 
pattern of foreign trade between America and Japan 
changed from pre-war American exports of cotton and petrol 
to Japan and Japanese exports of raw silk and tea to 
America, to post-war American exports of cotton, steel 
and machinery to Japan and Japanese exports of raw silk 
and silks to America^.22) Exports to and imports from 
America increased nearly 2 and 5.5 times during the war 
period.
For the whole of her trade, however, Japan had an 
excess of exports over imports during the First World 
War period.
(ii) The periods 1919-23 and 1924-28.
In 1919-23 a clear trade deficit emerged. During 
the Syowa period, the depression of 1924-28, the size 
of the trade deficit with respect to Asia and Europe 
grew. However, Japan’s trade surplus with the U.S.A. 
saved her from a major balance of payments crisis.
Japan’s total exports to Asia diminished from around 
950 million Yen in 1918-20 to only 620 million Yen 
in 1921. This situation was not reversed until 1925 
when exports to Asia rose to 1,004 million Yen.*23^
However, they dropped again from 1926 to 1929l24^Imports 
from Asia dropped from 1,075 million Yen in 1919 to 
943 million Yen in 1920. They were stagnant from 1920 
to 1924. However from that point imports from Asia 
increased and amounted to 1,215 million Yen in 1925.
This represented 47% of Japan’s total imports in that 
year. In 1926-28, imports from Asia again fell.^25^
Both exports to and imports from Southeast Asia 
during the period 1919-28 increased compared with the 
First World War years. Exports to Southeast Asia increased 
from 69 million Yen in 1914-18 to 149 million Yen in 
1924-28. Imports from this region increased from 
70 million Yen to 205 million Yen during the same 
period. This implied that although the Western countries 
re-emerged commercially in Southeast Asia after the war, 
Japan still maintained and expanded her foreign trade 
with the region in the 1920’s building on the trade 
which she had created during the First World War years.
Both exports to and imports from China and India 
increased in the years 1919-23 and 1924-28. However, 
imports from these two countries,as a proportion of 
total Japanese imports decreased during these periods.
Exports to the U .S .A. increased both absolutely 
and relatively in the years 1919-23 and 1924-28 compared 
to the First World War period. However, exports to 
Europe decreased substantially during the same years. 
Japan’s major export market shifted from Europe and was 
from 1919 concentrated on the U.S.A. Exports to the 
U.S.A., which were higher than exports to Asia, amounted 
to 43.6% of Japan’s total exports in 1924-28.
Imports from the U.S.A. increased from 280 million 
Yen in 1914-18 to 721 million Yen 1924-28. Imports 
from Europe increased from 102 million Yen in 1914-18 
to 447 million Yen in 1924-28. Imports from the U.S.A. 
and Europe combined amounted to 50% of Japan’s total 
imports in the years 1919-28. Imports from Asia 
accounted for 42% of total imports during the same 
period. Therefore it is clear that in the 1920’s
Japan’s dependence on Western imports was increased.
(iii) The period 1929-31.
Japan’s exports and imports fell markedly in this 
period. The former decreased from an annual average 
of 2,024 million Yen in 1924-28 to 1,588 million Yen 
in 1929-31. The latter decreased from 2,356 million 
Yen to 1,666 million Yen during the same period.*26^
Both exports to and imports from Asia, the U.S.A and 
Europe decreased in this period, compared to the period 
1924-28. However, Japan’s foreign trade remained 
predominantly concentrated in Asia and the U.S.A.
Exports to and imports from these two regions amounted 
to 85% and 72% of total exports and imports during this 
period.
Exports to Southeast Asia increased from 7.4% 
in 1924-28 to 8.4% in 1929-31. Imports from Southeast 
Asia fell from 8.7% to 7.7% during the same period.
The most important feature of trade during this 
period was that a collapse of U.S. demand led to a 
decline in raw silk prices. Silk exports to the U.S.A. 
dropped from an annual 713 million Yen in 1924-28 to 
499 million Yen in 1929-31. This seriously affected 
Japan’s trade surplus with the U.S.A.
(iv) The period 1932-36.
The Manchurian Incident (September 1931) and the 
abandonment of the gold standard (December 1931) gave 
a considerable impetus to Japan’s foreign trade. Exports 
increased from an annual average of 1,588 million Yen 
in 1929-31 to 2,127 million Yen in 1932-36, Imports 
increased from 1,666 million Yen to 2,173 million Yen 
during the same period. Exports to Asia increased
from 712 million Yen (45% of total exports) in 
1929-31, to 1,093 million Yen (51%) in 1932-36.
Exports to the U.S.A.decreased from 640 million Yen 
(40%) to 531 million Yen (25%) during the same period. 
The increase in exports to Asia was due principally 
to an immense increase in cotton goods and miscellaneous 
goods exports to Southeast Asia. The reduction in 
exports to U.S. was due principally to an abrupt 
decrease in raw silk exports!27  ^Exports to Southeast 
Asia increased from 134 million Yen (8$) in 1929-31 
to 255 million Yen (12%) in 1932-36. In short in the 
early 1930fs Southeast Asia was becoming increasingly 
important as a trading partner for Japan. Furthermore 
apart from exports of cotton goods and miscellaneous 
goods, Japanese exports of rayon manufactures, textile 
goods, vehicles and iron goods began to enter Southeast 
Asian markets. (28)
Exports to the U.S.A. were less than half of 
exports to Asia, by value, in 1932-36. This implied 
that after the Manchuria Incident Japan’s export trade 
was predominantly concentrated in Asia despite the fact 
the Japan lost markets in Central and South China as a 
result of the boycott movements against Japanese 
manufacturers during this period.
Imports from the U.S.A increased substantially 
from 531 million Yen (32%) in 1929-31 to 771 million 
Yen (36%) in 1932-36. This was principally due to 
large imports of raw cotton^^and then munitions and 
heavy industrial goods. The last two items were also 
imported in large quantities from Europe. Imports from 
Asia rose in absolute terms from 662 million Yen (40%) 
to 771 million Yen (36%) during the same period. The 
decline in relative terms was due largely to a fall 
in imports from China.
(v) The period 1937-41
Exports to Asia increased from 1,093 million Yen 
(51%) in 1932-36 to 2,056 million Yen (65%) in 1937-41. 
Among these, exports to China (Manchuria and the North 
China Bloc) increased abruptly from 525 million Yen 
(24%) to 1,474 million Yen (47%) during the same 
period. This was in spite of Japanese Government 
restrictions placed on manufactured exports to China.
During this period exports to Southeast Asia 
and India diminished as a proportion of Japan’s total 
exports. This was due largely to the measures taken 
by local governments in this area to restrict imports 
of Japanese goods. Exports to the U.S.A and to Europe 
also diminished substantially during this period. 
Obviously war in Europe from September 1939 and tensions 
between Japan and the West contributed to this decline. 
Moreover as Japan was increasingly involved in war after 
the China Incident in 1937 and as domestic production 
increasingly served the military effort, there was a 
further decrease in the export trade.
In contrast imports from Asia increased from 
771 million Yen (36%) in 1932-36 to 1,339 million Yen 
(43%) in 1937-41. This was due to large increases in 
imports from China and Southeast Asia. These two areas 
accounted for 21% and 12% of Japan's total imports in 
this period. This indicated that during the later 193Q*s 
Japan acquired an increasing supply of raw materials 
from Asia to ensure her war preparations at a time when 
supplies from the West were increasingly threatened, 
particularly by acts on the part of the U.S.A.
Among the Western countries, the U.S.A. was 
particularly anxious not to provoke Japan into moving 
into Southeast Asia. Therefore it was not until July 
1941, when the U.S.A., together with England and the
Netherlands, seeing that war against Japan was inevitable, 
froze Japanese assets. Later Western trade with Japan 
was suspended. Prior to this, imports from the U.S.A. 
and Europe amounted to nearly 50% of Japan’s total imports 
This was in the period 1937-40. This volume of imports 
created an enormous trade deficit with Europe and with 
the U.S.A. The trade deficit with the U.S.A. increased 
from 1*200 million Yen in 1932-36 to 2,693 million Yen 
in 1937-41. This was due principally to increased 
imports of cotton, iron, machinery and engines.
Conclusion: Japan’s visible trade balance with 
each country is summarized in Table 22 on an annual 
basis and in Table 23 on a period basis.
It appears, from Table 23, that merchandise 
trade with Southeast Asia, America and Europe was unfavour 
able to Japan in the period 1914-41. Large imports of 
heavy industrial manufactures and raw cotton from the 
West and exports of raw silk in return created total 
adverse balances of 2,407 million Yen with respect to 
the U.S.A. and 3*177 million Yen with respect to Europe 
during period 1914-41. With regard to Asia, exports of 
machinery, cotton cloth and miscellaneous commodities 
to, and imports of foodstuffs and raw materials from 
this area, created a balance of 4,800 million Yen in 
Japan’s favour over the period 1914-41. Particularly 
after 1937 trade with China was in Japan’s favour 
(producing a trade surplus of 7,625 million Yen over 
the years 1914-41). But as noted earlier this trade 
with the Yen-bloc brought in little foreign currency 
after the Manchurian Incident!30) However, by 1941 part 
of the trade surplus with China was offset by an adverse 
balance with Southeast Asia (of 482 million Yen) and 
with other Asian countries. Japan's trade surplus with 
Asia as a whole exceeded her adverse trade balance with 
America and Europe over the period 1914-41.
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Part 3, Changes in the Commodity Composition of 
Japanese Foreign Trade.
In general, during the inter-war period, raw silk 
was exported to the U.S.A and Europe in return for 
raw cotton, machinery and engines, iron and crude oil.
Cotton goods, miscellaneous commodities and later 
machinery were exported to Asia in exchange for industrial 
raw materials and foodstuffs.
(i) The period 1914-18.
(a) Exports and imports by category:
As we can see from Table 24, during the period 
1914-18, Japan’s export trade comprised 80% semi-finished 
and finished manufactures, while over 50% of her import 
trade was composed of raw materials and imports of 
foodstuffs fluctuated between 4% and 13%.
Relative to total exports finished manufactures 
increased whilst exports of both semi-finished manufactures 
and raw materials decreased during this period. The 
most conspicuous feature of the period 1914-18 was that 
exports of finished manufactures were replacing exports 
of semi-finished manufactures. By 1918 finished manufactures 
contributed 43.5% of Japan’s total exports and were 
Japan’s greatest export earner.
As a whole imports of raw materials and 
semi-finished manufactures increased more rapidly than 
imports of finished manufactures during this period.
(b) Exports a n d  imports by commodities.
(1) Exports: Commodities shown in Table 25 comprised 
around 50% of Japan’s total merchandise exports. Of
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these a single commodity, raw silk, comprised more than 
20%* Raw silk was exported mainly to the U.S.A.
The U.S.A. absorbed more than 80% of Japan’s total 
raw silk exports in 1914-18 (See Table 26). Furthermore, 
raw silk exports for the American market increased 
substantially after 1916. This was due to the war boom 
in America.
Exports of two further commodities, cotton yarn 
and cotton tissues, were concentrated predominantly 
in Asian markets. Tables 27 and 28 show that China 
was the largest market for Japan’s exports of cotton 
yarn and cotton tissues. The sudden change in the 1918 
figures for China and India was due, partly to the rapid 
development of the Chinese spinning industry and partly 
to the fact that China levied customs duty on imported 
manufactures in 1 9 1 8 Japanese cotton manufactures 
found a large market in India after the contraction 
of imports from Britain into India. Moreover due 
to a shortage of European goods during this war period, 
Southeast Asia increasingly consumed Japanese cotton goods. 
During this period, Japan captured a large part of the 
cotton goods market in the Far East at the expense of 
Great Britaini32^
(2) Imports: Japan’s principal imports in 1914-18 
were raw cotton, iron, wool, oil cake, machinery and 
engines, sugar, rice and mineral oil (See Table 29).
Of these, imports of raw cotton were the most important. 
Although they declined substantially as a percentage of 
total imports they increased considerably in value.
Raw cotton constituted more than 30% of Japan’s total 
imports throughout the period 1914-18.
Imports of iron, wool and oil cake were also 
essential. In particular, imports of iron increased 
after 1916 and constituted about 20% of Japan’s total
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imports in 1917 and 1918. This reflected the rapid 
development of the Japanese industrial sector, particularly 
of the shipping industry.
Tables 30, 31 and 32 show cotton, wool and oil 
cake imports by country of origin.^33  ^ These commodities 
were predominantly imported from Asia (China, Kwantung 
and British possessions). However, imports of cotton 
from America increased sharply in this period and were 
almost equal to those from India in 1918, 40/£ of imported
cotton came from America at the end of the First World 
War.
Machinery and engines were amongst Japans most 
important imports. Japan imported these almost exclusively 
from Europe and America. England and Germany were the 
two main exporting countries to Japan. However, America 
took over England*s position in this respect in 1916, 
and that of the whole of Europe in 1917. BD% of Japanfs 
total imports of machinery and engines came from America 
in 1918. (See Table 33). Obviously the First World 
War seriously affected exports of these commodities 
from Europe to Japan.
By the end of the First World War, Japan was 
employing more American cotton and machinery in her 
spinning industry in order to export cotton goods to 
other Asian countries.
(ii) The period 1919-31.
(a) Exports and imports by category: Japanfs foreign 
trade by commodity composition is shown in Table 34.
As we have also seen for the period 1914-18 exports of 
semi-finished and finished manufactures during the 
period 1919-31 were the most important. Exports of 
semi-finished manufactures increased slightly. But
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exports of finished manufactures were either stagnant or 
decreased due to the revival of Western competition*
The percentage of exports which were semi-finished or 
finished manufactures was almost the same in the 1920!s.
Compared to the First World War period, imports of 
finished manufactures increased remarkably# This was 
due to an increased demand for machinery and heavy 
industrial manufactures in the 1920!s. On the other 
hand, imports of semi-finished manufactures declined 
substantially during this period. Imports of foodstuffs 
increased and were maintained at between 12-15% of total 
imports over the period 1921-31. Raw materials were 
Japan*s most important import in the 1920*s, as they had 
been during the First World War period. Except in 1921 
and 1922, imports of raw materials always exceeded 50% 
of Japanfs total import trade. This was an important 
weakness of the Japanese economy, as fluctuations in 
raw material prices directly affected her trade balance. 
Moreover it led her to further territorial expansion in 
Asia, in order to secure her raw materials supplies.
(b) Exports and imports by commodities.
(l) Exports: Principal exports from Japan during 
the period 1919-31 are shown in Table 35. Two significant 
features can be noted from this Table. Firstly, exports 
of raw silk were very important. They were inow far 
more important than in the First World War period.
This indicates that Japan!s export trade at this time 
was heavily reliant on semi-finished manufactures. 
Furthermore as the raw silk was exported principally to 
America, (see Table 36), Japanfs foreign trade was 
increasingly linked to the American market. This was 
an important weakness in Japan*s foreign trade, for this 
commodity could be easily affected by fluctuations in 
raw silk prices in America. Indeed the price of exported 
raw silk fell from 485.1 in 1929 (1914=100) to 220.5
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Secondly in the 1920’s exports of cotton tissues 
increased substantially while exports of cotton yarn 
decreased. These changes were due basically to an 
improvement in Japanfs textile industry. Although 
the spinning industries of China and India could produce 
substantial cotton yarn during this period, cotton 
tissues were not produced there on a sufficient scale.
The First li/orld War had suspended the flow of British 
cotton tissues into the Chinese and Indian markets, 
and this gave Japan an opportunity to increase her 
exports of cotton tissues to these markets.
Exports of cotton yarn and cotton tissues were 
concentrated in Asian countries. (Tables 37 and 38)
Exports of cotton yarn to China diminished remarkably
in the 1920fs and were replaced by exports to the
Indian market by the end of the decade. India took
66% of Japanfs exports of cotton yarn in 1931 (see Table 37).
Exports of cotton tissues to China also fell in this
period. The basic reason for this shift from the
Chinese market to the Indian Market is as follows:
Japan’s exports of cotton tissues to China 
increased from 24% in 1914 to 62% in 1919 of China’s 
total imports of cotton tissues. At the same time 
the British share of this market fell from 58% to 26%.
In 1919 China promulgated a law to increase customs 
duties in an attempt to prevent Japanese cotton tissues 
from flooding the Chinese market. In response Japan 
extended its investments intoTsingdao and Shanghai.
The Zaikabo emerged and developed quickly representing 
the direct investment in China by Japan’s spinning industry. 
The number of Japanese spindles in China increased from 
75 in 1913 (9% of the total spindles in China) to 1,630 
(39%) in 1931, while British capital investment in China 
declined. As the Japanese spinning industry in China 
satisfied the local cotton tissues market, exports from
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Japan itself to China decreased, and this is turn 
allowed for an expansion in exports to India.
(2) Imports: Japan’s principal imports in 1919-31 
are shown in Table 39. Imports of raw cotton were the 
largest single-commodity in Japan’s import trade. This 
phenomenon can also be found in 1914-18. Nevertheless, 
the relative importance of cotton imports during this 
period had declined compared to the First World War 
years, although imports of raw cotton increased absolutely 
in some years during the period 1919-31.
Increased imports of machinery, engines and mineral 
oil indicate that during this period Japan built her 
industrial foundation in preparation for the immense 
industrial expansion of the 1930’s. Increased imports 
of sugar and rice during this period reflected increased 
dependence on foreign foodstuffs.
Cotton was imported mostly from India and America. 
During the years 1914-17, the value of cotton supplied 
to Japan from India was more than twice as large as 
that from America. Over the years 1919-31, imports of 
cotton from America were virtually equal to those from 
India, although during the period 1927-31, America was 
in fact the largest cotton supplier of Japan (See Table 
40). Imports of cotton switched from India to America 
partly because cetton produced in India was increasingly 
consumed by the local Indian spinning industries and, 
partly because America supplied good quality cotton 
to Japan. This made it possible for Japan to produce 
better cotton manufactures and so compete more effectively 
with India and China.
Imports of cotton from China accounted for 11% 
and 12% of Japan’s total cotton imports in 1918 and 1919. 
However, in 1920 they dropped abruptly and returned to
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1919 levels only in 1924* Over the years 1925-31, imports 
of cotton from China never amounted to more than 10% 
of Japan’s total cotton imports. There are two main 
reasons for the 1920*s decline in Japanese consumption 
of Chinese cotton. The expansion of the Chinese spinning 
industry resulted in increased domestic consumption of 
cotton, and America supplied Japan with better quality 
cotton. In addition, although the Japanese spinning industry 
cultivated cotton in North China the rapid development 
of the Zaikabo consumed large quantities of locally- 
produced cotton. Consequently exports of cotton from 
China to Japan fell.
In short Japan imported more cotton from America in 
order to expand cotton manufacture exports to Asian markets.
As regards iron, it was imported principally from 
Western countries (notably America, Germany and England) 
and from India. (See Table 41)• Japan had no iron ore 
at all for her iron industry. Japan tried to acquire 
iron ore from Southeast Asia, principally from Malaya, 
in order to reduce her dependence on Western supplies.
Imports of machinery and engines came mainly from 
Europe and America, as in the First World War period.
Table 42 shows imports of machinery and engines by 
country of origin. In the 1920’s imports of these 
commodities from Europe increased absolutely and from 
America decreased. In 1919 America provided three 
times the value of machinery and engine imports as did 
European countries. In 1922, imports from Europe and 
America were almost equal. Imports from America diminished 
substantially after 1923 (except for the year 1924) and, 
at the end of the 1920’s, imports of machinery and engines 
from these five European countries were double those 
from America. In short during the 1920*s in contrast 
to the First World War period when Japan was heavily
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dependent on American supplies, Japan’s imports of 
machinery and engines came principally from Europe".
The switch of imports of machinery and engines 
from America to Europe (mostly from England and 
Germany) during the 1920fs can be explained as follows:
First, imports of high quality machine tools into 
Japan diminished during the 1920fs due to a government 
policy of reducing armaments manufactures, and more 
importantly to an improvement in the production of high 
quality machinery in Japan itself during the latter 
half of the decade. High quality machinery and engines 
had been imported mainly from Americai34* Consequently 
imports of machinery and engines from America fell 
markedly in the 1920’s as part of the reduction in imports 
of high quality stock.
Second, machinery and engines exported from 
America to Japan were much more expensive that those 
exported from England.(-^Moreover the quality of the 
European products was comparable to those from America.
Third, Japanese policy makers may have wished 
to expand trade with Europe in order to lessen dependence 
on American supplies. Although Japan increased her 
reliance on Europe, imports of machinery and engines from 
America still accounted for more than 30% of total 
imports in this category in the 1920’s.
(iii) The period 1932-41
(a) Exports and imports by category: Japan’s 
foreign trade commodity composition is shown in Table 43. 
The most distinct feature of this period is that exports 
of semi-finished manufactures fell sharply whilst exports 
of finished manufactures rose. Exports of finished
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manufactures greatly exceeded exports of sdmi—finished 
manufactures in the period 1932—41. Compared to the 
1920!S/ exports of foodstuffs and raw materials were in 
absolute terms either stationary or increased.
In the import trade, imports of semi-finished manufactu 
increased in the 1930*s and imports of finished manufactures 
remained static. Imports of semi-finished manufactures 
in the years 1937-40 were very substantial. In absolute 
and relative terms, imports of finished manufactures 
were maintained in the 1930fs due not only to domestic 
industrial development in this period but also to the 
trade policy of the Japanese Government, This aspect 
of the Japanese governments trade policy was to restrain 
exports of finished manufactures to the Yen-bloc and to 
reduce imports of finished manufactures from non-Yen-bloc 
countries. Government payments overseas increased 
substantially after the Manchurian Incident and accelerated 
even further after the China Incident. As Japan was 
becoming increasingly short of foreign currency, she 
could not import sufficient finished manufactures from 
outside the Yen-bloc.
Raw materials were the largest component in Japan*s 
imports in the years 1932-41, as they had been during 
the First World War and the I9201s
Imports of foodstuffs dropped absolutely in 1931 
and their total value in the 1930*s was smaller than in 
the 1920*s. However, as Japan became fully involved 
in War after the China Incident of 1937, local foodstuffs 
production was ignored, and increasingly supplies came 
from the “Greater East Asia Co-Pro9perity Sphere".
(b) Exports and imports by commodities.
(1) Exports: Principal exports from Japan during
the period 1932-41 are shown in Table 44. Two significant 
features should be noted* First, exports of raw silk 
decreased substantially. This was due essentially to 
a dramatic drop in raw__silk prices in the 1930*3. The 
important role of raw silk in securing foreign currency 
was thus undermined. Second, exports of cotton tissues 
were very substantial in the years 1932-37 but fell 
drastically, together with exports of cotton yarn and 
silk tissues, after the China Incident. Exports of cotton 
tissues and cotton yarn were concentrated in Asia (see 
Tables 45 and 46). China was the largest market for Japan* 
cotton tissues and cotton yarn during the First World 
War and in the 1920fs. But she imported only small 
quantities during the 1930!s. Exports of Japanese cotton 
manufactures shifted from China to India and the 
Netherlands East Indies in the 1930*s. By the eve of 
the Pacific war, the Indies were a more important market 
than India for Japanese cotton goods.
Japan*s cotton manufacturer exports shifted from 
China to India for the following reasons, noted earlier. 
First, after the 4th May Movement in 1919 and the 
Chinese campaign against Japanese manufactures, China 
increased her customs duty on Japanese goods. Second, 
the rapid growth of the Japanese spinning industry in
pCD>h
P
rdCO
PO
g
■aEh
12 7.
d CN CO vD cn CD in
<SP • * * * • • « • • •
CO o o O O O O O
1-1
CD
CO
CO
CD
00 CO co 00 o d VD in CN [-"•
a CM 00 ft t"- cn d d< CD ft CM
id CD d 00 CM O CO 00 ID CD 00
CD P * *■ V
-p r—1 in CD cn d O cn CM
cn rtf i—i i—1 ■—I CM i—1
>
C"H cn
dP • •o O
P
d)
ft
ft i0 00 r^ ft
u rH in •H
CD in d rd CD
P > ftrH O CO rd A
03 H P r3
> to
o 00 in d d cn d cn CM in
dP • • • • * • • • ■
iH o O o O O O O o O
,—t
rd0
u o 00 in ft vD c - p~ in cn O
in in t"~ CN m CN d co 00 cn
CD d i—i cn r^- cn cn ft CO CM o
P * «. * *. V **rH cn d O cn O cn O cn 00 d
rtf ■—I ft ft i—1 *—1 ft
>
CO Vi) d vD ft in cn CO m o co
CD dP • • • • • • • • • •
P cn m cn cn CM CM ft ft ft ft
CO
(0•H
Eh
00 in p~ d vD VD CM VD cn CN
00 d 00 d CM 00 in cn cn VD
i—1 CD CM in d d O CM cn cn <D ftft P •* »■ •» * *■CQ rH O cn r^ ["• 00 CM <n r-~ r- CN
rtf LD co vD r'' d1 d cn d
>
CO
CD in co r^- cn O O O cn cn r-'
P dP • • • • • • • • • •
CO O O CM cn 00 CD in ft O O
CO CM CN CM i—i ft i—1 i—i ■—I i—l i—I•H
Eh
P CO m ft r~ 1—1 d cn CM i> o
0 ft i—i in cn cn co cn d cn 00
■P d) r-~ CM cn O in O CM cn ft ft
-P P » v *■ •* * *■ *■
0 rH 00 m CM CD cn cn d cn cn d
U rtf 00 00 cn cn 00 r~ O O cn 00
> CM cn d d d in d d cn CN
in 00 ft d d in O co o
P dP < • • • • • • • • •
p ft O ft ft ft ft ■—i CM ft CM
rd
>h
P
0 r~ CN d cn d m in cn in cn
■P d ft 00 d O in CD r^ cn
■P d) m d CO cn cn cn O cn d
0 P * I*
U «H ft in cn m 00 d cn ft r^- CN
rtf CM ft CM cn cn in cn r-~ in m
>
i—1 O CM in cn CD in CM CM ■—I
dP • • • • • • • • • •
M r- ft cn m o CM cn d CN 00
iH CM CM ft ft 1—1 ft ft i—1 ft•H
CO
> CO ft cn CM 00 r-~ d d O vD
CO o cn cn o ft CM d vD O« CD cn cn r-'- O 00 ft i—l 00 O P-P * ■k h. * •fc k
rH CM O co r^ CM p- d CO CO in
rtf 00 cn 00 00 cn O ID O d i—i
> cn m CM cn CM d* cn in d CM
p CM cn d in co 00 cn O i—1
p cn cn cn cn cn cn cn cn d d
(D cn cn cn cn cn cn cn cn cn cn>< iH ft ft iH i—i ft ft ft i—I i—i
ftO
u>H
aou
a)ucuS
d
id
m
cn
73
O*H
u
a)ft
a)
a
Cn
P
■H
upTJ
CD(0
CO
cd>
acd
a)
■P(0
»CJ
P<d
■HCO
4HO
CO
■PP
oftXJw
12 8.
o>c
p
-p
9
2
O'c
!§
O'cow
cd•H>op
<d
p•HA
V
dP
0* 0
0
1
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
*
0
0
1
1
0
0
.
0
0
*
0
0
1
0
*
0
0
1
0
*
0
0
1
0
*
0
0
1
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
CO CN "3* cn in in O' co O'
sr I—1 CO r-> O in 00 e'­ O'
O LD r- CO cn O' m o en ”CF
0 •a *
i—1 i—i in cn in CO 'sF cn 1-1 r-> CN
(d CN ■—I CN cn cn in cn r-~ in in
>
r- cn CN in cn ■—i CO CO 'd1 cn
dP . . . a . • • • • •
CD r- r- CN in CO O' CN d*
i—1 i—l CN rH i—i cn in
in CO in CN O' o 00 cn r- ■d*
cn O' O CO O' f—1 O' co CN
d) CN co in r- <d< O r- in
P .. — —
i—I i—i i—i i—i -cF in cn r- F^ CO CO
cd rH rH t—1 CN
>
i—i O' O' r- CN CN n* CN i—1
dP . . I • • • • • • •
cn cn CN CO in CO cn i—1 cn
i—1 r—1 rH
cd
•rl
O -cr U ["• I—1 cn CN rH sF CN
r- i—i P CN O' cn cn I-" i—1 cn
CD co CO .P CO cn cn CN co e'­ co
P U -■ - »• *» •» *■
rH P CD 00 m CO rH
"3
> Si
CM O' CO CO CO CO CO O en CO
dP . . • . . . • • • •
CO i—1 O CN CO i—i r- O rHi—I l—1
CO H CN cn O F^ in O O' CO
cn O' cn *d* •d* CN i—i i—i O' rH
CD m CN i—i O' CO CO r- O O' i—I
o ■» ■a
rH i—1 r—1 cn in m CO
rd
>
CO <vF cn O i—1 i—i i—I r- co cn
dP . • . i • • • • • •
co CO r'' CO CO CN O r-
CO 'vj* m cn in <d< CN rH
cn in i—I cn O in i—i 00 CO rH
O i—l cn in o in rH i—1
CL) m co i—I o O 00 in O' o d1
p h. «* * ** k
rH i—( o CO O' O CO CO O'
rd i—I i—I CN 1—1 i—i CN CN i—1
>
CN i—i r- CO O' CO rH
dP • • . . . . . O . *
iH rH O O O 1—1 1—1 o
CO CO in CO cn 'd* co o CO d
LO KO r- cn t-~ CN CN 00
CD CN i—1 i—i i—i CN O CO
P
rH rH
cd
>
CN cn in co r-- CD O' O i—1
<n cn cn m cn m cn m ■d* ■d*
cn <y\ O' cn O' cn cn cn cn cn
i—i rH *—) rH j—I i—I rH i—l i—I rH So
ur
ce
: 
YC
, 
op
. 
c
i
t
.
, 
PP
. 
15
9-
16
0.
129.
*1—1
<*>
0*001 10
0.
0
10
0.
0 0*001
0*001
0*001
o
8rH
o
o*oi—i 10
0.
0
10
0.
0
rd■P0
Eh CM in rH r- rH d< cn CD r- 1—1i—I i—i in cn cn ID CO d< CO CO0) r" CM CO O LO o CM <n rH rHG k k *» k k k k k kr—1 oo CO CM CD CO CO d< CO cn •d*rd CO 00 cn cn CO r- O O cn CO> CM CO d* d1 d< in d< d< CO CM
1—1 ID CM CN CO r- d< rH ID i—1<#p • • • . • • • • • •1—1 in 00 r- cn cn cn I—1 O Oid•Hu
g
xo CO ID CO CO rH 00 cn CO r-- CO
g ID CM in CO CM d< O d* r- COrd CD CM ID CM i> CM r- o in d< COs G k k k k k «. krH co 1—1 O in C- in CO d< CM(d CM CO d< in CO>
d1 d1 CO d< in cn 00 CM rH I—1dP • • • • • « • • • •r- O ID CO i—i d< cn CO d1 CM• i—i CM rH rH rH i—i rH rH CMH
H
S CO co cn CO o CO m <D in cnCM C" CM cn O 00 in ID CO0) CM CM 00 LO CO ID d< rH CM r-G k k k k k. k k k krH o 00 CM <D in in cn CO CD CM(d in r- 00 ID in CO CO in in ID>
cn ID ID CM O O CO d< CD indP • • • • • • • • • •CO CO in i—i ID in in CMCM 1—1 1—1 rH i—i ■—i rH i—i *—i rHrd•HT3
GH CO CO in CM r- o CO ■d1 00 CMIT) ID i—i CO i—i d* r- ID O CM
CD d i—1 CO rH in O CO CO CM IDG k k k k •k k. k k k krH O i—1 ID LO CM CO r- CM CM inrd CO e'­ ID CO C- CO CO ID ID CO>
ID en in rH cn rH CO CO 00 rH<jp « • • • • « • • • •LO d< CO CO in LO d* I—1 CM oS' I—1GG■PGrd r- CM CO 1—1 i—i in cn <D d* CO& O CM CO 1—1 CO CM 00 i—1 i—I d1W a) rH CO CM CM CO d1 CO CN r—1 r-G k k k .. k. k. k k k •rH ID 00 cn in CO cn c- in 1—1 COrd rH 1—1 rH rH CM CM rH rH CM>
Cn ID d* ID O cn r- CO CMdP • • • • • • • • ♦ •CN ID CM CM i—1 CM in CM r- ■drH rHrd/“HJ-H■rH <—•Au CO d* O CN O m O 00 cn <nm O CO i—1 ID cn i—i o CO OQ) i—i ID O cn 00 CM cn cn CM d<G k k * k k. k k k k krH r-~ in CO 1-1 c- 1-1 co o cn o<d CO CM rH rH I-I CM rH CM d*>
SH CM CO d* in ID r- CO cn o i—iid CO co CO co CO CO CO CO d1 d10) cn cn cn cn cn cn cn cn cn cnJH i—i rH 1—1 ■—i i—i rH i—i rH i—i rH
CDi—1-H
xu
k
ido•rlSH<u
Sid•rlCO
k
COa;G-rlPiPi•*HrH•HxPi
CDXEh
k
(0•PGd)e0)r—1-P-Pa)CO •__
(0 id-p •H•rl i—1Id idU Sh■P -PCO COGCD <XEh Ck idCnG idO o•rlucn mG <c• 0O HI Xr- •—• •p—I Gi cn 0cn u COID Q)rH X k-P CD0 GPi •H
Pi rH -PrH Gk a>• tn-P tn Sh•rH G <O •rl
fO k• G XPi rH Pi0 a > iG Cnk H W
U
>H *
<do
oCO
China (the Zaikabo), reduced exports from Japan herself. 
Third, the decline of British cotton manufactures in 
India opened the way for an expansion of Japanese imports 
into the sub-continent. In 1931, the Manchurian Incident 
caused a further boycott in China against Japanese goods. 
Japan soon lost markets in Central and South China, At 
that point India and Southeast Asia, in particular the 
Netherlands East Indies, became important alternative 
markets for Japanese cotton goods.
However the flood of Japanese cotton goods into 
the Indian market prompted India to establish jin August 
1932 a discriminatory customs duty under which Japan 
had to pay double the customs duty paid by British imports 
to India. In June 1933 the duty was further increased. 
However Japan still succeeded in penetrating the Indian 
market through the depreciation of the Yen. Therefore, 
on the eve of the China Incident, India had, to a great 
extent, replaced China as the principal market for Japanese 
cotton goods.
The Netherlands East Indies also absorbed large 
quantities of Japanese cotton goods in the 1930's. She 
became particularly important when India was taking measures 
to prevent Japanese goods flooding her market. Eventually 
by 1940 the Indies absorbed 32$ of Japan's total cotton 
yarn exports and 14$ of cotton tissues exports. In 1941 
the former rose to 54$ and the latter rose to 22$.
(2) Imports: Japan's principal imports in the years
1932-41 are shown in Table 47. Three significant 
features should be noted. First, imports of raw cotton 
fell substantially after 1937 yet remained the largest 
single commodity imported into Japan over the period 
1932-41. Cotton was imported principally from America 
and India (see Table 48), despite the fact that prices 
of imported raw cotton from the U.S.A. increased from 
135.2 in 1931 (1914=100) to 388.1 in 1937 (See appendix A ).
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As the export of cotton goods to Asia, particularly to 
India and to the Indies, was the most important mechanism 
by which Japan secured foreign currency, Japan could not 
suspend or restrict raw cotton imports. Although 
importing raw cotton at high prices jeopardized Japan’s 
trade balance with the U.S.A., there was no alternative 
since Japan could only be successful in the Asian 
markets with cotton manufactures of higher quality than 
those of India and China. However, Japan had to reduce 
her reliance on American cotton supplies as political 
tension between the two powers increased, particularly 
after 1937. Consequently Japan encouraged cotton production 
in Greater East Asia to increase cotton imports into 
Japan from China and from Southeast Asia.
Second, imports of iron increased in the 1930’s.
Iron imports from each country are shown in Table 49.
Japan imported iron almost entirely from the West, the 
U.S.A. being the most important supplier. Japan attempted 
to import more iron ore from China and Malaya in order 
to reduce her dependence on U.S. supplies. But China and 
Malaya were not able to supply sufficient iron ore.
Therefore when a scrap iron and steel embargo was announced 
by America on 26th September 1940, followed by an embargo 
on iron ore, iron alloy, iron and steel products and 
semi-finished manufactures on 10th December the same 
year, there was total confusion in Japan’s industry 
and government.
Third, imports of machinery and engines came mainly 
from the West in 1930’s (see Table 50), as they had during 
the First World War and in the 1920’s. It has already 
been explained why Japan’s imports of machinery and engines 
switched from America to Europe in the 1920’s. However 
in the 1930*s and particularly after 1937, Japan’s 
imports of machinery and engines rapidly switched back 
to America despite the tensions between the two powers. 
Political instability in Europe contributed to this
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change* Imports of both machinery and engines from 
England and France fell after 1937* Since Germany had 
a close diplomatic relationship with Japan in the late 
1930*5, she became Japan’s most important supplier of 
machinery and engines amongst the European countries* 
Nevertheless, Japanese heavy industry would almost 
certainly have collapsed if imports of machinery and 
engines from America had been suspended. Even as late 
as 1939, 60% (148 million Yen) of Japan*s total machinery 
and engine imports were from America. They increased 
to 66% (149 million Yen) in 1940. This is why when she 
planned to expand her economic and political influence 
in Asia, Japan could not afford to ignore American reaction.
Conclusion: Passing through the specific periods
from 1914-18 to 1937-41, Japan*s exports of semi-finished 
manufactures fell (except in 1924-28) from 44% of the 
value of total exports in 1914-18 to 25% in 1937-41, 
while exports of finished manufactures increased from 
37% to 58% during the same period, (see Table 51).
The former was due largely to a decrease in raw silk 
exports (after 1924-28) while the latter was due mainly 
to an increase in cotton goods exports. (see Table 52). 
Throughout the inter-war period, raw silk was exported 
principally to America (see Table 53) while cotton goods 
were exported largely to Asian countries (mostly to China, 
India and the Netherlands East Indies) (see Table 54).
Imports of raw materials remained at approximatley 
50% of Japan’s total imports throughout the inter-war 
period. (See Table 51). Large imports of raw cotton 
contributed substantially to the high level of raw 
materials imports. Raw cotton was imported principally 
from America and India (see Table 55). In addition, 
throughout the inter-war period, imports of iron, machinery 
and engines from the West were also of considerable 
importance, (see Table 52).
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These features of Japanese foreign trade in effect 
obliged her to export more raw silk in exchange for raw 
cotton, iron and machines from the West* This in turn 
made it possible for Japan' to export cotton goods to 
Asian countries. The more cotton goods Japan exported 
to Asia, the more she had to depend on Western (mostly 
American) raw cotton, iron and machine imports. Owing 
to increases in imported raw cotton, iron and machinery 
prices, in conjunction with falls in the price of exported 
raw silk, Japan always had a trade deficit with the 
West in the inter-war years. In order to correct this 
trade deficit and reduce her dependence on the West,
Japan tried to import more raw cotton from China and 
India, and more iron ore and other industrial raw materials 
frorn China and Southeast Asia. Later she encouraged 
cotton cultivation in Southeast Asia. However, Asian 
cotton supplies, together with cotton from Egypt and 
Brazil, could never meet the needs of the Japanese spinning 
industry. Asian iron ore supplies and supplies of other 
raw materials, for example oil could never make it possble 
for Japan to rid herself of Western supplies completely. 
Furthermore Japanese economic penetration in other Asian 
countries paralleled by an expanding political 
influence in the area - provoked strong protest not only 
from within Japanese influenced Asia but also from the 
West. Although Japan, through the depreciation of the 
Yen and through an improvement in her industrial efficiency, 
defeated British, Indian and Chinese competitors in 
the Asian cotton goods market, her commercial expansion 
in Asia had been continually interrupted by the restrictive 
measures taken against her.
144.
Notes on Section Two.
(l) For an analysis of the Indian and Chinese import 
trade, see K. Matsui, Kindai Nihon Boeki-shi (Trade 
History of Modern Japan), vol. III.
(2) Japan acquired not only an important market in 
Asia. She also exported capital to this region in 
order to ensure supplies of raw materials. Most notably 
Japan*s famous Ishihara Sangyo Company started mining 
iron ore in Malaya in 1920. (See Section Four. Part 2.
The Acquisition of Iron Ore)•
(3) For example: the Encouragement Bill for Dye
and Medicine Manufacturing in 1915; the National Treasury1^  
Assistance Bill of the Physico-Chemical Research Institute 
in 1916; Encouragement Bill for the Steel Industry and 
a Vessels Control Ordinance in 1917; A war Industries 
Mobilization Bill and a Military Vehicles Supplementary 
Bill in 1918.
(4) For more information, see Yoshio Andff, Kindai 
Nihon Keizaishi Yoran (A Survey of Modern Japanese Economic 
History), 1978, P.101; Toyo Keizai Sinposya, Kinyu 
Rokuzyunen-shi (Sixty Years of Financial History),
P.512; G.C.Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern 
Japan. 1867-1937 (Revised Edition), 1972, P.97 and 
S.Uyehara, The Industry and Trade of Japan. P.17.
(5) With the end of the First World War in November 
1918, prices of commodities and in particular pig iron, 
steel, copper, soda ash and dye fell markedly. Japanese 
foreign trade had an adverse balance in 1919. The total 
current surplus on merchandise and invisible trade fell 
from 869 million Yen in 1918 to 429 million Yen in 1919.
(6) See K.Matsui, op. cit.. PP. 208-209.
Ibid., Vol. Ill, P.60.
^  See also W.W.Lockwood, The Economic Development 
of Japan. Growth and Structural Change 1868-1954. P.58.
^  K.Matsui, op.cit.. Vol. Ill, PP.249-250; 
lii.W.Lockwood, op. cit.. P.63
(10) Uruguay, Australia and Argentine each abandoned 
the gold standard in December 1929 followed by Mexico 
in July 1931. The abandonment of gold by England in 
September 1931 caused British India, Canada, Ireland, 
British Malaya, Egypt, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, 
Portugal, Palestine, Austria and Japan to follow suit. 
Furthermore, South Africa, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Colombia, 
Chile, Peru, Greece and Siam abandoned gold in 1932,
America and the Philippines in 1933, Czechoslovakia 
in 1934 and Belgium in 1935.
1^:L^ This will be discussed in more detail in Part 3 
of this Section, Changes in the Commodity Composition 
of Japanese Foreign Trade.
(12) Japanese government expenditure abroad increased 
from 30,058,000 Yen in 1930 to 37,896,000 Yen in 1931.
Most notably Japan’s penetration into China in 1931 caused 
government expenditures to increase suddenly.
For more detail on this development of Japanese 
industry and foreign trade, see S.Uyehara, op. cit..
PP.637-638 and F.Moriya, Keizai-shi (Economic History 
of Modern Japan), PP.288-289.
See K.Ono, op. cit.. P.31. He also pointed out 
that Mwhat is hidden on a yen basis becomes very apparent 
on a dollar basis •••• when expressed in dollars, the 
value of Japanese trade after the lifting of the gold
embargo fell below the level of 1926-29, and the export 
price in dollars fell to 68 in 1935 against 100 in 1928. 
Exports increased in quantity to 185 in 1935 also against 
100 in 1928, while the terms of trade fell to 71” (refer 
to the Table on next page).
(15) See the following works by Akira Hara, Nicchu 
Senso-Ki no Kokusai Syushi (international Balance during 
the.Sino-Japanese war Period) in Syakai Keizaishi Gakkai. 
Vol. 34, No. 6, 1969, P.72; Nicchu Senso-Ki no Gaika 
Kessai (Foreign Settlement during the Sino-Japanese
war Period) in Keizai-qaku Ronsyu. Vol. 38, No.2, 1972,
P.55; Senji Tosei Keizai no Kaishi (The Beginning of the 
Controlled Economy in War Time) in Nihon no Rekishi (History 
of Japan), Vol.20, Kindai 7, 1976, P.230 and Rekishi 
Kagaku Kyogikai, op. cit.. PP.254-255
(16) A.Hara, Daitoa Kyoeiken no Keizai-teki Jittai 
(The Economic Realities of the Greater East Asia Co- 
Prosperity Sphere), 1974, P.9.
(17) For example: The Acts of the Temporary Measure 
of Exports and Imports and the Foreign Exchange Control 
Act were promulgated in 1937; the Links System of 
Exports and Imports with regard to the Yen-bloc was 
abandoned in 1938 and the Materials Mobilization Plan 
was then introduced.
(18) Thereafter, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
South Africa, India, Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements, 
the Philippines and Hawaii froze Japanese assets abroad.
For a detailed discussion of the frozen assets 
issue, see Nihon Boeki Hokoku Renmei, Shisan TSketsu- 
rei Kaisetsu (An explanation of Frozen Assets),
1941; Toa Kenkyusho, Bei-Ei-Ran to Syokoku Tainichi
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ShisantSketsu Gaikan (A General Survey of Japanese Assets 
Frozen by America, England and the Netherlands East Indies) 
1942 and Okura-sho, Dainizi Taisen ni Okeru Renqokoku 
Zaisan Shori (Assets Disposition by the Allies in 
World War II), 1976,
(19) With regard to this subject, see K.Matsui, 
op* cit,, Vol.II, Chapter 2, Sections 3 and 4.
(20) Prof. K.Ono noted that Japan’s exports to 
Europe decreased in 1915-18 (See Daiichiji Taisen 
Zengo no Gaikoku Boeki (Foreign Trade Around the First 
World War) in Nihon Shihon-shuqi Hattatsu-Shiron II,
1972, P.243). This is rather misleading as although 
exports to Europe dropped from 23% of total exports in
1913 to 16% in 1914 they recovered substantially after
1914 and amounted to 21% of total exports in 1917*
Japan’s exports to Europe during the inter-war years 
never attained the level reached during the First World 
War*
(21) Japan’s exports to India were slightly greater 
than her exports to Southeast Asia* But imports from 
India were substantially below those from Southeast 
Asia, though greater than those from China*
(2 2 ) See K.Matsui, op* cit*, Vol. Ill, P.35.
(23) The changes in Japan’s foreign trade in 1925 
were discussed in Part 1 of this Section, Brief Summary 
of Japanese Foreign Trade*
(24) However exports to Asia in the periods 1919-23 
and 1924-28 were always more than 40% of Japan’s total 
exports*
(25) Imports from Asia in this period were maintained 
at around 40% of Japan’s total imports.
(26) Japan’s total merchandise trade in 1929 amounted 
to 4,365 million Yen which was substantially higher 
than in 1927 or 1928. But Japan’s export and import 
trade both diminished after 1930.
(27) Raw silk exports to America dropped from an 
annual average of 499 million Yen in 1929-31 to 324 
million Yen in 1932-36.
(28) This will be discussed in more detail in Part
3 of this Section, Ghanoes in the Commodity Composition 
of Japan’s Foreign Trade.
(29) Imports of cotton from America increased from an 
annual average of 202 million Yen (49% of Japan’s 
total cotton imports) in 1929-31 to 370 million (55%)
in 1932-36.
(30) See Part 1 of this Section, Brief Summary of 
Japanese Foreign Trade.
(31) The Chinese Institute of National Economy ed., 
Riben Dui Hu Touzi (Japanese Investments in Shanghai), 
Shanghai, 1937, P.35.
(32) M.S.Farley, Japan as a Consumer of American 
Cotton in FES, 3-7-1935, P.98.
(33) Statistics of imports of iron from each country 
during the period 1914-18 are not available.
(34) For example, imports of generators and electric 
motors (1,000-5,000 kg in weight) and metallic and wood­
working machines (1,000-5,000 kg in weight) from America 
represented 55.9% of Japan’s total imports of those 
items and 61.6% in 1928. - See K.Matsui, op. cit.,
Vol. Ill, P.87. See also Minoru Toyosaki, Nihon Kikai 
Kogyo no Kiso Kozo (The Basic Structure of Japan’s 
Machinery Industry), P.161.
(35) See K.Matsui, op. cit.. Vol. Ill, P.90, for 
statistical evidence on this point.
Section Three.
The Development of the Japanese Spinning Industry and 
the Restriction of Exports of Cotton Goods to Southeast 
Asia.
Part 1. Exports of Japanese Goods to Southeast Asia.
Throughout the period under consideration, Asia was 
the most important market for Japanese finished manufacture 
Outside the Japanese Empire - Manchuria, Kwantung,
Korea and Formosa * Southeast Asia was an important region 
to Japan for the distribution of its industrial commodities 
By the mid-nineteen thirties, Japan was exporting 
increasing amounts of machinery, vehicles, metals, 
metal manufactures, textiles and cotton piece goods, as 
well as some light manufactures and consumption goods, 
and each of these was important in Japan’s export trade 
with Southeast Asia.
In order to examine the position of Southeast Asia 
in Japan’s export trade, specific manufactures in that 
trade will be examined in some detail. To facilitate 
this, commodities may usefully be divided into two 
basic categories - (a) Commodities produced wholly or
largely from Japanese domestic raw materials and (b) 
commodities produced wholly or largely from imported 
raw materials. Silk tissues and artificial silk tissues, 
pottery, glass and glass manufactures, cement, coal and 
toys belong to the former category; cotton tissues, 
cotton towelling, cotton blankets, cotton yarn, knitted 
goods, paper, lamps and parts, iron manufactures and 
rubber tyres belong to the latter.
(A) Commodities produced wholly or largely from 
Japanese domestic raw materials (D.R.M.).
The "Oriental Economist" in its statistical 
survey of the "Foreign Trade of Japan" - one of the most 
authoritative and widely quoted sources on Japan’s 
foreign trade statistics - divided articles exported 
from Japan proper (including Sakhalin) into 7 groups 
and 441 items. Of these, 6 D.R.M. goods exported from 
Japan will be considered.
Raw silk was in fact the most important D.R.M. 
good exported by Japan. However, it was consumed only 
by America and Europe. Japan could not find a significant 
export market for its raw silk in Southeast Asia as it 
was a luxury commodity.
Although the 6 D.R.M. goods shown in Table 56 were 
largely purchased by Southeast Asia, the total value 
of these exports accounted for less than of Japan’s 
total merchandise exports throughout the inter-war 
period. Among the 6 D.R.M. goods exported from Japan 
to Southeast Asia, silk tissues and artificial silk 
tissues ^  were the largest.
(B) Commodities produced wholly or largely from 
imported raw materials (I.R.M.).
8 I.R.M. goods which were largely exported to 
Southeast Asia during the inter-war period have been 
summarised in Table 57.
Among these 8 I.R.M. goods, two groups can be 
identified, that is cotton goods (cotton tissues, cotton 
towelling, cotton blankets, cotton yarn and knitted 
goods) and non-cotton goods (paper, lamps and parts, iron 
manufactures and rubber tyres). Exports of cotton goods 
from Japan to Southeast Asia were much more important than
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the exports of non-cotton goods# Exports of cotton goods 
to Southeast Asia were particularly important after 
the abandonment of the gold standard in December 1931# 
Depreciation of the Japanese Yen enormously stimulated 
exports of cotton goods to Southeast Asia# Indeed this 
trade amounted to more than 5% of Japanfs total merchandise 
exports in the years 1932-36.
Total exports of I.R.M. goods to Southeast Asia 
amounted to 6% of Japan’s total merchandise exports 
in the years 1932-36. Non-cotton goods alone constituted 
less that 1% of total exports. In short cotton goods 
were by far the most important item in the I.R.M. goods 
category of exports to Southeast Asia.
(C) A comparison of D.R.M., I.R.M. and raw silk exports.
Table 58 shows the total exports of D.R.M. goods,
I.R.M. goods and raw silk in Japan’s total merchandise 
exports. I.R.N. goods were much more important than 
D.R.M. goods, if raw silk is not taken into account.
Total exports of D.R.ffl. and I.R.M. goods taken 
together were larger than exports of raw silk throughout 
the inter-war period. Exports of raw silk dropped from 
33% of total merchandise exports in the period 1929-31 
to only 16% in the years 1932-36. However, the total 
exports of D.R.M. and I.R.M. goods combined increased 
from 37% to 41% during the same period. In the years 
1937-41 D.R.M. and I.R.M. goods combined constituted 
31% of Japan’s total exports. Exports of D.R.M. and 
I.R.M. combined increased absolutely from an annual 
average of 863 million Yen in the years 1932-36 to 975 
million Yen in the years 1937-41. However, in relative 
terms it dropped from 41% to only 31% during the same 
period. Similarly, exports of raw silk increased absolutely 
from an annual average of 348 million Yen to 388 million 
Yen. However, in relative terms it dropped from 16% to 
12% (See Table 58). The fall in relative terms of the
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combined D.R.M., I.R.M. and raw silk share of total 
exports was due to the increase in exports of capital goods 
These exports of capital goods were mainly to Manchuria 
and China.
Japan!s exports of raw silk were replaced in importanc 
by exports of D.R.M. and I.R.M. goods during the period 
1932-41. This indicates that Japanfs export trade 
relied increasingly on D.R.M. and I.R.M. goods, rather 
than on exports of raw silk, after the Manchurian 
Incident in 1931. As a result, these commodities became 
Japan’s most important source of foreign currency in 
the 19301s •
”Silk tissues and artificial.'silk tissues” and 
"cotton tissues” were the most important items in the 
categories of D.R.M. and I.R.M. goods respectively.
(See Table 58). The position of raw silk in Japan’s 
export trade was in fact taken over by these two items 
in the period 1932-41.
Moreover, exports of cotton tissues were substantial 
in the 1930*s. Exports of this item were even larger 
than those of raw silk from the later 1930*s. (See Table 
58). This implies that exports of cotton tissues to 
Asian markets were larger than exports of raw silk to 
America during this period. The abandonment of the gold 
standard and Japanese economic expansion in Asia after 
the Manchurian Incident of 1931 are important in explaining 
these changes.
(D) exports of cotton goods to Southeast Asia.
From the above analysis, it is clear that Southeast 
Asia purchased more I.R.M. goods than D.R.M. goods from 
Japan. Table 59 shows that total exports of D.R.M. and 
I.R.M. goods combined to Southeast Asia amounted to more 
than 60% (I.R.M. goods alone constituted around 50%) of
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Japan!s total exports to the region throughout the period 
1914-41. Among I.R.M. goods, cotton goods were 
predominant in Japanese exports to Southeast Asia, 
and among cotton goods, cotton tissues were particularly 
important. (See Table 60).
In short cotton goods, especially cotton tissues, 
were the main Japanese export to Southeast Asia during 
the inter-war period.
This was a crucial problem in Japan’s foreign trade. 
Raw silk had long been the most important commodity in 
Japan’s export trade, but it suffered a drastic drop in 
value during and after the world economic crisis of 
1929-31. After that date Japan’s main export was dependent 
on a foreign rather than domestic raw material - that 
is raw cotton. Prices of raw cotton imported into Japan 
rose markedly after 1931 essentially because of the 
depreciation of the Yen following the abandonment of 
the gold standard in December 1931, and later because of
the cotton control policy adopted by America after the
(3)cotton panic of June 1932. This increase in the cotton 
price eventually caused a deterioration in Japan’s trade 
balance. In addition the price of imports of machinery 
and engines from America and Europe also increased after 
1931. Japan’s own heavy industry was largely committed 
to military production. Therefore, although Japan produced 
some machinery and engines for its own industry - and 
for export to the Yen-bloc - imports of these items 
were very substantial up to 1942.
The more cotton goods that were exported, the 
larger the raw cotton and machinery imports that were 
required. Japan lowered her domestic wages and expanded 
exports of cotton goods to Asia, in order to prevent 
further deterioration in her trade balance. This export
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effort provoked many difficulties which Japan could 
not easily tackle. These will be considered in more 
detail in the following section.
Part 2 « Exports of Cotton Goods and Dependence on Raw 
Cotton and Machinery Imports.
(A) Dependence on raw cotton and machinery imports.
(a) Dependence on U.S.A. and Indian raw cotton supplies
As noted in Section Two,throughout the inter-war 
period raw cotton was imported mainly from the U.S.A. 
and India. Comparatively low-quality Indian raw cotton 
was used extensively by Japan, as Japanese cotton goods 
were exported mainly to Asia, Africa, and Central and 
South America. In other words, Japan produced relatively
low-quality cotton goods which were consumed by countries
(4)with low per-capita incomes. However, although 
India supplied a very substantial volume of raw cotton 
to Japan throughout the inter-war period, imports from 
the U.S.A. into Japan surpassed those from India after 
1929. This was due to the following reasons. First, raw 
cotton output in India was increasingly consumed by 
the Indian spinning industry in this period. Up to the 
First World War, exports of Indian cotton yarn were 
restricted by British policy in India and by keen 
competition from J a pan.^ The Indian spinning industry 
developed rapidly during and after the First World War 
as a result of the temporary absence of British cotton 
goods during the hostilities, and later as a result of 
high import duties imposed on Japanese goods by India.
The total number of spindles and looms in the Indian 
spinning industry increased substantially in this period, 
as shown in Table 61. It followed that the development 
of the Indian spinning industry led to increasing domestic 
consumption of Indian raw cotton. Raw cotton consumed 
by the Indian spinning industry increased from an
annual average of 2,143,126 bales (each of 392 lbs)
(6 )
in 1913-14 to 2,633,176 bales in 1930-31. This increase 
in consumption was sufficient to restrict the amount of 
raw cotton available for export.
Table 61
The Development of the Indian Spinning Industry
(unit: thousand)
Year No. of 
spindles
Spindles
in
operation
No. of 
looms
Looms in 
operation
1914 6,788 5,848 104 85
1917 6,738 6,067 114 100
1920 6,763 6,238 119 105
1925 8,510 7,454 154 135
1928 8,704 6,505 166 126
1931 9,311 8,093 182 157
1934 9,572 n.a. 194 n.a.
1937 9,876 n. a. 197 n.a.
1938 10,020 n.a. 200 n.a.
Sources: Takako Sanpei, Nihon Mengyo Hattatsu-shi (Studies
on the Development of the Japanese Cotton Industry) 
1941, PP.213-214; M.P.Gandhi, the Indian Cotton 
Textile Industry, 1930, P.95.
Note: n.a. = Not Available.
Second, during this period America provided comp­
aratively good quality raw cotton to Japan. This 
ensured the production of improved quality cotton goods 
in Japan, so enabling her to compete with Indian and 
Chinese cotton goods. Japan depended almost entirely on 
Indian and Chinese raw cotton to produce cotton yarn 
below 20*s; however, she depended mainly on American
(7)
cotton in producing 24fs and 60fs. Therefore, despite 
increases in American cotton prices from the early 1930's, 
Japan imported more cotton from America to make better- 
quality cotton goods - higher counts of yarn, finer 
varieties of cloth.8^
Furthermore, we must note that from the early 1930fs 
domestic cotton consumption in Japan also increased 
along with the increase in exports of Japanese cotton 
goods. Therefore Japan had to import more raw cotton 
to meet her domestic and export needs. Between 1932-36 
although imports of both Indian and American raw cotton 
combined remained between 11.0 and 12.7 million piculs 
there was a clearly discernible trend towards lowering 
America's share in favour of India. (See Table below). 
However, the annual average of imports from America 
(6.94 million piculs) was much higher over this period 
than that from India (4.89 million piculs). This shows 
that America was still Japan’s most important source of 
raw cotton not only for quality but also for quantity.
Imports of Raw Cotton from India and America
(unit: million piculs)
India America Combined
1932 2.74 9.10 11.84
1933 3.98 7.43 11.41
1934 5.79 6.49 12.28
1935 5.21 5.76 10.97
1936 6.73 5.93 12.66
1932-36
(average)
4.89 6.94 11.83
Source: YC, op. cit., P .243
Imports of raw cotton from China were less important 
than those from either the U.S.A or India, except in 1941. 
The low volume of imports from China for the period 
prior to 1941 was due largely to the fact that most 
Chinese raw cotton was of a far lower quality than that 
from the U.S.A. Moreover, raw cotton production in 
China was increasingly consumed by the Chinese spinning 
industry and by the "Zaikabo" (the Japanese spinning 
industries in China itself).
Imports of raw cotton from India and China fell 
further and further behind Japanese requirements.
Thus Japan's dependence on U.S. raw cotton imports was 
decisive. Prices of imported raw cotton from U.S.A. 
increased from 135.2 in 1931 (1914=100) to 388.1 in 
1937. This implied an increasing burden on Japan's 
trade balance as she consumed large quantities of American 
raw cotton.
(b) Dependence on the U.S.A and Europe for machinery 
and engines.
For imports of machinery and engines Japan was 
completely dependent on the U.S.A. and Europe throughout 
the inter-war period. Suspension of exports of machinery 
and engines by England or America was one of the great 
fears for Japan in this period. As Japan's relations 
with America and England worsened in the 1930's, this 
fear increased. As an insurance, a great effort was 
made by Japan to produce machinery and engines domestically, 
particularly machinery for the spinning industry. In 
addition an attempt was made to switch imports of these 
items from America and England to Germany.
To a certain extent, this effort was successful.
Heavy industrial production was greatly expanded in 
Japan in the 1930's. In addition imports of machinery 
and engines from Germany increased greatly in the 1920's
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and surpassed those from England in the 1930's. Imports 
of these items from Germany amounted to only 5 thousand 
Yen in 1919, but this rose to 21 million Yen in 1929, 
and to 73 million Yen in 1938. Imports of machinery and 
engines from England were only 15 million Yen in 1938.
However, as noted earlier, Japan's heavy industrial 
development in the 1930's was concentrated largely on 
munitions production. Japan did not produce sufficient 
machinery and engines for its own industrial sector. 
Consequently, imports from the U.S.A. were still of some 
importance in the 1920's and 1930's.
(B ) Imports of raw cotton from the Yen-bloc and 
raw cotton cultivation in Southeast Asia.
The spinning industry was the most important industry 
in Japan from the very beginning of Japanese industrial 
development. Exports of cotton goods rapidly developed 
after the First World War. During the period 1932-41 
exports of cotton goods surpassed exports of raw silk. 
Cotton goods played a particularly important role in 
improving Japan's international trade balance in the 
period 1932-37, at a time when Japan depreciated its 
currency in order to expand exports.
However, Japan was concerned over the possible 
suspension of raw cotton exports from the U.S.A. and 
from India, (which in the latter case depended largely 
on British policy). The cessation of raw cotton imports 
from these two countries would mean that Japan would 
have to halt its cotton goods production. Imports of 
raw cotton from China could not meet Japan's requirements. 
And indeed when imports of raw cotton from America 
diminished from 52% (6,942,000 piculs) of total imports 
in 1932-36 to 29% (2,716,577 piculs) in 1937-41, the 
result was serious contraction of Japanese cotton goods 
exports.
Japan had established raw cotton production in 
Osaka and Aichi from the very creation of its mechanized 
spinning industry in the 1880's. Japan started to export 
cotton goods in 1889 and in the following year began to 
import Chinese raw cotton* Dependence on Chinese and 
Indian raw cotton was built up in the period 1889-1892*
Imports of raw cotton further increased when Japan 
abolished its Cotton Import Tariff in 1896 thus allowing 
cotton to be imported without duty* As soon as the 
First World War broke out, the U.S.A. replaced China 
as a major supplier of raw cotton to Japan.
At the beginning of the 1930fs Japan drew up a 
cotton self-sufficiency programme. It was based on 
increasing cotton production in the Yen-bloc and later 
in Southeast Asia.^ This programme was principally 
the result of the immense increase in raw cotton con­
sumption in Japan and the rise in American raw cotton 
prices. It attempted to reduce dependence on American 
supplies. Exports of cotton goods to Asian countries 
increased markedly from the early 1930fs and this 
forced Japan to import more and more raw cotton. Furthermore, 
the revoking of the Japan-India Commercial Treaty in 
April 1933 and the suspension of Indian cotton imports 
by Japan soon after, created a panic in the Japanese 
spinning industry. This panic strengthened Japanese 
determination to establish cotton self-sufficiency.
The first Japanese effort in this direction was 
to cultivate cotton in Korea. Raw cotton production had 
been temporarily built up in Korea after the First World 
War. However, production then fell and was eventually 
halted on Japan's insistence that Korea produce only 
foodstuffs. But Korean cotton production was again 
encouraged by Japan from the beginning of the 1930's.
A plan was drawn up to produce 420 million Kin of 
cotton in the decade after 1935j10  ^ Cotton production 
in Korea increased in the 1930Ts due mainly to immense
investment by the Japanese spinning industry. However,
Korea was still unable to produce sufficient cotton to 
meet Japanese needs, for the Korean agricultural sector 
continued to concentrate on rice.
Japan also encouraged raw cotton cultivation in 
Chinaj11  ^ In the early development of the Japanese 
spinning industry in the years 1873-1895 China had been 
Japan's largest supplier of raw cottcm.^12  ^ Imports of 
Chinese raw cotton surpassed those from America in this 
period due partly to their lower quality. As China was 
in the early 1920's the third largest cotton-producing 
country in the world after America and India, Japan 
expected her, rather than Korea, to produce raw cotton - 
particularly following the Japanese occupation of Manchuria.
li/ith the encouragement of the Nationalist Government, 
cotton production in China amounted to 11.3 piculs in 
1934. This was 48% higher than production in 1930.
Cotton production in North China comprised 60% of China's
(13)
total cotton production in 1934. After the First 
World War, continental cotton (so-called North China - 
American cotton - its quality was between that of American 
and Indian cotton) was transplanted from Japan and 
cultivated in North China, particularly in Shantong and 
Shanxi provinces. This Japanese policy was, to some 
extent, successful, and enabled North China (Shantong, 
Shanxi, Sanxi, Hebei and Henan provinces) to produce 
7.1 million tons of raw cotton by 1936. This was 
sufficient to meet the needs of the Japanese spinning 
industry in China itself.
Nevertheless, when we consider raw cotton consumption 
in Japan proper, China provided only a small part of 
the total raw cotton requirements of Japan. For example, 
in 1933-37 raw cotton consumption in Japan proper 
amounted on average to 13 million piculs per annum.
Of this only 0.27 million piculs was provided by China.
In other words, China provided only 2% of Japan’s total 
raw cotton requirements in this p e r i o d F u r t h e r m o r e ,  
Japan’s military expansion in China faced constant resistance 
from the Chinese people. An anti-Japanese movement in 
China, thwarted complete Japanese occupation of North 
China, the principal cotton growing area* In fact 
cotton production in North China, as well as in other 
parts of the country, decreased markedly after 1936, 
as the following Table makes clear*
Cotton Cultivation Area and Cotton Production in China
Cultivation area (1,000 acres) Production (1,000 piculs)
North
China
Remainder Total North
China
Remainder T otal
1936 28,937 27,273 56,210 7,131 7,337 14,468
1937 2,144 1,575 3,719 6,165 4,216 10,381
1938 1.043 862 1,905 4,089 3,203 7,292
Source: Compiled from Takako Sanpei, op * cit.. PP.348-350
In 1938, Japan again proposed to encourage raw 
cotton production in China, particularly in North China. 
Production in North China was expected to increase from
about 4 million piculs in 1938 to 5.8 million piculs
(15)in 1941, and then to 10 million piculs in 1946. But 
this plan was unsuccessful, due essentially to Japan’s 
further involvement in war and eventual defeat in 1945.
It was impossible for Japan to achieve complete 
self-sufficiency in raw cotton from within the Yen-bloc 
and later from within the ’’Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere”. Japan consumed on average 13 million piculs of 
raw cotton in each year from 1933-37 but raw cotton 
production in the Yen-bloc (China - including Kwantung 
province, Manchuria and Taiwan; Korea) and Southeast 
Asia totalled only 9.7 million piculs per annum during 
the same period* In other words, even if all the raw 
cotton produced in the Yen-bloc and Southeast Asia
had been exported to Japan, Japan would have secured 
only 75% of her raw cotton requirements. The remainder 
would have had to have been imported from America and 
India. But not all raw cotton production in the Yen-bloc 
and Southeast Asia was available for export to Japan.
China itself was a major raw cotton consumer. Although 
she produced on average 9.1 million piculs of raw 
cotton each year between 1933 and 1937, she consumed 9.6 
million piculs each year during the same period. Consequently, 
Japan’s cotton self-sufficiency programme was designed 
first to ensure a sufficient supply of raw cotton to 
the Japanese spinning industry in China, and second to 
prevent the contraction of cotton-goods production in 
Japan itself, were imports of raw cotton from America and 
India'to cease. Japan constantly encouraged raw cotton 
production in the Yen-bloc, in spite of the fact that 
her colonies would be unable to export sufficient raw 
cotton to Japan to meet her needs.
When the war in China was prolonged beyond Japan’s 
initial expectations, she turned to Southeast Asia for 
an expansion in cotton cultivation. Imports of raw cotton 
from the Yen-bloc were increasingly short of Japan’s 
requirements. Moreover at the same time, conflict with 
the Western powers in Asia, particluarly with America, 
was coming to the surface. Raw cotton was not as 
important to Japan as war supplies, notably petroleum 
and rubber. In any case the need to expand exports of 
cotton goods in order to acquire foreign currency would 
vanish when, as the Japanese intended, a major part of 
Asia came under Japanese domination. However, without 
raw cotton, Japan would not have been able to produce 
cotton goods for her own needs. A nation-wide panic 
would have emerged if no raw cotton had been available 
for the spinning industries.
By 1936, Germany had diversified her sources of 
raw cotton supplies to thirty c o u n t r i e s T h i s
div/ersification might have attracted Japanese attention#
Japan considered Southeast Asia as an important supplier 
in general outside the Yen-bloc. However, Southeast 
Asia had a low level of cotton cultivation at that time^17) 
as cotton production had not been encouraged by the 
Western colonial administrations* The average annual 
raw cotton production in Southeast Asia (including Burma) 
in the years 1936-38 was less than 0*5 million piculs 
(see Table 62)* Nevertheless, Japan felt she must 
acquire more raw cotton from Southeast Asia, as well as 
from the Yen-bloc#
Table 62
Cotton Production in East Asia
(unit:l,000 piculs)
Country 1936 1937 1938
Korea 458 801 701
Manchuria 319 380 289
China 14,468 10,651 8,078
15,245 11,832 9,068
F.I.C. 22 20 n.a.
S. 23 32 20
P. 8 8 n.a.
N.E.I. 22 32 35
Burma 345 453 322
420 ' 545 377
T otal 15,665 12,377 9,445
Australia 32 37 47
India 18,852 17,303 15,255
Source: Toshiyoshi Okabe, op, cit*. P.265. 
Note: n.a* s Not available.
To accomplish this, a self-sufficiency programme 
within the Yen-bloc was introduced from the beginning of 
the 1930fs, and an expansion of cotton cultivation 
in Southeast Asia was planned. This self-sufficiency 
programme included the training of experts in cotton 
production, and financing local agricultural co-operative 
associations and local research institutes. For example 
Japan disbursed 17,650 Yen to Korea in 1938 1^8) and
(19)2,470 Yen to Taiwan in 1937 to encourage local cotton 
production. In 1933 Japan spent 2.25 million Yen 
(Japanese Government 1 million Yen; the Japanese Spinning 
Associations 1 million Yen; and the South Manchurian 
Railway Company 0*25 million Yen) to establish an 
association called the Manshu Menka Kyokai ( the Manchuria 
Cotton Association). This was designed to encourage 
cotton production in M a n c h u r i a . I n  1935 Japan established 
the Xing Zhong Company ( a subsidiary of the South 
Manchurian Railway Company) with a capital of 10 million 
Yen in order to encourage raw cotton production in North 
China. The Xing Zhong Company worked with the Nihon 
Menka Dogyokai (the Japan Cotton Association), Nihon 
Boseki Dogyokai (the Japanese Spinning Association),
Toa Menka Kyokai (the East Asian Cotton Association),
Nichiman Menka Kyokai (the Japan Manchuria Cotton Association)
and Santo Menka Kairyo Kyokai (the Shangtong Cotton
(21)
Improvement Association) in North China. Moreover in 
1937 20 million Yen and 30 million Yen were invested 
in establishing the Nanyo Takushoku-gaisha (the South 
Sea Colonization Company) and the Taiwan Takushoku- 
gaisha (the Taiwan Colonization Company) respectively
in order to secure raw materials, including iron ore,
(2 2 )
oil, rubber and raw cotton from Southeast Asia. Then, 
in 1937, the Japanese Cotton Association spent 1,854 Yen 
in assisting the Nanyo Gunto Sangyo Kyokai (the Industrial
Association in the Southern Islands) in its attempts to
(23)
cultivate cotton in the Southern Islands.
In addition the Japanese introduced American cotton 
varieties into the Yen-bloc and Southeast Asia for they 
regarded the cotton cultivated in Asia as being of low 
quality. A great effort was made by Japan in sending 
delegations and individual experts to the Japanese 
dominions to investigate the possibility of cultivating 
American cotton there. Soil, climate and topography 
were taken into account and particular areas were 
eventually chosen for the cultivation of American cotton.
For example, as early as 1916, the Mitsubishi Zaibatsu 
was involved in cotton cultivation in North China.
This was initially based in Shijia-zhuang and later 
extended to Zhending, Uuji, Shuru, Shunde and Zhangde 
prefectures. Mitsubishi distributed American cotton 
seeds to the Chinese peasants, on condition that they 
sold their raw cotton only to the company. Cotton 
cultivation in this area developed after more than ten 
years* involvement by Mitsubishi, which purchased almost 
all the raw cotton produced. In 1918 Toyo Takushoku- 
gaisha (the Eastern Colonization Company) also started 
cotton cultivation in Shandong Province. Amongst the 
millions spent in expanding the cultivation of American 
cotton was for example the Eastern Colonization Company 
which made a loan of 0.2 million Yen to a Japanese 
cotton company and to the Shuntai Company in Jinan in 
order to expand the cultivation of American cotton in 
Zouping, Zhangdian and Gaomi prefectures. The Company 
purchased most of the raw cotton production from these 
prefectures. In addition in April 1934 the Okura and 
the Sumitomo Zaibatsu established the Manshu Menka-gaisha 
(the Manchuria Cotton Company) in Manchuria to promote
cotton cultivation along the Liao basin. The Zaibatsu
(24)
purchased all the cotton production from this area.
In April 1933, the Manshu Menka Kyokai (the Manchuria
/ 25)
Cotton Association) was established. This Association 
encouraged cotton cultivation in Manchuria through the 
selection and distribution of cotton seeds and by 
encouraging and instructing the Chinese peasants. In 
the following year a joint-venture, the Manzou Mianhua 
Gufen Youxian Gongsi (the Manchurian Cotton Co. Ltd.) 
was established with a capital of 2 million Yen of which 
the Manchurian Government contributed 1 million Yen.
This Company established 29 raw cotton purchasing offices
in the principal cotton producing areas of Manchuria
and also established cotton spinning factories in Dahushan,
Liaoyang, Dashiqiao and Mianzou. The purpose was to 
control both raw cotton production and the manufacture
/ 9 / - \
of cotton goods in Manchuria.
With regard to Thailand, the Japanese Foreign Office 
financed cotton cultivation in Udon and Nakhon Rajashima 
Provinces in the Northeast, Phitsanulok Province in 
Central Thailand and in several Northern provinces. It 
was reported that in 1937 the area under cotton cultivation 
in Thailand was little more than two thousand Chobu 
(1 Chobu = 2.45 acres). Cotton production was only 30,000 
piculs, Japan had intended that Thailand would eventually 
produce 1 million bales of cotton annually on the 
assumption that the cotton cultivation area was expanded 
to 548,000 Chobu. As the first step in this programme, 
in 1937 Japan set up a Five Year Plan, aimed at expanding 
cotton cultivation in the above provinces. The immediate
target was 0.1 million Chobu and 0.1 million bales over
(27)five years. The Thai Government was required to meet 
the expenses of promoting cotton cultivation among its 
people whilst cotton experts were sent by Japan to 
Thailand/28  ^ The Taiwan Colonization Company was, through 
its subsidiary the Taiwan Menka (the Taiwan Cotton 
Company, established in 1937), responsible for carrying 
out this project. *29^
In the Philippines, Batangas (in the Southern area 
of Luzon) and Irokos (?) (in the North of Luzon) 
were regarded as suitable places for the expansion of 
cotton cultivation!30  ^ In 1918, the area of the Philippines 
under cotton cultivation was 2,115 hectares producing 
2,120,083 kg of cotton per annum. However, in 1932, only
725 hectares were under cultivation producing only
(31)147,260 kg annually. In 1935, experiments were carried 
out in the Philippines with a view to reviving cotton 
cultivation in the islands. Japanese commercial agents 
reacted promptly to this development and made a tour 
of inspection through those provinces which were experimenting
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with cotton. They then announced their readiness to
(32)purchase any supplies that became available. In 1937, 
the area under cotton cultivation in the Philippines was 
about 2,000 hectares which produced 501,984 kg of cotton 
per annum. Once again Japan showed great interest in 
promoting and purchasing cotton from the Philippines.
The Japanese authorities estimated that the Philippines
could produce 36,288,000 kg of cotton each year in the
(33)
five years after 1942.
In New Guinea in the Netherlands Indies, Japan 
successfully cultivated cotton through the Nanyo Kohatsu- 
gaisha (the South Seas Development Company). In addition 
high quality American cotton was produced in Celebes.
The Japanese authorities estimated that the Netherlands 
Indies could produce 1 million piculs of cotton per annum
from 1942, if cotton cultivation were expanded to Java,
_ , , „ (34)
Sumatra and Borneo.
In French Indo China, Annam and Cambodia were both 
regarded as suitable areas for expanding cotton cultivation. 
This view was based on a detailed investigation undertaken 
in 1941 by Nakae Enomoto (1892-1961), Emeritus Professor 
of Kyoto University. Enomoto stressed that 40,000 
Chobu of uncultivated land in Cambodia could be used 
for cotton cultivation. Moreover the Japanese Spinning 
Association estimated that 3 million hectares of red 
clay land in French Indo China as a whole could be used
for cotton cultivation. This area would yield at least
(35)4 million piculs of raw cotton each year.
Finally Japan formed companies and organizations 
to import raw cotton from the Yen-bloc and from Southeast 
Asia. Toyo Menka Kabushiki-gaisha (the Toyo Cotton Co. 
Ltd.), Nippon Menka Kabushiki-gaisha (the Japan Cotton
Co. Ltd.) and Gosho Kabushiki-gaisha (the Gosho Co.
Ltd.) were the three largest of those companies in the
Asian cotton trade* They set up numerous branches and 
subsidiaries throughout Asia to purchase raw c o t t o n j ^
Those local governments and agricultural co-operative 
associations u/hich accepted Japanese assistance in the 
cultivation of cotton were obliged to sell their 
raw cotton to Japan* In order to purchase cotton from
China and Southeast Asia, Japan had formed some 15-16
(37)companies by 1932. From then, the Manchurian cotton
/ 3Q) ^
Co. Ltd. was formed in 1934, the Xing Zhong Koshi
(the China Development Company) in North China in 1935^39^
the Hokushi Menka Kaisha (the North China Cotton Company)
in 1936 and the Siam Sangyo Kyokai (the Siam Industry
Association) and the Siam Menka Kabushiki-gaisha (the
Siam Cotton Co* Ltd.) in 1937i41  ^ The cotton produced in
these areas was almost completely purchased by Japan.
However, in spite of these efforts on the part 
of the Japanese, Japan*s cotton self-sufficiency programme 
was unsuccessful. First although the programme was 
earnestly pursued from the very beginning of the 1930fs, the 
cotton cultivation policy was continually interrupted as 
Japan became increasingly involved in war. Second, 
cotton production in these areas could, at best, supply 
sufficient raw cotton to meet the needs of the Japanese 
spinning industry in China. But they could never supply 
sufficient raw cotton to meet the needs of Japan herself.
□n the eve of the Pacific war, Japan estimated that each 
year she could secure 943,000 piculs of raw cotton from 
Korea and China, 80,000 piculs from Southeast Asia, and 
526,000 piculs from Central and South America. These 
three regions would thus provide 1,594,000 piculs 
per annum (see Table 63). However, Japan also estimated 
that she would consume 2,304,000 piculs of raw cotton 
each year if there was a war. Therefore Japan would be 
short of 755,000 piculs of raw cotton each year even if 
she could secure supplies from the ”Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere” and from Central and South America^.42) 
But, to import from Central and South America would be
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impossible in war conditions. Moreover to import from 
China would itself be very difficult if Japan were 
involved in war. And then Southeast Asia could supply 
only 80,000 piculs of raw cotton each year despite the 
considerable efforts made by Japan in the region.
In fact, after the beginning of the Pacific war, 
acquiring raw cotton from its dominions was less important 
to Japan than acquiring other war supplies, principally 
petroleum, rubber, iron ore, bauxite, and later, salt 
and foodstuffs.
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Part 3 . The Restriction of Exports of Cotton Goods to China.
The spinning industry was a key industry in Japanese 
economic development. It developed rapidly during the 
later nineteenth century and by the end of the century 
it not only dominated the domestic market but also 
competed with other countries in foreign markets. Exports
of cotton yarn and cotton tissues were greater than imports
(43)in 1897 and 1909 respectively. Korea and China were 
the two most important markets for Japanese cotton 
manufactures. Japan began to drive away Indian and English 
cotton manufactures from the Korean market during the 
Sino-Japanese war (1895). She completely controlled the 
Korean market after the Russo-Japanese war (1905).
Thereafter by establishing a powerful cotton tissues 
export organization (which was supported by the Bank 
of Japan), by taking advantage of the cheap transport 
provided by the South Manchuria Railway Company and the 
Japan-Manchuria-Korea Railways, and by the low tariffs 
on Japanese goods in Manchuria, Japan ousted American 
cotton tissues from the Manchurian market by 1913. ^ 44)
Japan then began to compete with England in the 
Chinese market. Until 1916, England held a firm position 
in the Chinese cotton tissues market. But Japanfs 
exports of cotton tissues increased substantially after 
1914 and surpassed those from England (including India) 
by 1917. In 1919 Japanese goods amounted to 62% of 
Chinafs total cotton tissue imports. (See Table 64).
The First World War led to the suspension of exports 
of cotton tissues from England to Asia. This gave the 
Chinese and Indian spinning industries an opportunity to 
increase their production for their domestic markets. 
However, Japan's exports of cotton goods to China, India 
and Southeast Asia also increased significantly during 
the First World War. Indeed Japan to a large extent, 
displaced English cotton manufactures in Asian markets.
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Table 64
China: Imports of Cotton Tissues from Principal Countries*
(unit 1.000 Haikwan Tael")
Year
Japan Engl«
(incl.
and
[ndia)
Hong Kong
Value % Value % Value %
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
25,168
25,839
30,493
54,046
57,298
87,920
23.9 
31*2 
41.1 
56.0
56.9 
62.4
63,835
46,977
31,934
31,100
31,555
36,368
58.3
56.7
43.0
32.2
31.2 
25.9
10,939
9,961
8,887
1,078
9,852
11,577
10.0
12.1
12.0
11.1
9.8
8.0
Source: Nagayoshi Yamazaki,Shina Shizyo ni Okeru 
Gaikokusei Menpu no Kenkyu (A Study of Foreign Cotton 
Tissues in Chinese Markets), in Shina, vol. 16, No.9.
However, this is quoted from Kazuichiro Ono, Daiichizi 
Taisen Zengo no Gaikoku Boeki (Foreign Trade Around 
the First World War) in Nihon Shihonshuqi Hattatsu 
Shiron (History of the Development of Japanese Capitalism), 
vo1 II, 1972, P.249.
Japanfs exports of cotton yarn increased from 78 
million Yen in 1914 to 158 million Yen in 1918; her exports 
of cotton tissues increased from 35 million Yen to 238 
million Yen during the same period. Exports of cotton 
tissues increased more than exports of cotton yarn, 
because the Chinese and Indian markets were thrown open 
to Japan whilst, at the same time, China and India could 
produce sufficient cotton yarn to meet their own requirements.
The expansion of Japanese cotton tissue exports 
to China was, of course, not without its difficulties.
However, at the same time competition with India for 
ChinaTs cotton yarn market became less severe. China 
had been India!s principal cotton yarn market during the 
Meiji Period but India was surpassed by Japan as a supplier 
of the Chinese market in 1912. JapanTs exports of cotton
yarn to China surpassed those from India in every year 
between 1914-25 (except 1920).
Japan*s main rival in China was in fact the 
Chinese spinning industry. The absence of English cotton 
goods during the First World War gave Chinafs spinning 
industry an opportunity to develop. Table 65 shows that 
the number of spindles in the Chinese spinning industry 
increased from 504 in 1913 to 2,033 in 1923. However, 
at the same time Japanese cotton goods flooded the 
Chinese market, provoking Chinese resistence. For example 
the introduction of increased customs duties in 1918 
and the 4th May Movement in 1919, were directed principally 
against Japanese commercial penetration of China.
Table 65
Ownership of Spindles in China by Nationality
................. 1 Chinese Japanese English Others T otal
1913 No. of 
Spindles 504 75 176 80 835
% 60.4 9.0 21.1 9.6 100.0
1923 No. of 
Spindles 2,033 961 255
— 3,250
% 62.6 29.6 7.8 — 100.0
1927 No. of 
Spindles 2,033 1,303 205
— 3,541
% 57.4 36.8 5.8 — 100.0
1931 No. of 
Spindles 2,403 2,630 177
— 4,210
% 57.1 38.7 4.2 — 100.0
Source: Toakeizai Chosakyoku, Shina Bosekioyo no Hattatsu
to Sono Syorai (The Development and Future of Chinafs 
Spinning Industry). However, this Table is quoted from 
Ichiro Nakanishi, Kinyushutsu Saikaishi Igo no Boeki- 
Kawase Mondia (Trade and Foreign Exchange Problems after 
the Reapplication of the Gold Embargo) in Nihon Shihon-
shugi Hattatsu-shi-Ron (History of the Development 
of Japanese Capitalism), vol.Ill, 1968, P256.
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The development of the "Zaikabo” —  direct investment 
in China by the Japanese spinning industry —  increased 
substantially in response to this initial Chinese 
resistence. The "Zaikabo" were also encouraged by the 
availability of cheap labour and easy access to raw 
cotton supplies in China. Therefore, at a time when the 
Western countries were abandoning the China Market after 
the First World War, Japanese direct capital investment
(45)
in China was being stimulated. The number of spindles 
owned by the "Zaikabo" increased from 75 in 1913 to 
961 in 1923. The development of the "Zaikabo" continued 
throughout the 1920fs though at the time, the Chinese 
spinning industry was stagnant. (See Table 65).
Indeed a large portion of the Chinese spinning industry 
was absorbed by the Japanese "Zaikabo" during this period.
Exports of cotton goods from Japan to China decreased 
in the 1930!s. Japan lost markets in Central and South 
China essentially as a result of the Chinese boycott 
campaign against Japanese goods following the Manchurian 
Incident in 1931. This was at a time when exports of 
raw silk were also falling whilst imports of raw cotton 
and machinery were increasing, so causing Japan to experience 
a severe trade deficit with America throughout the 1930fs. 
India was thus chosen by Japan in the 1930*s as a pot­
ential major export market for her cotton goods, to replace 
China.
183.
Part 4 . The Restriction of Exports of Cotton Goods to India.
India had exported cotton goods (mostly cotton yarn) 
to Japan, Korea, China and other Asian countries at a 
time when the Japanese spinning industry had been still 
at a primitive stage. India was the major rival to 
Japan when, in the Meiji era, the Japanese mechanized 
spinning industry had started to dominate its own 
domestic market. Japan ousted India from the Korean 
cotton yarn market in 1895. She began to compete with 
India in the cotton yarn markets of North China in the 
early 1900s, and of Manchuria after 1905. By 1912, exports 
of cotton yarn from Japan to the whole of China surpassed 
exports from India.
The reasons why the Japanese spinning industry 
developed so quickly and overtook that of India first 
in the Japanese domestic market, and then in Korea and China can 
be summarised as follows.
First, in the years 1887-1896 Japan completely 
abandoned domestic raw cotton production and instead relied 
on Chinese and Indian raw cotton supplies. Japan replaced 
domestic raw cotton production by more profitable raw 
silk production. However, India concentrated on achieving 
self-sufficiency in raw cotton. India’s advantage as 
regards raw cotton supplies was, however, outweighed by 
Japans superior technology and industrializing economy.
Japan transplanted modern spinning techniques from 
England and quickly removed production restrictions that 
derived from Japan’s semi-feudal small-scale agricultural 
structure; Japan replaced the small-scale spinning 
industry with the more efficient English model. India, 
however, maintained her semi-feudal small-scale 
agricultural structure. Thus whilst Japan imported raw 
cotton and concentrated on the export of higher quality 
cotton goods, India concentrated on self-sufficiency in 
raw cotton for export and for use in the production of 
lower quality cotton goods.
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Second, rather than the expensive high quality cotton 
goods exported by England, Japan produced mainly inexpensive 
cotton goods of a slightly lower quality which also had 
a large Asian market. As the Indian Cotton Tariff Board 
noted "the Japanese manufacturers are supplying long-cloth 
and shirtings, which are only slightly inferior to Lancashire 
goods, at prices which are distinctly lower than those 
of the latter, and differ very little from the cost of 
manufacture alone of Indian goods, to which their quality 
is distinctly s u p e r i o r " . I n  short Japanese cotton 
manufactures were of good quality but relatively cheap. 
Therefore, during the First World War the suspension 
of English cotton goods exports to Asia gave Japan a 
major opportunity to expand her markets.
Third, Japan’s expansion into Asian markets was due 
in part to governmental assistance. The Japanese Govern­
ment removed the cotton yarn export duty in 1894 and 
the raw cotton import duty in 1896. The Government 
lent 3 million Yen to the Yokohama Specie Bank in 1897 
in order to assist cotton yarn exports to China. Another 
3 million Yen was lent to the same bank and for the 
same purpose the following year. 4^9^0f course, governmental 
assistance was not confined to economic or financial 
measures. As we have seen, in the case of China, Japanese 
economic expansion was allied with political and military 
expansion.
Fourth, the development of the Indian spinning 
industry was restricted by British imperial policy.
English cotton tissues exported to India were exempt 
from Indian import duty. From 1894 Indian production 
of cotton tissues and cotton yarn 20!s uppers were
subject to a 5% consumption tax. This limited the
(50)
expansion of the Indian spinning industry. Indian 
Factory legislation in 1881, 1891 and 1911 regulated hours 
of work and prohibited children from working in the 
mills. This served to increase the production costs of
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(51)
Indian manufacturers.
Furthermore, high import duties on machinery and
coal, the existence of the managing agency system
(53)and low capital accumulation in India, also restricted 
the expansion of the Indian spinning industry. In contrast, 
in Japan the high efficiency of labour, the widespread 
use of cheap female labour, lower taxation of manufacturers, 
organized bulk-buying of raw cotton in America and India 
and finally low freight rates, 5^4^each ensured the rapid 
expansion of the Japanese spinning industry.
Consequently the Japanese spinning industry not 
only ousted Indian exports from the domestic Japanese 
market, but also overwhelmed Indian exports to Korea 
and China. When Japan’s expansion in China met with 
Chinese resistence, Japan transplanted part of her 
spinning industry to China itself, and also began to 
increase exports of her goods to India and to Southeast 
Asia.
Japan’s exports of cotton yarn and cotton tissues 
increased from 78 million Yen and 35 million Yen in 
1914 to 158 million Yen and 238 million Yen in 1918.
Cotton yarn exported to India increased from 0.9 million 
Yen in 1914 to 35.D million Yen in 1918. Cotton tissues
exported to India increased from 1.7 million Yen to
(55)55.4 million Yen over the same period.
When Indian exports to China were ousted by Japan,
India had to consume most of her cotton yarn production 
domestically. However, due to the fall in English 
exports of cotton tissues to India from 3,104 million 
yards in 1913-14 to 867 million yards in 1918-19, the 
Indian spinning industry was in a position to develop 
quickly during this period. Nevertheless, imports of 
cotton tissues from Japan into India increased from 
only 9 million yards in 1913-14 to 238 million yards 
in 191B-19. (See Table 66). Indeed, as noted earlier
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Table 66
Imports of British and Japanese Cotton Tissues into 
the Indian Market
______________________ (Unit: Million Yard)____________
England Japan Others Total
Year Quantity % Quantity % Quantity % Quantity %
1913-14 3,104 97.1 9 0.3 84 2.6 3,197 100.0
1918-19 867 71.5 238 19.6 107 8.8 1,212 100.0
1924-25 1,614 88.5 155 8.5 54 3.0 1,823 100.0
1925-26 1,287 82.3 217 13.9 60 3.8 1,564 100.0
1926-27 1,467 82.0 244 13.6 77 4.3 1,788 100.0
1927-28 1,543 78.2 323 16.4 107 5.4 1,973 100.0
1928-29 1,454 75.1 357 18.4 126 6.5 1,937 100.0
1929-30 1,248 65.1 562 29.3 109 5.7 1,919 100.0
1930-31 523 58.7 321 36.1 46 5.2 890 100.0
1931-32 383 49.4 340 43.8 52 6.7 776 100.0
1932-33 597 48.7 580 47.3 48 3.9 1,225 100.0
1933-34 426 53.5 349 43.9 21. 2.6 796 100.0
1934-35 552 58.5 374 39.6 18 1.9 944 100.0
1935-36 440 46.4 496 52.4 11 1.2 947 100.0
1936-37 334 43.7 417 54.6 13 1.7 764 100.0
1937-38 267 45.1 306 51.8 18 3.0 591 100.0
1938-39 206 31.8 425 65.6 17 2.6 647 100.0
Source: Compiled from IchirS Nakanishi, op. cit., P.263.
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Japan!s commercial expansion in India posed a severe 
threat to the Indian spinning industry. However, owing 
to the absence of British competition cotton tissue 
production in India increased from 1,164 million yards 
in 1914 to 1,578 million yards in 1917, Nevertheless 
the increase in Indian cotton tissue production was 
relatively small owing to the Japanese competition.
In the face of severe Japanese competition Indian cotton 
yarn production fell slightly from 1,706,000 koli 
(1 koli = 400 pounds) in. 1914 to 1,589,000 koli in 1920,
Japanfs major exports of cotton goods switched 
from China to India in the 1920fs. Exports of Japanese 
cotton yarn to India surpassed those to China in 1926,
In 1929 exports of cotton yarn to India amounted to 50% 
of Japan’s total cotton yarn export: in the same year 
China accounted for only 25%. Exports of cotton tissues 
from Japan to India amounted to 26% of JapanTs total cotton 
tissue.exports in 1929. They surpassed those to China 
in 1931. During the world economic crisis of 1929-31, 
India’s imports of cotton tissues fell substantially.
The annual imports of tissues from England fell from 
1,454 million yards in 1928-29 to 523 million yards in 
1930-31, However, imports of tissues from Japan increased 
in 1929-30 and in 1932-33. Indeed at this time Japan’s 
exports of cotton tissues to India were almost equal 
to those from Britain. Japan’s exports of cotton tissues 
to India surpassed those from Britain in 1935-*36 and 
in 1938-39. In those years India’s imports of cotton 
tissues from Japan were more than twice those from 
England. (See Table 66).
By 1930, the Government of India had established 
an 11% customs duty against British and Japanese cotton 
goods in order to protect the domestic spinning industry. 
However, Japan’s cotton goods continued to flood the 
Indian market, much to the embarrassment of the Government 
of India. In April 1930, the Government introduced a
discriminatory customs duty against Japanese goods.
There were two amendments to this duty in 1931, so that 
by August 1932 Japanese goods paid twice the customs 
duty paid by British imports on entering India. However, 
Japan had abandoned the gold standard in December 1931 
and the Japanese yen had dropped precipitously against 
the rupee. The yen dropped from 147 Rupee in 1931 to 
98 Rupee in June 1932 and 80 Rupee in November of the 
same year. Therefore, Japan could still expand its 
exports of cotton goods to India in the early 1930’s, 
despite the discriminatory duties imposed against 
Japanese imports.
Exports of cotton yarn and cotton tissues from 
Japan to India rose from 5.6 million Yen and 49.9 million 
Yen in 1931 to 14.3 million Yen and 80.7 million Yen 
in 1932. In contrast, imports of British cotton goods 
into India decreased during this period. (See Table 
66). Eventually in April 1933 England required the 
Government of India to renounce the Japan-India Commercial 
Treaty of 1904 and to raise the customs duty against 
Japanese cotton imports from 50% to 75%. At that time 
British imports into India had to pay only 25% dutyl 
These measures were crucial to Japan. The Japanese 
Spinning Association immediately decided to suspend 
the purchase of Indian raw cotton in protest against 
this highly discriminatory customs duty. The price of 
Indian raw cotton dropped drastically and cotton exports 
to Japan diminished. Eventually in January 1934 India
reduced the customs duty against Japanese imports from
(57)
75% to 50%.
In April 1934, Japan established a law called 
Tsusyo Yogo Ho (Adjusting Trade and Protecting Commercial 
Relations). According to this law Japan could raise 
import duties or generally restrict imports in order 
to negotiate over commercial issues with other countries. 
Moreover, as a consumer of Indian raw cotton, Japan had, 
in 1933-34, forced India to suspend its discriminatory
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customs duty against Japanese imports by refusing to 
buy Indian raw cotton. Eventually Japan paid merely 
twice, instead of three times, the customs duty paid 
by British imports into India.
Nevertheless, Japan still had to accept a discriminatory 
customs duty. She could not abandon her dependence 
on India, as both a market for cotton exports and as 
a supplier of raw cotton. As Japan was attempting to 
reduce her dependence on American raw cotton supplies, 
suspension of imports of raw cotton from India would 
simply mean that Japan had to import more from the U.S.A., 
China, Egypt, Brazil and Southeast Asia could never 
export sufficient raw cotton to meet Japan’s needs.
One more point must be emphasized here. During 
the 1930’s the price of imported raw cotton rose more 
rapidly than the price of exported cotton goods. Over 
the period 1932-36 imports of raw cotton into Japan 
increased by 20% in quantity but by 9D% in value.
Japanese exports of cotton tissues increased 33% in 
quantity and 67% in value during the same period. The 
relatively high price of imported raw cotton was due 
largely to the U.S.A.’s price support policy in the 
early 1930’s and the depreciation of the Japanese Yen. 
Conversely the fall in the yen’s value depressed the 
price of exported cotton tissues. This enabled Japan 
to compete with other cotton producers in foreign markets.
The low price of Japanese cotton tissues in the 1930’s 
was also due to low wages and technical improvements 
in the Japanese spinning industry.
Through the trade in cotton goods, frequent conflicts 
occurred between Japan and England (including India,
Egypt and Australia), America (involving the Philippines) 
and the Netherlands (in practice the Netherlands East 
Indies). We will discuss here only the conflict between 
Japan and England, (involving India, Egypt and Australia).
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The first Japan-India Conference was held in India 
in September 1933. The revoking of the Japan-Indian 
Commercial Treaty the previous April and the imposition 
of a highly discriminatory customs duty against Japanese 
cotton goods the previous June had been critical to the 
Japanese economy. Therefore, both governments were eager 
to normalize their trade relationship. After 7 months 
and 48 negotiating sessions, agreement was reached in 
April 1934. The new commercial treaty, with an attached 
protocol, was signed in London in July 1934. India 
abandoned its 75% discriminatory customs duty against 
Japanese cotton goods; Japan agreed not to export more 
than 400 million sq. yards of cotton tissues to India 
each year; Japan also agreed to import 1.5 million bales 
of raw cotton from India annually; exports of Japanese 
cotton tissues into India were to be reduced whenever 
Japan purchased less than 1.5 million bales of raw 
cotton. But Japan still felt that the remaining 
restrictions on her trade in cotton goods and in raw 
cotton, jeopardized her international trade balance.
Indeed Japanese cotton goods were still being discriminated 
against by the Indian customs duty. Similarly, India 
considered that the import of 400 million sq. yards of 
cotton tissues from Japan each year was to her serious 
disadvantage. It was also felt that some imports from 
Japan should bear a higher customs duty. Therefore, the 
protocol attached to the treaty of 1934 was revoked 
by India and Japan in December 1936 with respect to raw 
cotton and in March 1937 with respect to cotton tissues.
In April 1937, a second Japan-India Conference was 
held and soon came to agreement. Japan agreed to 
import 1.57 million bales of raw cotton from India 
each year and India agreed to import more coloured 
tissues and bleached cotton (Terashi-ji) from Japan.
A third Conference was held in October 1939 as the 
agreement made at the 1937 Conference had lapsed in 
March. However, this third Conference was interrupted
/cg\
by the outbreak of war.
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Parallel to the first Japan-India Conference was 
a Japan-Britain Conference held in London in March 1934. 
However, negotiations were soon suspended due to Japanese 
insistence that under the proposed treaty British cotton 
exports be confined to the British Empire. In May 
1934 Britain gave instructions to all her colonies to 
restrict imports of Japanese cotton goods. The Straits 
Settlements, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Zambia, Jamaica 
and Trinidad immediately responded to this campaign.
In addition,in July 1935 the Egyptian government 
denounced the Japan-Egypt Provisional Commercial Agreement 
and a conference between the two countries was held in 
Cairo the following October. This Conference broke 
down in April 1936 due partly to Egypt’s insistence 
that she impose a 40% exchange compensation tax on 
Japanese cotton and silk goods imports and partly due to 
Japan’s insistence that she export 109.74 million sq. M.
of cotton tissues to Egypt each year instead of the 11.5
(60)
million sq.M. requested by Egypt.
Australia imposed a discriminatory customs 
duty on Japanese cotton goods and silk goods imports in 
May 1936 but Japan retaliated by suspending imports of 
Australian wool and wheat. This conflict was settled 
in December 1936 when Australia abandoned the high 
customs duty whilst Japan agreed to import 0.8 million 
bales of wool from Australia by June 1938. Australia 
agreed to import 51.25 million yards of cotton tissues 
and silk tissues from Japan each year.
In short trade conflicts between Japan and 
Britain increased substantially in the 1930*s. This was 
reflected in the restriction or even suspension of the 
import of Japanese cotton goods in many ports of the 
British Empire. Although some commercial compromises 
between Japan and the British dominions, notably 
India and Australia, were reached, Japan’s export of 
cotton goods to the British Empire as a whole was 
seriously restricted in the 1930’s.
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Part 5 . The Restriction of Exports of Cotton Goods to 
Southeast Asia.
Like China and India, Southeast Asia was an important 
consumer of Japanese cotton goods during the inter-war 
period. Southeast Asia’s position in this respect 
became even more important when Japan’s exports of cotton 
goods to China and India were forced to overcome disc­
riminatory customs duties and boycott campaigns.
In the Chinese and Indian cotton markets, Japan 
competed not only with the British spinning industry 
but also with local Chinese and Indian producers. With 
the restriction of British cotton goods exports to Asia 
during the First World War, the Chinese and Indian spinning 
industries developed rapidly as direct rivals to Japanese 
producers, as all three Asian industries produced mainly 
low quality cotton goods.
There was no local Southeast Asian spinning industry, 
though Japan competed with China and India in the 
Southeast Asian cotton market. However China and India 
were not major competitors in Southeast Asia for 
Japan had ousted them from this market. The boycott 
campaign in Southeast Asia against Japanese goods in 
the 1930’s was essentially a protest against the 
Japanese military expansion in China. From the economic 
point of view, the Southeast Asia boycott campaign 
benefitted only the Western spinning industries and 
not the people of Southeast Asia.
The colonial powers were the direct competitors 
of Japan for the cotton market of Southeast Asia. Japan 
competed with America in the Philippines, France in 
French Indo-China, Britain in Siam and the Malay States, 
and the Netherlands in the Netherlands East Indies.
However, in general Britain was the major competitor 
of Japan in Southeast Asia’s cotton market during the
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inter-war period. Britain exported cotton goods not 
only to its own colonies but throughout Southeast Asia. 
Japan switched her exports of cotton goods from China 
and India to Southeast Asia when it became difficult to 
export to the former. Furthermore, imports of raw 
materials from Southeast Asia were becoming increasingly 
vital for the Japanese war economy and this forced 
Japan to expand her exports to the region.
Japanese expansion into the Southeast Asia cotton 
goods market began in earnest during the First li/orld 
War when Europe was involved in hostilities. Although 
Japanese cotton exports to Southeast Asia were not 
particularly substantial during this period, Japan at 
least secured a footing for her later commercial 
expansion in the area.
Japan’s exports of cotton goods to Southeast Asia 
rose markedly during the 1920’s, becoming almost equal 
to her cotton exports to India. (See Table 67). This 
increase in cotton exports to Southeast Asia in the 1920’s 
comprised mainly an increase in exports to the Netherlands 
East Indies. These exports increased particularly 
rapidly in 1920 because Japan could not find a large 
market in China for her cotton goods following the 
imposition of a high tariff and the institution of an 
anti-Japan campaign in 1919. Japan exported over two 
fifths of her cotton tissue exports to India and 
the Netherlands East Indies in 1920.
Exports of both cotton yarn and cotton tissues 
from Japan to the Netherlands East Indies were very 
substantial in the 1930’s. (See Tables 67 and 68). The 
Netherlands East Indies was clearly Japan’s major customer 
in Southeast Asia in this period. This was partly because 
of the size of her population and partly because the 
Indies was an important free trade country at least up 
to the 1930’s. In contrast French Indo-China consumed
Table 6 7 Exports of Cotton Tissues from Japan to Each Country
(Thousand Yen)
Year China Manchuria Kwantung India
Value % Value % Value % Value %
1914 26,188 75.2 3,330 9.6 1,727 5 .0
1915 27,331 71.0 3,177 8.2 3,703 9.6
1916 34,783 57.9 4,024 6.7 10,560 17.6
1917 84,804 66.5 8,988 7.1 15,121 11.9
1918 88,047 37.0 20,832 8.8 55,435 23.3
1919 143,283 51.1 44,207 15.8 29,507 10.5
1920 130,515 39.0 26,592 7.9 67,289 20.1
1921 100,987 49.6
NOT
15,536 7.6 30,465 15.0
1922 108,757 49.0 18,494 8.3 33,567 15.1
1923 100,292 42.7
APPLICABLE
14,617 6.2 36,551 15.6
1924 137,721 42.2 15,700 4.8 47,114 14.4
1925 194,012 44.8 19,501 4.5 70,394 16.3
1926 179,797 43.5 15,858 3.8 69,726 16.9
1927 123,360 32.3 12,983 3.4 85,781 22.5
1928 158,497 45.0 15,073 4.3 70,185 19.9
1929 150,115 36.4 15,358 3.7 109,138 26.4
1930 86,914 31.9 9,186 3.4 61,216 22.5
1931 39,529 19.9 3,543 1.8 6,172 3.1 49,866 25.1
1932 37,158 12.9 3,263 1.1 16,107 5.6 80,653 27.9
1933 25,604 6.7 21,626 5.6 18,822 4.9 71,163 18.6
1934 13,030 2.6 40,253 8.2 19,233 3.9 66,815 13.6
1935 11,912 2.4 35,733 7.2 15,211 3.1 85,182 17.2
1936 7,860 1.6 47,221 9.8 28,331 5.9 72,517 15 .0
1937 11,295 2.0 55,748 9.7 29,425 5.1 63,040 11.0
1938 23,910 5.9 38,009 9.4 17,389 4.3 67,878 16.8
1939 10,908 2.7 4,548 1.1 5,216 1.3 62,364 15.4
1940 29,289 7.3 2,477 0.6 11,114 2.8 62,208 15.6
1941 40,409 14.2 383 0.1 28,743 10.1 35,622 12.5
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Table 6 7 continued
(Thousand Yen)
Year Netherlands East Indies
The Straits 
Settlements
The Philippines Siam
Value % Value % Value % Value %
1914 183 0.5 212 0.6 308 0.9 60 0.2
1915 428 1.1 338 0.9 247 0.6 67 0.2
1916 2,245 3.7 757 1.3 277 0.5 179 0.3
1917 5,701 4.5 1,359 1.1 1,066 0.8 382 0.3
1918 17,693 7.4 3,900 1.6 1,547 0.7 1,544 0.6
1919 24,415 8.7 2,742 1.0 505 0.2 334 0.1
1920 60,465 18.1 6,949 2.1 6,551 2.0 1,362 0.4
1921 25,571 12.6 3,841 1.9 3,779 1.9 609 0.3
1922 24,938 11.2 5,892 2.7 3,452 1.6 1,362 0.6
1923 22,534 9.6 6,048 2.6 5,398 2.3 1,432 0.6
1924 37,153 11.4 7,069 2.2 7,190 2.2 1,574 0.5
1925 49,373 11.4 14,559 3.4 10,888 2.5 2,911 0.7
1926 44,468 10.7 11,998 2.9 9,123 2.2 3,190 0.8
1927 49,213 12.9 9,776 2.6 10,927 2.9 4,038 1.5
1928 39,275 11.2 3,519 1.0 6,797 1.9 1,358 0.4
1929 42,283 10.2 5,797 1.4 5,629 1.4 3,815 0.9
1930 28,284 10.4 6,283 2.3 5,438 2.0 2,581 0.9
1931 28,279 14.2 5,212 2.6 4,162 2.1 795 0.4
1932 50,228 17.4 11,229 3.9 2,769 1.0 3,338 1.2
1933 78,273 20.4 17,607 4.6 5,779 1.5 6,778 1.8
1934 82,829 16.8 17,394 3.5 13,206 2.7 10,818 2.2
1935 66,578 13.4 8,494 1.7 14,492 2.9 13,462 2.7
1936 55,390 11.5 9,187 1.9 7,679 1.6 13,620 2.8
1937 85,603 14.9 12,230 2.1 12,056 2.1 16,148 2.8
1938 39,485 9.8 5,053 1.3 6,053 1*5 14,905 3.7
1939 53,156 13.2 5,447 1.3 5,983 1.5 14,163 3.5
1940 56,265 14.1 7,748 1.9 6,706 1.7 20,958 5.3
1941 62,739 22.1 4,117 1.4 4,856 1.7 18,398 6.5
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Table 6 7 continued
(Thousand Yen)
Year Total of (S.E.A
four
.)
TOTAL(15
Value % Value %
1914 763 2.2 34,840 100.0
1915 1,080 2.8 38,511 100.0
1916 3,458 5.8 60,050 100.0
1917 8,508 6.7 127,458 100.0
1918 24,684 10.3 237,913 100.0
1919 27,996 10.0 280,311 100.0
1920 75,327 22.6 334,966 100.0
1921 33,800 16.7 203,673 100.0
1922 35,644 16.1 222,052 100.0
1923 35,412 15.1 234,754 100.0
1924 52,986 16.3 326,587 100.0
1925 77,731 18.0 432,850 100.0
1926 68,779 16.6 413,699 100.0
1927 73,954 19.9 381,760 100.0
1928 50,949 14.5 352,217 100.0
1929 57,524 13.9 412,706 100.0
1930 42,586 15.6 272,116 100.0
1931 38,448 19.3 198,731 100.0
1932 67,564 23.4 288,712 100.0
1933 108,437 28.3 383,215 100.0
1934 124,247 25.2 492,351 100.0
1935 103,026 20.8 496,097 100.0
1936 85,876 17.8 483,591 100.0
1937 126,037 22.0 573,064 100.0
1938 65,496 16.2 404,239 100.0
1939 78,749 19.5 403,946 100.0
1940 91,677 23.0 399,137 100.0
1941 90,110 31.7 284,181 100.0
Source: Computed from YC, op. cit., PP.168-170. 
Notes: (1) Inaluding all others.
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only a negligible quantity of cotton goods from Japan, 
essentially because imports were strictly controlled by 
France. Japan found it almost impossible to export 
cotton goods to French Indo-China because an extremely
discriminatory customs duty was enforced against
t (64)Japanese goods.
But Southeast Asia as a whole consumed Japanese 
cotton goods on a large scale in the 1930fs. The total 
value of Japanese cotton goods exports increased sub­
stantially in the 1930’s. Indeed cotton exports surpassed 
raw silk exports during this period, partly because the 
price of raw silk dropped drastically after the world 
economic crisis, and partly because cotton goods became 
the most important Japanese export to India and Southeast 
Asia. Exports of cotton goods increased particularly in 
the years 1932-37 due to the depreciation of the 
Japanese Yen. Southeast Asia became the largest consumer 
of Japanese cotton goods after India during this period.
In 1933 and 1934 the Netherlands East Indies was 
the largest market for Japanese cotton tissues in 
Southeast Asia. Exports to the Indies amounted to 20% 
and 17% of Japan’s total cotton tissue exports in those 
years. Exports of Japanese cotton tissues to the Indies 
surpassed cotton tissue exports from the Netherlands 
and from England throughout the 1930’s, except in 1938, 
when Japanese and Dutch cotton exports were virtually 
the same. Exports of cotton tissues from Japan accounted 
for three quarters of the total imports of cotton 
tissues into the Netherlands East Indies in 1933-35.
(See Table 69).
Exports of cotton tissues from Japan to the 
Philippines in the 1930’s were surpassed only by exports 
from the U.S.A. (See Table 70). In addition Japan dominated 
the Siamese cotton market in the period 1933-39, (See 
Table 71), whilst Japanese cotton tissue exports to
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Malaya surpassed exports from England in 1931, 1933 
and 1934. (See Table 72).
In short Japan’s economic expansion into Southeast 
Asia —  through the export of cotton tissues —  directly 
affected Western interests in the area. Exports of 
cotton tissues from. Japan to the Netherlands East Indies 
increased from 28,494 kg in 1929 to 42,903 kg in 1932, 
and to 56,806 kg in 1933. In contrast, imports of cotton 
tissues from the Netherlands itself fell from 17,953 kg 
to 8,380 kg, and then to 3,014 kg ov/er the same years. (65)
The Netherlands almost totally lost its largest cotton 
market as a result of Japanese expansion. Accordingly 
in September 1933, the Netherlands East Indies introduced
an import restriction laui designed to prevent Japanese
(66)
cotton goods from flooding the Indies market. This 
was a serious prospect to Japan, as in 1933 the Netherlands 
East Indies was Japan’s major cotton tissues market in 
Southeast Asia. The Indies absorbed 20% of Japan’s 
cotton tissue exports. Then, in 1934, new restrictions 
against Japanese cotton goods and Japanese firms working 
in the Netherlands East Indies were introduced. 6^7^
With this background, a Japan-Netherlands East Indies 
Conference was held in Batavia in June 1934. However, 
no agreement was reached, and the Japanese delegation 
left the Indies after seven months of futile negotiation.^68^
In June 1936 America imposed an average 42% customs 
duty against Japanese cotton tissues. 6^9^In fact America 
was not an important market for Japanese cotton tissues.
In 1931 America imported only 488,000 sq. yards of 
Japanese cotton tissues that is only 0.03% of Japan’s 
total cotton tissues export. However, American imports 
of Japanese cotton tissues increased to 17.4 million 
sq. yards in 1934 (0.67% of total Japanese cotton tissues 
exports) and 73.4 million sq. yards in 1936 (2.7%).
However when it is noted that exports of American raw 
cotton to Japan amounted to 400 million Yen in 1934,
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and furthermore that in the same year the Japanese spinning 
industry consisted of 9 million spindles compared to
(71)
the 30 million spindles of America, then imports of 
Japanese cotton tissues to the value of 2*7 million Yen 
should not have embarrassed the American government.
However, for three reasons, the American administration 
reacted strongly to the increase in imports from Japan. 
First, it realized that cheap Japanese cotton tissues 
were being switched from the British Empire market to 
the U.S. following the Ottawa Conference of 1932.
Second, it was felt that the switch might be further 
encouraged by the restrictions against Japanese cotton 
tissues which had been imposed by the Netherlands East 
Indies in 1934. Third, in 1934 the American spinning 
industry was in serious difficulties largely as a result 
of the imposition of a new processing tax on raw cotton,
(72)
rises in domestic wages and a reduction of working hours.
Exports of Japanese cotton tissues to America rose 
to 123.8 million sq. yards in 1937 in spite of the 
restrictions imposed against Japanese cotton tissues in 
1936. This increase was partly due to economic recovery 
in America and also to an agreement made between America 
and Japan in Osaka in January 1937 that Japan would be 
permitted to export up to 170 million sq. yards of cotton 
tissues to America each year. ^73^However, owing to Japanese 
involvement in 1937 in China, America lowered her quota 
of imports of cotton tissues from Japan in 1938. Exports
of Japanese cotton tissues to America dropped to 16
(74)
million sq. yards in 1938. They never returned to the 
1936 level.
America was also concerned over the expansion of 
Japanese cotton tissues exports to the Philippines, for 
that market had traditionally been dominated by America. 7^5  ^
However, Japan began to replace America in the Philippines 
cotton tissues market in 1934. Exports of Japanese 
cotton tissues into the Philippines increased from 20.6
million sq. metres in 1932 to 56.4 million sq. metres in 
1934, and then to 72.4 million sq. metres in 1935. In 
contrast, imports of American cotton tissues into the 
Philippines fell from 88.1 million sq. metres to 43.3 
million sq. metres, and then to 35.3 million sq. metres
/ n r  \
over the same years. This embarrassed and annoyed 
the American government and consequently in August 1935 
a conference was held in Washington between the Japanese 
and American governments to discuss this issue. In 
September 1935 an agreement was reached by which Japan 
would, for 2 years, restrict its cotton tissues exports 
to the Philippines to 45 million sq. metres annually. 7^7  ^
However, imports of Japanese cotton tissues into the 
Philippines amounted to 47.4 million sq. metres and 
50.2 million sq. metres in 1936 and 1937. Nevertheless, 
compared to 1935, imports of Japanese cotton tissues 
into the Philippines had been cut by more than 3Q%.
In 1930, Japanese imports were reduced to 37 million sq. 
metres and American cotton tissues imports, at 81.2 
million sq. metres, once.again dominated the Philippines 
market. 7^8^
Exports of cotton tissues from Japan to Southeast 
Asia increased from 292.7 million sq. yards in 1931 to 
668.3 million sq. yards in 1934. This was in line with 
the increase in Japan*s total cotton tissue exports 
from 1413.8 million sq. yards to 2577.3 million sq yards 
over the same period. Obviously Japan would have exported 
more cotton tissues to Southeast Asia if Japanese imports 
had not faced restrictions in the area. Exports of cotton 
tissues to Southeast Asia fell after 1935 but recovered 
in 1937, probably as a result of an agreement between 
Japan and the Netherlands East Indies in April of that 
year whereby exports of cotton tissues from Japan to 
the Indies were allowed to rise to 434.4 million sq. 
yards each year. (See Table 73).
Imports of raw cotton, particularly from America,
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India and Egypt dropped drastically in 1938 due to the 
Japanese invasion of China the previous year. Japan 
depended almost entirely on Chinese raw cotton supplies 
after the outbreak of the Pacific war in 1941. As a 
result, Japanfs total cotton tissue exports decreased 
from 2445.5 million sq. yards in 1939 to 1018.8 million 
sq. yards in 1941, and to only 166.6 million sq. yards 
in 1942. Not unexpectedly, exports of Japanese cotton 
tissues to Southeast Asia also fell during this period, 
although the region had been the most important market 
for Japanese cotton tissues in the 1930fs.
*
Notes on Section Three
1^) In order to avoid confusion, in this study the 
terms ”silk tissues” and "artificial silk tissues” are 
limited to silk fabrics (including cotton mixtures) 
and filament-rayon fabrics (including mixtures but 
exclusive of spun-rayon fabrics).
^  Because of the important position of I.R.fO. 
goods in Japan’s trade with Southeast Asia and because 
Japanese raw silk was not consumed in Southeast Asia, 
raw silk has been temporarily excluded from the D.R.M. 
category.
^  Toitsu Nawa, Nihon Bosekiqyo no Shiteki Bunseki 
(A Historical Analysis of the Japanese Textile Industry) 
1948, PP.313-318.
^  Furthermore, low Japanese wages and advanced 
techniques in mixing cheap cottons, were important in 
the development of the Japanese spinning industry and 
in its domination of foreign markets.
See Takako Sanpei, Nihon Menqyo Hattatsu-shi 
(Studies on the Development of the Japanese Cotton Industry), 
1941, P.211.
Rohinimohan Chaudhuri, The Evolution of Indian 
Industries. Calcutta, 1939, P.131. See also H.P.Gandhi,
The Indian Cotton Textile Industry. Calcutta, 1930 
P.95.
(7) _ _ _
Kiyoshi Matsui ed. , Nichi-In Mengyo Kosho-shi
(Studies in the History of Japanese-Indian Economic 
Relations in the Cotton Trade), 1960, P.198. The ”S” 
count is the technical term used to measure the quality 
of thread or yarn.
1 reel weighs 1 lb. then the quantity is IS
2 reels weigh 1 lb. n » it 2S
It it it 1 lb. it it n ii
II it it 1 lb. n tt n it
20 reels weigh 1 lb. it it it 20S
The higher the ”5” count, the finer (i.e. better) 
the yarn or thread*
Note: 1 reel = 1 hank = 1 skein = 840 yards or 768 
RL in length, for cotton yarn.
f o \
TO.S.Farley, "Japan as a Consumer of American 
Cotton” in FES, 3-7-1935, P.98*
^  Apart from the Yen-bloc and Southeast Asia,
Japan also encouraged cotton production in Brazil by 
increasing imports of raw cotton from that country* The 
cotton producing area in Brazil increased from 1.66 million 
acres in 1931 (which produced 0.62 million bales, 1 bale 
= 180 kg) to 3.23 million acres in 1934 (which produced 
1*58 million bales). This increase was due partly to 
coffee over-production and partly to increases in 
cotton prices following America^ cotton control policy 
in the 1930*s.
Moreover the number of Japanese migrants to Brazil, 
many of whom engaged in cotton cultivation, increased 
substantially in this period. In 1935, there were 
173,420 Japanese in Brazil. A large proportion were 
engaged in cotton production in Sao Paulo. In 1935, 
cotton production in Sao Paulo amounted to about 40/$ 
of Brazils total cotton production; and about 50% of 
Sao Paulo's output was produced by Japanese.
In 1935 the Japanese Government sent an economic 
delegat ion to Brazil to promote cotton cult ivation and 
export. In February 1936, the Japanese-Brazilian
211.
Cotton Co. Ltd. was established with a capital of 2 
million Yen. It was to import Brazilian cotton into 
Japan and to administer 5 cotton spinning factories in 
Brazil. —  See Toitsu Nawa, op. cit.t PP.362-367;
Takako Sanpei, op. cit.. P.341. See also Deborah A. 
Hubbard, "Brazil now a Ranking Source for Japanese 
Cotton" in FES, 14-2-1940, PP.45-46.
1^0^Toitsu Nawa, op. cit.. P.343.
1^:L^ Cotton production was also encouraged by Japan 
in Manchuria, Taiwan and other parts of China. But 
North China was the most important cotton producing 
district•
1^2^See YC, op. cit.. PP.244-245. However in 1891 
imports of raw cotton from India surpassed those from 
China. In contrast during the whole period between 1895 
and 1941, imports of raw cotton from India surpassed 
those from China except in 1907 and 1941. (See Ibid.,
P.245).
1^3^Toitsu Nawa, op. cit.. P.353.
1^4^Takako Sanpei, op. cit., P.361, Table 122.
( 1 5 )
Ibid., PP.350-351.
Kamayoshi Takahashi, Nihon Koqyo Hatten-Ron 
(A Study on Japanese Industrial Development), 1936, P.344.
( 1 7 )
The area under cotton in Southeast Asia was
as follows: French Indo China (1937): 1,500 hectares.
Siam (1937): 4000/5000 hectares --- 7000/8000 hectares.
The Philippines (1937): about 2000 hectares. The
Netherlands East Indies (1938): about 1000 hectares. —
Toshiyoshi Okabe, Nanpo Sen'i Genryo no Seisan ni Tsuite
(on the Production of Textile Materials in the Southern
Region) in T5yo Keizai Ronso (Eastern Economic Review),
March 1942, PP.267-276.
(18) Takako Sanpei, op. cit.. P.340.
(19) Ibid.. P.341.
2^0  ^Toitsu Nawa, op. cit.. P.346.
(21) Ibid.. P.356.
(22) Ibid*, P.359.
2^3  ^See Takako Sanpei, op. cit.. P.341.
2^4  ^ Yan Zhong Ping, Zhonq Guo Mian Fang Zhi Shi Gao 
(History of the Chinese Textile Industry), 1963, P.167 
See also Takako Sanpei, op. cit., P.346; Toitsu Nawa, 
op. cit.t P.346.
2^5  ^ In March 1933, Manshu-Koku Keizai Kensetsu 
Yoko (The Outline of the Economic Development of Manchuria) 
was released by the Japanese Government. This Outline 
indicated that Manchuria should produce 150 million Kin 
of cotton within 20 years, with 0.3 million Chobu under 
cultivation. The Manchurian Cotton Association was to 
be the major organization in the implementation of this 
plan. —  See Toitsu Nawa, op. cit.. P.346.
<26> Ibid., P.346
( 2 7 ) The targets of this Five Year Plan for Thailand, 
were based on Dr.Mihara's investigations and proposals. —  
See Toshiyoshi Okabe, op. cit.. P.273.
( 2 8 )  _
Toitsu Nawa, op. cit.. PP.359-361.
( 2 9 )  Toshiyoshi Okabe, op. cit.. P.273.
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(30) Ibid.. P.274.
(3 1 ) "Philippines to Revive Cotton Growing" in FES, 
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Section Four:
The Acquisition of Important Ram Materials from 
Southeast Asia.
The aim of this section is to analyse the 
acquisition by Japan of raw materials - rubber, iron 
ore and oil - from Southeast Asia, the demand for which 
eventually led to Japanese military occupation of the 
region. Special emphasis is placed on the economic 
penetration of Southeast Asia by Japanese big business, 
the "Zaibatsu", and their connections with the Japanese 
Government, the military authorities and right-wing 
movements in Japan. By examining the cooperation 
between Japanese southern entrepreneurs (for example 
Fusanosuke Kuhara, Koichiro Ishihara and Tadaharu 
Mukai), military figures (Giichi Tanaka, Kuniaki Koiso 
and Yoshimasa Nakahara etc.), southern expansionists 
(Syumei Okawa, Ikki Kita and Kunishige Tanaka) and 
politicians (Yosuke Hatsuoka, Ichizo Kobayashi and 
Kenkichi Y o s h i z a w a ) , it is possible to trace the 
origins of and motivation behind the Japanese southern 
expansion.
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Part 1 .
The Acquisition of Rubber
World rubber production increased with the 
development of the motor industry in the early 
twentieth century. Rubber was widely used in making 
tyres, accessories and footwear during both peace 
time and war time. War demanded more military equipment 
made from rubber which made Japan and the Western powers 
eager to secure rubber from Southeast Asia.
During the inter-war period, rubber was produced 
principally in Southeast Asia, mainly in British 
Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies as may be 
seen in Table 74, Rubber was also produced in French 
Indo-China, British Borneo, Sarawak, Ceylon, India 
and Burma; all these states accounted for approximately 
97% of world total rubber production throughout the 
decade 1929-38. Less than 3% of world output came 
from Brazil during this period.
The rubber producing countries were, in almost 
all cases, not consumers of rubber. Table 75 shows 
that America was the largest consumer, absorbing 
between 45/6 and 60% of total rubber output between 
1929 and 1940. Following America were, in order of 
importance, Britain, France, Germany and Japan.
Japan*s rubber consumption did not rise above 8% of 
total world output between 1929 and 1940.
During the 1930s America, Europe and Japan each
tried to encourage domestic synthetic rubber production
and improved techniques to reclaim rubber, but with
(2 )
little success, apart from in Russia' . America 
also tried to secure additional rubber from Brazil 
in order to reduce her dependence on Southeast Asian 
supplies, but again with little success.
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Table 74.
Rubber Production in British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies
(Unit:ton)
Year
World 1 s Production British Malaya The Netherlands 
East Indies
Quantity % Quantity % Quantity %
1913 108 440 100. 0 33 600 31.0 6 400 5 . 9
1914 120 380 100.0 47 000 39 . 2 10 400 8.7
1915 158 702 100.0 70 200 44 . 2 20 000 12 . 6
! 1916 201 598 100. 0 96 OOO 47 . 8 33 100 16.5
1917 265 698 100.0 129 000 48.7 44 OOO 16 . 6
1918 296 579 100.0 112 OOO 37 . 8 42 000 14 . 2
1919 326 860 100.0 204 000 62 . 6 85 OOO 26 .1
1920 343 731 100 . 0 174 000 50. 7 77 000 22 . 5
1921 296 900 100.0 150 000 50.5 70 000 23.6
1922 379 900 100.0 192 000 50.5 ' 98 700 26.0
1923 412 800 100.0 198 000 48 . 1 131 000 31 . 8
1924 421 300 100.0 167 800 39 . 9 162 000 38.5
1925 516 100 100.0 212 900 41. 3 189 500 36 . 7
1926 617 788 100.0 285 700 46 . 3 203 800 32 . 4
1927 605 196 100.0 242 200 40.0 228 900 37 . 8
1928 649 674 100. 0 297 508 45 . 8 223 221 34 . 4
1929 863 410 100.0 453 468 53.2 256 386 29.7
1930 821 915 100 . 0 442 940 53.9 238 973 29 . 1
1931 797 441' 1 0 0 . o 423 383 53 . 1 255 048 32 . O
1932 709 840 loo . 0 405 706 57 . 2 210 124 29 . 6
1933 845 291 loo . 0 446 012 52 . 8 281 338 33.3
1934 1,013 442 100 . 0 471 360 46 . 5 373 306 36 . 9
1935 863 007 100 . 0 415 614 48 . 2 275 439 30. 1
1936 852 173 100.0 352 392 41.4 301 893 35 . 4
1937 1,133 070 100.0 469 030 41.4 426 827 37 . 7
1938 890 790 100.0 370 810 41.6 306 826 34 . 5
1939 1,001 931 100.0 375 000 37 . 5 372 000 37 . 2
1940 1,388 000 100. 0 539 000 38.8 536 000 38 . 6
Source: Compiled from Yoshihiko Taniguchi, Nanpo Gomu Shigen
To Sono Taisaku (Rubber Resources in Southern Regions 
and its Policy) in Toa Keizai Ronso (East Asian 
Economic Review), vol. 2, No. 1, March 1942, PP. 300, 
314 and 326.
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In the years 1935-38 America imported nearly 
three quarters of her rubber from British Malaya.
In the years 1937-38 Britain imported nearly 80% of 
her rubber from British Malaya. (See Tables 76 and 77).
Therefore, when political tension between Japan 
and the West increased after the Manchurian Incident 
in 1931, Japan became increasingly concerned to 
secure rubber from the Southern region. This would 
not only ensure her own war supplies, but would also 
prevent rubber from being exported to America and 
Britain. A number of Japanese publications argued 
that Japan should gain control over rubber production 
in the South in order to reduce exports to America 
and Britain, at that time the largest consumers of
f 3 N
rubber' • On 2Gth November 1941, the 70th Liaison
Conference was held in Tokyo and announced Japan!s
intention to prevent the flow of rubber from the
(4)Southern region to potentially hostile nations.' '
Rubber was not found in Japan or in the Yen-bloc.
Japan was entirely dependent on external sources of
rubber, principally from Southeast Asia. Japan had
tried to grow rubber within her Empire, particularly
(5)in Formosa, but had failed.' J Moreover, Japan had 
easy access to Southeast Asia and the regionTs low 
cost rubber. Among Southeast Asian countries, British 
Malaya was the largest supplier of rubber to Japan 
throughout the inter-war period. (See Table 78).
Japan had long been interested in securing her 
rubber supplies by investing directly in Southeast 
Asian rubber plantations. This investment was 
concentrated in British Malaya rather than Sumatra, 
Borneo or the Philippines.
As early as 1902, Japanese entrepreneurs invested
/ 6 N
in rubber plantations in Malaya.' In 1906, a
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Table 78-A
Rubber: General Imports Into Japan, by Principal Sources, 1914-41
rear All Countries
Princioal Countries
All Othe^2) 
CountriesThe Straits Settlements
Netherlands 
East Indies
British India
L914 2,146 1,357 3 447 334
L915 3,431 1,727 226 940 510
L916 7,246 4 ,968 165 1,487 614
L917 9,-130 6,285 89 1,976 735
L918 12,948 11,876 147 468 414
.9 19 17,364 15,872 43 412 1,018
.920 13,422 8,852 366 2,960 1,234
.921 15,724 14,136 74 1,419 52
.922 11,315 7,375 53 253 89
.923 19,325 14,558 450 260 106
.924 23,342 19,712 1,466 1,399 710
.925 33,610 26,772 376 5,921 448
.926 40,010 28,131 214 10,869 783
.927 34,398 21,887 594 11,600 221
.928 27,895 19 ,564 1,220 6,578 326
929 33,885 22,802 1,880 8,791 371
930 17,930 11,615 2,173 3,756 310
931 13,183 9 ,272 3,206 343 39
9 32 15,988 10,060 4 ,995 293 318
933 29,685 20,499 7,268 364 1,091
934 57,337 37,818 14,383 478 1,079
935 51,636 36,873 11,660 187 1,777
936 72,956 43,047 22,878 474 4,272
937 99,217 59,710 25,774 342 8,371
938 51,373 35,883 12,080 51 1,364
939 57,490 38,176 16,178 405
940 67,046 40,195 17,901 4,289
941 137,346 7,293 36,413 91,143
Durce 
Dtes :
YC, op. cit., PP.236-237.
(1) Represents the Straits Settlements and British Malaya in the 
years 1935-41.
(2) Represents only England, America and Siam. Imports from Siam 
amounted to 4.3 million Yen, 49.6 million Yen in 1940 and 1941
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Japanese called Naokichi Kasada replanted his coffee
plantation with rubber trees in Seremban, Negri Sembilan,
which he had acquired in about 1895. Another Japanese
who cooperated with Kasada was Kikuzo Nakagawa. In the
same year (1906) Mitsuzo Nakano and Henry Tsutada
purchased a German estate on Tekong Island, whilst
Toshi Ogawa established an estate in Setapak, Selangor.
Yasugoro Tatematsu purchased an estate in Negri
Sembilan, and in Pengerang, Johore, Naoya Akuzawa
(proprietor of the Sango Company) established yet
(7)another rubber estate.' 7
The Japanese Zaibatsu, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Fujita, 
Furukawa and Okura, were also interested in investing 
in Malayan rubber plantations. Mitsubishi had, through
the Sango Company, acquired a rubber estate in Johore
(8} —as early as 1906,' 7 Mitsui Gomei-gaisha owned the
Sungei Papan Estate at Tanjong Surat, J^ohore. Baron
Heitaro Fujita acquired the Nam Heng Rubber Estate in
1914. Furukawa of Tokyo invested in rubber planting
in Tohore in 1910. Okura Gomu Kabushiki-gaisha had
( g )
estates in Niyor, Johore•' 7
Japanese capital, attracted by high rubber prices,
flowed into Malayan rubber plantations, particularly in
1910 and 1911. These investments were concentrated in
Zohore, but were also scattered throughout Selangor,
( iq)
Negri Sembilan, Perak, Kedah and Singapore. ' 7
Rubber acreage owned by Japanese increased from 92 
in 1907 to 83,750 in 1 9 1 1 . ^ ^  The Sango Company was 
the largest Japanese rubber concern in MalayaJ^)
The Sango Company acquired land in Zohore for 
rubber cultivation - in October 1906 8,300 acres were 
purchased in Pengerang and in May 1909 26,000 acres 
were purchased in Batu Pahat. Then in July 1910,
Kojiro Matsukata acquired 4,500 acres in Santi, ,J”ohore• 
Kojiro Matsukata (1865-1950) was the third son of 
Masayoshi Matsukata. Kojiro was a noted financier
who had been educated at the Tokyo Imperial University, 
in America and in France. He became managing director 
of the Kawasaki ship-building Company in 1896. He later 
became at various times managing director of the 
Kawasaki Steamship Company, the International Steamship 
Company, the Hokuyo Hokuho Company and the Nisso 
Petroleum Company. From 1936 he was elected to the 
House of Representatives on four separate occasions 
and played an active part in Japanese politics in 
the 1930s.^15)
In August 1911, Nan-a Koshi (the South Asia Company) 
acquired 6,000 acres of land in Sungai Tolong, Tohore. 
Nan-a Koshi was thus the second largest Japanese holding 
after the Sango Company. The capital came from
Ichizaemon Morimura though the enterprise was managed
~ (16) by Masaji Inoue and Koji Hokketsu. ' Morimura
(1839-1919) was a noted industrialist in the Meiji-Taisho
(17)era. In 1868 he was instructed by Taisuke Itagakiv 'to 
engage in munitions and foodstuffs production and to sell 
raw silk to foreign companies. Morimura!s businesses 
flourished and were the foundation of the Morimura-gumi, 
established in 1875. From there he founded the 
Morimura GinkS (The Bank of Morimura), became Head 
of the Bank of Japan and a Consultant for the Kobu
n • i (18)Railways. ' '
In December 1910, Mitsui Dozoku-kai (The Association 
of the Mitsui Relatives) acquired 5,000 acres of land 
in Raya, Johore. In August 1911, Fujita Gumi acquired 
3,500 acres of land in Berangan, also in Johore.
The Sango Company, the South Asia Company, Kojiro 
Matsukata, the Association of the Mitsui Relatives and 
the Fujita Gumi were the five largest Japanese rubber 
land-holders in Johore by August 1911. Japanese-owned
231.
rubber plantations spread along the Johore River
from Pengerang to Kota Tinggi, a distance of about
30 miles. The area was described as "just like a
(19)Japanese colony”. '
In 1912, the Japanese Planters1 Association^^
was established in Singapore to promote rubber cultivation
in Malaya and other parts of the Southern region.
In the same year, the first Japanese bank in Malaya was
established, in Singapore. This was a branch of the 
(21)Bank of Taiwan.' ' Then in 1916, the Yokohama
(22)Specie Bank Limited' 'also opened a branch in Singapore. 
These two banks financed part of the Japanese enterprises 
in the Southern region, including Japanese rubber 
plantations in Malaya.
The demand for Malayan rubber rose sharply during
the 1914-1918 war. In J'ohore, rubber under Japanese
ownership increased from 24,450 acres in 1913 to about
(23)100,000 acres in 1917.' ' The increase in Japanese
ownership threatened British interests. Eventually 
the British authorities in Malaya introduced the/ 2 \
Rubber Lands (Restriction) Enactment'1 'in 1917, the 
main purpose of which was to restrict further Japanese 
expansion in the local rubber industry.
This enactment was to further Japanese investment
in Malayan rubber plantations. The immediate effect
was that a Japanese planter, Ziro Itochu of Kobe, who
had purchased Wan Shou Shan rubber plantation from
a Chinese on 31 July 1917, was not allowed to register
(25)his purchase with the Government.' ' The Japanese
Consul in Singapore, Yamazaki, sent a report immediately 
(26)to Japan.' } This alerted Japan to the problems of 
Japanese rubber planters in Malaya.
□n 26 August 1917, another warning was given 
by the head of the Ushiotani Syokai in Singapore,
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Kawaguchi, on his return to Nagasaki. He expressed 
concern that the Enactment would eventually affect 
all Japanese rubber plantations in Johore, for 
the Sango Company controlled almost all the land 
along the Johore River. He stressed that under the 
Enactment, Japanese planters would be unable to 
acquire more rubber land in the Malay States. He
(27)called upon Japanese planters in Malaya to protest.
In response to the introduction of the 1917 
Enactment, the Japanese rubber concerns, principally 
Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Fujita, Furukawa and Okura, 
protested to the authorities in Malaya. The Japanese 
Planters1 Association in Singapore, the Japanese consul 
in Malaya and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs 
in Tokyo each lodged a strong protest against this
cr 4- 4- (28)Enactment. '
Mitsubishi and Mitsui, the two most prominent
Zaibatsu in Japan, undoubtedly had considerable influence
in Japanese government circles. Other Zaibatsu, such
as Fujita, ^ ^ F u r u k a u i a ^ ^  and O k u r a ^ ^ a l s o  had
considerable influence. But Fusanosuke Kuhara was
particularly important in urging the Japanese Minister
of Foreign Affairs to protest against the restrictions
being imposed on Japanese acquisition of rubber land 
(32 ^
in Malaya. J Kuhara (1869-1965) was the founder of
the Kuhara Zaibatsu. He was President of the
(34)Seiyukai' 1 between May 1939 and July 1940. He was
one of the most powerful right-wing leaders in Japan
and a noted Southward expansionist. He was regarded
as a pro-military politician, who had a close
(35)relationship with the Kwantung Army. 1 Kuhara was
elected five times to the House of Representatives.
(36)He gave financial support to Giichi Tanaka and
(37)Ikki Kita. ’ He became the Minister of Communications 
between May 1928 and July 1929 in the Tanaka (Giichi) 
Cabinet (April 1927-July 1929). Thereafter, he served
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as Chief Secretary, Director and later a Consultant
_  (38)
of the Seiyukai. He was involved in the 2.26 Incident' 1
and was arrested in 1936. As soon as war broke out in
Europe in 1939, Kuhara, as President of the Seiyukai,
strongly urged that Japan should seize the whole of
China. He also argued for a strengthening of military
control of the Government. In 1940, he supported
Konoe in the formation of the Second Konoe Cabinet.
Kuhara also acted as a member of the House of Councillors
and approved strongly Tojo!s "Greater East Asia
(39)Co-prosperity Sphere" policy.' 1
Kuhara himself was the owner of the Kuhara Iron 
Mine in Bukit Besi near Dungun, and also had rubber 
interests in Malaya. Together with Mitsubishi, Mitsui, 
Fujita, Furukawa, Okura and other Zaibatsu he regarded 
the British enactment as the main obstacle to further 
expansion of Japanese rubber investments. The Zaibatsu 
leaders met in Tokyo in 1917 and invited the Press to 
hear their case. They also pressured the Japanese 
Government to protest against the legislation.^^
With the strong protests from the Zaibatsu and
from the Japanese Government, the British eventually
allowed Japanese in Malaya "to lease land for residential,
commercial, industrial and other lawful purposes in
the same manner as native subjects". However,
from 1917 to 1919 the expansion of Japanese rubber
holdings in the Malay States had been held in check
by the Rubber Lands (Restriction) Enactment. In 1919,
Japanese rubber estates in Malaya amounted to only
148,611 acres, of which 93,418 acres were already
(42)planted. ' ' The most important Japanese-owned
estates were as follows:
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Total Planted Total Commenci
area, area, latex ment of
acres acres yield, busines
lbs
* Straits Settlements 2,648 2,260 549,894
Nissin Gomu 1,412 983 250,644 1913
* Zohore 96,449 65,823 8,782,286
Nitto Gomu 17,227 5,590 547,376 1919
Pahang Gomu 9,937 5,552 856,452 1910
Sango Kosi
(Batu Pahat) 13,697 9,718 1,809,911 1897
Nanko Syokusan 8,807 6,684 670,742 1910
Sango Kosi
(Pendira) 7,848 5,963 868,903 1896
Negri Sembilan 7,303 6,518 1,273,937
Malai Gomu 2,323 2,323 380,437 1912
Senda & Co. 1,648 1,548 180,000 1920
* Selangor 4,033 3,787 249,050
Matsuda-Sanziro 631 631 100,200 1911
* Perak 1,170 1,146 233,470
Mizukami-Syotaro 153 143 23,000 1911
* Pahang 327 294 26,600
Kaneko-Tsuru 24 24 - 1915
* Trengganu 20,814 120 -
Malai Gomu 3,194 100 - 1917
* Kedah and Perlis 331 282 18,800
Okano-Sizu 105 105 5,000 1918
Source: Iwao Hino and Raja Singam, op. cit.. P. 124.
See also M. Nomura, Fifty Years of Nanyanq. PP. 190-201.
Indicates total acreage of Japanese rubber estates in the 
various states.
Japanese rubber planters suffered a further severe
setback between 1920-22 when the post-war boom in commodity
prices broke. The price of rubber in Singapore fell to
31 cts. per lb. in 1922 from 81 cts. per lb. in 1920.
(43)Some Japanese estates in Malaya were sold.' ' It was 
reported that in the early 1920s some 25,000 acres or 20%
of total Japanese rubber holdings in Southern Malaya 
were sold, many being sold to British interests.
The Nanyo Kyokai (South Seas Association) called on 
the Japanese Government to assist Japanese planters in 
Southeast Asia by granting liberal loans at a low rate 
of interest.
In December 1925, with the prospect of a rubber 
boom created partly by the expansion of motor-car 
productivity in America, the price of rubber was 
increased by the Stevenson Committee from 3s to 4s per 
lb.. Some influential Japanese then considered floating 
a company, with a capital of 10 million Yen, to prevent 
Japanese rubber estates from being sold to non-Japanese. 
In February 1926, the Japanese Department of Finance 
considered giving financial assistance (in effect long­
dated loans) to maintain and develop Japanese rubber
(45)estates in the South Seas.' J However, in spite of 
these efforts, Japanese planters did not show any great 
enthusiasm to expand their rubber holdings.
The Stevenson Rubber Restriction Scheme (1922-28) 
and the International Rubber Regulation Agreement 
(1934-43), together with unpredictable fluctuations in 
rubber prices in the inter-war period, made it difficult 
for Japanese-owned rubber plantations in Malaya to 
expand. It was reported that in 1938, 36 Japanese 
planters held leases to only 58,000 acres of rubber 
in Malaya. Of this approximately 30,000 acres were in 
Zohore. In 1938 there were over three million acres 
under rubber in Malaya.
During the same year, the Japanese Government 
decided, for the first time, to assist their rubber 
planters in Malaya by purchasing all the rubber, at 
higher prices, produced on Japanese estates. But this 
had little effect, as the potential addition to the 
annual Japanese production of approximately 50,000 tons
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( L i ' S
was only 5,000 metric tons.v '
Apart from investing in Malayan rubber plantations,
Japanese planters also extended their interests to other
parts of Southeast Asia, When Japanese rubber interests
in Malaya suffered a severe setback in 1926, the South
Seas Association advised Japanese planters to transfer
their operations to Sumatra, Borneo, New Guinea, Siam
or I n d o - C h i n a . ^  In the South Seas under Japanese
ownership were 361,560 acres in 1929, 498,999 acres
in 1930 and 514,505 acres in 1933, But the total production
from Japanese plantations in those three years was only
(49)12,500 tons, 13,000 tons and 18,000 tons, '
Prior to the Pacific war, Japan consumed as much
as 70,000 tons of rubber in a y e a r . ^ ^  However, due
to Japan's external deficit, imports of rubber from the
Southern region were reduced from 64,000 tons in 1936
to 47,062 tons in 1938, In fact from the time of the
China Incident, Japan purchased less rubber from Malaya.
This reduction was accelerated by the outbreak of the
European war which led to export control measures being
imposed by the Malayan authorities. Japan increasingly
imported rubber from the Netherlands East Indies,
(51)particularly after September 1939. 1
In 1939, Japan imported only 43,032 tons of rubber 
(52)from the South. 1 Japanese rubber plantations in the 
southern region provided from one-quarter to one-third 
of total Japanese consumption.^^
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Part 2 . The Acquisition of Iron Ore.
Due to the rapid growth of the Japanese steel
(54}industry in the 1930s, iron orev 'output in Japan 
proper increased from 208,000 metric tons in 1931 to
620,000 metric tons in 1936. However over the period 
1931-1936, domestic iron ore production in Japan 
constituted no more than 16% of Japan’s total requirements. 
In fact in the period 1922-1925, Japan could supply 
only S% of her iron ore requirements (See Table 79).
A major characteristic of the Japanese iron and
steel industry in this period was that production of
steel was greater than production of pig iron. This was
essentially because steel production in Japan was based
(55)on the use of scrap iron.' ' However, almost all the 
scrap iron consumed in Japan was imported - from 
America, India, England and China. The U.S. was the 
most important source of scrap iron for Japan in the 
years 1927-41.
The percentage of U.S. scrap iron in Japan’s total 
scrap iron imports: 1927-41.
1927 - 37.2 1934 - 69.3
1928 - 47.2 1935 - 77.4
1929 - 45.1 1936 - 69.6
1930 - 53.6 1937-38 - (not available)
1931 - 11.3 1939 - 86.0
1932 - 28.7 1940 - 85.4
1933 - 43.1 1941 - 63.8
Source: Computed from Ishii Takashi (ed.), Yokohama- 
shi-shi: Shiryo-hen 2 (Source Materials relating to 
the History of Yokohama City, vol. 2), 1962, P. 271. 
Henceforth this publication will be referred to by 
the abbreviation **YC”.
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For the Japanese war economy, the most serious
(56}bottleneck was very low domestic iron and steel production.' 1
The Japanese authorities had long been eager to reduce
imports of scrap iron from America. It was planned to
increase domestic production of iron ore, shift
purchases of imported ore from potential enemies to
regions within the Japanese sphere of influence, substitute
pig iron for scrap in the making of steel and finally
build up large stockpiles of iron ore, scrap, manganese
and ferro-alloys. In addition, a five-year plan was
undertaken for the expansion of pig iron, ingot and finished
(57)steel production in Japan, Korea, Manchuria and China.' *
Japan attempted to import more iron ore from the 
Yen-bloc and from Southeast Asia, in order to meet 
her domestic requirements and to reduce dependence on 
American supplies of scrap iron. Table 80 shows that 
during the inter-war period the iron ore imported into 
Japan came mainly from China and Southeast Asia. The 
Malay States alone through the Straits Settlements 
supplied 44% of Japan's total iron ore imports in the 
years 1924-28 and nearly 57% in the period 1929-31.
Imports from China declined from 56% to 38% of total 
imports over the same periods. Chinese exports of iron 
ore to Japan became relatively less important mainly 
because China's iron ore was increasingly consumed within 
China herself. The iron ore produced in Manchuria was, 
for example, almost entirely consumed locally. Moreover 
Manchurian iron ore production had stagnated, because of 
inadequate equipment and facilities.
From 1914 to the late 1920s British Malaya was the
most important source of iron ore for Japan outside
(58)those territories under Japanese control.' ;However, 
in the early 1930s British Malaya became the most 
important source of iron ore for Japan and remained so 
until 1940. Japanese investment in Malayan iron mines 
during the inter-war years was of great importance to the
Table 80-A .
Iron Ore: General Imports into Japan by Principal Sources, 1914-41.
(thousand Yen)
Year Total China The Straits 
Settlements ^
Australia The Philippines
1914 1,729 1,671 - - -
1915 1,812 1,786 - - -
1916 1,671 1,641 - - -
1917 2,459 2,382 - - -
1918 9,673 9,601 - - -
1919 16,138 15,331 - - -
1920 14,896 14,372 - - -
1921 10,082 7,265 2,560 - -
1922 9,422 6,621 2,685 - -
1923 7,301 5,216 2,029 - -
1924 8,957 6,109 2,844 - -
1925 9,441 6,299 3,141 - -
1926 7,191 4,002 3,187 - -
1927 9,073 4,264 4,804 - -
1928 16,173 8,001 8,139 - -
1929 19,333 8,550 10,396 371 -
1930 18,955 6,723 10,401 1,655 -
1931 12,780 4,191 8,274 128 -
1932 11,878 3,726 7,638 170 -
1933 12,839 3,966 8,573 211 -
1934 19,420 6,389 8,505 1,107 78
1935 34,546 10,915 15,024 5,218 2,906
1936 40,042 11,607 18,114 3,011 6,037
1937
NOT AVAILABLE
1938
1939 85,330 12,370 38,335 1,674 21,088
1940 98,867 23,471 45,596 - 23,073
1941 101,606 55,238 24,662 - 17,012
Source: YC, op. cit., P. 264.
Note: (1) Represents British Malaya after 1936.
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Japanese steel industry and also for the revenues of
(59)the Unfederated Malay States. ' During the inter-war 
period, iron ore production in Malaya was concentrated 
in johore, Trengganu and Kelantan. There was also a 
little iron ore mining in Pahang and Perak. All these 
mining interests were controlled by Japan. The most 
important iron mining concerns were the Sri Medan Mine 
of the Ishihara Sangyo Koshi (Ishihara Sangyo Company); 
an iron mine in Dungun owned by the Nihon Kogyo 
Kabushiki-gaisha (Nippon Mining Company); the Bukit 
Langkap Mine owned by the Iizuka Tekko Kabushiki-gaisha 
(lizuka Mining Company); and the Bukit Besi Mine owned 
by the Nanyo Tekko Kabushiki-gaisha (South Seas Iron 
Mining Co. Ltd.)i60  ^ By the 1930s, total capital
invested in Malayan mines by these companies was: the
“ (61)Ishihara Sangyo Company, 6 million Yen;^ ' the Nippon
Mining Company, 12 million Yen (estimate); the South
Seas Iron Mining Co. Ltd., 3 million Yen; and the
(62)Iizuka Mining Company, 3 million Yen.' 1 In terms of 
total production the Ishihara Sangyo Company was the 
most important.
In September 1920, Koichiro Ishihara (who is known
as Hiroichiro Ishihara in western literature), the
pioneer of Japanese iron ore mines in Malaya, established
the Nanyo Kogyo Koshi (South Seas Mining Company) in
Johore with capital of 0.1 million Yen. In November the
same year, he established the Ishihara Sangyo Koshi
(ishihara Sangyo Company) in Singapore to sell and
(63 )transport the iron ore produced in Malaya. In 1921,
the Sri Medan Mine, situated in Batu Pahat, and owned by 
the Ishihara Sangyo Company, obtained a 21 year mining 
concession from the Sultan of Johore. A few years later 
the Company obtained another concession, this time, in 
Trengganu.
As soon as Ishihara discovered iron deposits in 
Johore, he came to an agreement with the Yawata Iron
243.
Foundry in Japan to export 50,000 tons of ore to 
Yawata in 1921, 100,000 tons in 1922 and more than
100,000 tons annually after 1923. This contract was 
the most important factor in the rapid development of 
the I.S.C.. The Company flourished and became the 
largest iron ore supplier to Japan within Asia. Exports 
of iron ore to Japan by the I.S.C. in Southeast Asia 
increased from 19,971 tons in 1920 to 357,923 tons 
in 1926. In the period 1927-29 Japan imported more 
iron ore from the I.S.C. than from China and Korea 
combined. (See Table 81). Ishihara extended his 
operations to the Philippines. Moreover as well as 
exploiting iron ore, he engaged in the exploitation of 
bauxite, tin and manganese deposits in Southeast Asia.
1.5.C. also included a shipping line, carrying miscellaneous
goods from Japan to the South Seas region and transporting
/ s 5 \
iron ore back to Japan.' I.S.C. owned many mines
in Japan itself - in Kishu. The Company also established
manufacturing industries in Yokka-ichi in Japan. Later
( 66)1.5.C. became a newly established (Shino) Zaibatsu.'
Koichiro Ishihara was a successful entrepreneur,
the author of many books^^nd above all, an enthusiastic
advocate of the Japanese Southward advance. He had a
close relationship with the Yawata Iron Foundry, the
Bank of Taiwan, the Ministry of Finance and the military
(68)hierarchy. He was a close friend of Fumimaro Konoe v ' 
and other right-wing politicians such a Yoshichika 
Tokugawa, Nobumasa Suetsugu and Ainosuke Iwata. He was 
the leader of two ultra-nationalist societies, the Toa 
Kensetsu Doshi-kai (Association of Comrades for Establishing 
East Asia) and the Sumera-juku (Private School of the 
Emperor). Early in the Syowa period, he supported 
financially the Zinmu-kai (Zinmu Association) which had 
been established by Syumei Skawa in 1 9 3 2 . In 1933, 
he became a director of the Merin-kai (Merin Association) 
which was led by General Kunishige Tanaka. He was
also a financial supporter of the Daiwa Club. Ishihara
of
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was detained in 1936 on account of his support
(71)for the 2.26 Incident.' 7 After the Pacific war, 
he was sentenced as an A-class war criminal. He was 
released from Sugamo Prison on 24 December 1948 and died 
on 16 April 1970, aged 80.
The investment of Kuhara in Malayan iron 
mining was also important. In May 1928 preparations 
were made for the development of the Kuhara Iron Mine,
(73)an area of 1,000 acres in Bukit Besi near Dungun, Trengganu.' 7
The Kuhara Iron Mine had an agreement with the Yawata
(74)Iron Foundry in Japan for the supply of iron ore.' 7
As was the case with Japanese investment in Malayan 
rubber, Japanese investment in iron mines was either 
supported by Japanese banks or incorporated with major 
Japanese concerns in Japan itself. For example, in 1920
the Bank of Taiwan advanced 0.1 million Yen to the
-- - (75)South Seas Iron Mining Company of Koichiro Ishihara.' 7
Moreover the South Seas Iron Mining Company was a
subsidiary of the Nihon Kokan Kabushiki-gaisha (Japan 
(7 6 )
Steel Co. Ltd.)' 7 which had a capital of 1 million
(77)Yen. It was based in Tokyo.' 7 In other words Japanese 
enterprises in the Southern region usually represented 
interests based in Tokyo.
During the 1920s iron ore production in British 
Malaya came essentially from Johore, though in 1935
(78)Johore output was surpassed by that from Trengganu. 7
In the 1930s Johore and Trengganu accounted for almost
the entire output of iron ore in Malaya. (See Table 82).
Iron ore production in Johore came mainly from the Sri
Medan Mine of the I.S.C. while production in Trengganu
came mainly from the Kuhara Iron Mine of the Nippon Mining 
(79)Company.' The iron ore from Malaya was almost entirely 
exported to Japan. The total volume of ore exported to
Japan from Malaya in the years 1935, 1936 and 1937 was
as follows (unit: ton):
Malaya: Production and Export of Iron Ore,
Year Total Prod­
uction
Total Export Exports to Japan
1935 1,411,635 1,411,635 1,405,421
1936 1,654,996 1,654,547 1,612,148
1937 1,560,828 1,660,342 1,538,923
Sources: Taiwan, Taiwan Sotokufu, op. cit,, P# 1179 
Li Yu Rong, op. cit., P. 129.
Exports of iron ore from Malaya to Japan amounted 
to 1,933,969 tons (42.2% of Japan*s total iron ore 
imports) and 2,047,013 tons (43.3%) in 1939 and 1940 
respectively. These imports from Malaya in turn 
represented a substantial proportion of the iron ore 
consumption of Japan1s iron and steel industry in the 
late 1 9 3 0 s / 81)
Iron Ore: General Imports into Japan, by Principal 
Sources. (Unit: Metric ton)^1 '
Year Total(including China Malaya The Philippines
all others)
1939 4,584,021(100)^  690,984(15.1) 1,933,969(42.2) 1,338,362(29.2)
1940 4,727,722(100) 1,184,319(25.1) 2,047,913(43.3) 1,218,914(25.8)
1941 4,910,070(100) 2,626,488(53.5) 1,182,055(24.1) 910,419(18.5)
Source: YC. op. cit.. P. 264.
Notes: ^'Conversion rate: 1 Picul = 60.48 kg.
1,000 kg. * 1 Metric ton.
(2)' 'Numbers in brackets represent percentages.
The mining of iron ore in the Philippines developed
(82)largely as a result of Japanese demand.' ' Japan began 
to import iron ore from the Philippines in 1934. The iron 
mines were owned principally by Filipinos but some were 
under American management. Japanese investment in iron
247.
Table 82 Production of Iron Ore in Malaya, 1921-41^
Year Peraku; Johore Ke lan tan Trengganu Total (Malaya)
1921 --- 74,250 --- 74,250
1922 --- 111,367 --- --- 111,367
1923 --- 154,161 --- --- 154,161
1924 --- 235,118 --- --- 235,118
1925 --- 271,992 --- 7,690 279,682
1926 --- 250,100 --- 45,511 295,611
1927 --- 409,242 --- 48,505 457,747
192 8 --- 584,588 --- 25,927 610,515
1929 --- 743,209 --- 55,150 798,359
19 30 --- 729,251 --- 87,364 816,615
1931 --- 488,877 --- 203,109 691,986
19 32 --- 485,067 --- 203,105 688,172
1933 --- 408,644 --- 357,833 766,477
19 34 --- 578,180 --- 557,468 1,135,648
19 35 --- 594,891 --- 816,744 1,411,635
19 36 4-49 590,288 1,064,259 1,654,996
1937 1,147 519,339 49,223 991,119 1,560,828
1938 923 549,960 159,900 9.05,316 1,616,099
19 39 768 681,886 210,930 1,048,937 1,942,521
19 40 957 625,550 226,241 1,109,715 1,962,463
1941 715 314,005 154,697 680,275 1,148,977
Sources: 1921-37, quoted from L.L.Fermor, Report Upon the Mining 
Industry of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 19 43, PP.48-49. 
1938-1941 quoted from Li Ytl Rong, Nan yang Nien-Zian 
(Year Book of South Seas), Singapore, 1951, P.129. 
Notes: (1) In 1921-37, the figures for Perak are figures of
production, and of the other States of exports.
(2) This ore is haematite, used as "ragging" for jigs 
on dredges, and not for iron-smelting.
"— " represents no production
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mines in the Philippines was prohibited by local law*
However Japan imported almost all Filipino iron ore 
output due to her close commercial and financial relations 
with the Filipino mining interests. In 1938 the
Oriental Iron Company in the Philippines agreed to 
supply the Japan Iron Works, the official smelter for the 
Japanese Army and Navy Departments, with ore for ten 
years. The Company was to ship 50,000 tons in 1938 and 
1,000,000 tons annually thereafter. in fact in
1939 and 1940, exports of iron ore from the Philippines 
to Japan amounted to 1,338,362 tons (29.2% of Japan’s 
total iron ore imports) and 1,218,914 tons (25.8%) 
respectively. Japan’s imports of iron ore from Malaya 
and the Philippines combined amounted to 71.4% of her 
total iron ore imports in 1939 and 69.1% in 1940.
Shipments of iron ore from French Indo-China to
Japan began in 1936. But they were terminated by the
authorities in Indo-China in 1938 as the French wished
(85 )to reserve the ore for a local munitions industry.' '
The Japanese Government lodged a strong protest with the.
French against this embargo, for the Formosan Development
Company had invested several million Yen in an iron ore
(86}concession in French Indo-China.'
Japan was also eager to import iron ore from Australia,
though Australia had relatively small deposits. Her annual
exports were only 4,300 tons of ore in 1935-36 and 2,700
tons in 1936-37. However, in June 1936 the Japan Mining
Company, strongly supported by the Japanese Government,
announced plans to invest 6-7 million Yen in the
British company of Brasserts, who held an iron ore
concession for Koolan Island in Yampi Sound, Western
Australia. The investment was to be made on condition
that the entire output from the concession would be
(87)
shipped to Japan. 7 The Japanese expected that from 
1939 the annual output of iron ore from Koolan Island 
would be 1 million tons. Under a new five-year plan for
the Japanese iron and steel industry, this would have
represented more than 10% of Japan*s total iron ore
(88 )requirements from non-yen bloc countries.' ' However 
in May 1938 the Australian Government announced an embargo 
on iron ore exports to Japan* In 1939 exports of iron 
ore from Australia to Japan were only 79,652 tons (1*7% 
of Japan*s total iron ore imports). After 1939 exports 
of iron ore to Japan c e a s e d . T h e  reasons for the 
imposition of the ban were to halt the exportation of 
war materials to a potential invader of Australia, and 
to meet Australian industrial development requirements.
The Japanese Consul-General in Australia, acting on 
behalf of the Japan Mining Company, immediately lodged 
a strong protest against the embargo, but to no effect.
In fact in the 1930s Japan attempted to curtail her 
imports of iron ore in order to reduce her trade deficit. 
However the local deposits of ore in Hokkaido, Niigata 
and Fukushima, together with imports from Korea and 
Manchuria, provided only a small part of total Japanese 
requirements. Consequently Japan was faced with an 
acute shortage of pig iron. In response to this problem, 
an official Iron and Steel Distribution Adjustment 
Council was established following the China Incident in 
1937. The Council was to ration the available supplies 
of ore, preference being given to those industries 
directly concerned with the manufacture of armaments and 
munitions. The Iron and Steel Industry Encouragement
Law was replaced in 1937 by a new Iron and Steel Industry 
Control Law, in order to strengthen state control over 
the industry, particularly in terms of iron ore supplies. 
However there remained an acute shortage of iron ore.
The embargoes imposed by French Indo-China and Australia 
in 1938 made the position even worse. It then became 
increasingly important for the survival of the Japanese 
iron and steel industry to increase imports of iron ore 
from Malaya.
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Malaya was particularly important to Japan in
this respect as she provided 56,9% and 48.7% of
Japan*s total iron ore imports in the periods 1929-31
and 1932-36. The export of iron ore from Malaya to
Japan showed a slight relative decline in the early
1930s, partly because there was a shortage of shipping
and partly because there was a boycott of the Sri Medan
(91)Mine in Johore by Chinese labour. In response to
this boycott the Japanese mining companies adopted a 
policy of offering higher wages to Chinese labour and 
of recruiting Indian labour to supplement the existing 
small Javanese labour force. In June 1938 the Nippon 
Mining Company Limited employed more than 25,000
(q2)
Indians as the Chinese refused to work for the Company. '
At almost the same time, the British authorities 
began to restrict the export of iron ore from Malaya 
to Japan. In 1937 they forced the Japanese to abandon 
a strategically-placed iron ore mine in Johore. In addition
the Federated Malay States prohibited the export of scrap
(93)iron to anywhere other than the Straits Settlements.
In June 1938 it was suggested in the House of Commons
(94)that Malayan iron ore should be diverted to Britain. 7
However these restrictive measures against Japan appear
to have had little effect, for during the first seven
months of 1938, 791,164 tons of iron ore were exported to
Japan from Malaya. This compared with 697,084 tons
exported in the same months of 1937 and 734,973 tons in 
(95)1936.' 7 One possible reason for the ineffectiveness of
restrictions was that the export duty on iron ore was 
vital to the revenues of Kelantan and Trengganu, although 
it was much less important in Johore. Moreover British 
capital in Malaya had shown little interest in ores 
other than t i n . ^ ^
In February 1941, the Johore authorities imposed an 
additional 2\% ad valorem duty on iron ore exports to 
Japan. However, it was not until the end of August 1941,
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when Britain’s freezing of Japanese foreign assets
was implemented in the Malay States, that all iron ore
shipments to Japan ceased. The Japanese mines in
(97)Malaya were closed down. 7
The suspension of American exports of scrap iron 
to Japan in September 1940 and of exports of iron ore 
and of pig iron the following December, was particularly 
critical for the Japanese. Imports of scrap iron from 
America accounted for 64% of Japan’s total scrap iron 
imports in 1941, though owing to the American embargo 
they had in fact fallen from 18.6 million picul in 
1940 to only 1.8 million picul in 1941. Japan’s imports 
of scrap iron had fallen remarkably from the levels of 
1940 and in consequence Japan attempted to import more 
iron ore from countries under her control. Imports of 
iron ore increased from 98.9 million Yen (5.1 million 
tons) in 1940 to 101.6 million Yen (5.6 million tons) 
in 1941. But imports of iron ore from Malaya and from 
the Philippines fell after 1941. This was due partly 
to Japan’s failure to exploit fully Malayan and Filipino 
iron ore during the Occupation and partly due to shipping 
difficulties. In 1942-45, Japan became almost totally 
dependent on China for her supplies of iron ore. During 
the Japanese Occupation the role of Southeast Asia 
changed from that of supplying raw materials to Japan 
into that of maintaining the Japanese army in the
Part 3. The Acquisition of Oil.
Oil was important not only to Japan’s war economy
but also to her economic development in peace time.
It was said by Professor Seiichi Kajima that na drop of
(99)oil is equal to a hundred drops of blood”. After
the formation of the First Konoe Cabinet in June 1937,
Konoe himself repeatedly asked the Planning Board to 
consider whether it would be possible for Japan to 
achieve self-sufficiency in certain key materials.
Always the answer was that it was not. This was particularly 
the case with regard to o i l . ^ * ^  In November 1945 
Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, who had been Ambassador to 
the United States in 1941 and a member of the Privy 
Council in Way 1944, recalled that prior to the war Japan 
had depended on oil from the Southern islands as oil 
stocks in Japan itself were limited. Fleet Admiral
□sami Nagano (Chief of the Naval General Staff from 
April 1941 to February 1944, thereafter Supreme Naval 
advisor to the Emperor) stated in November 1945 that one
of the major causes of the Pacific war had been the
.. - (102) question of oil* 7
The Cabinet Planning Board disclosed that Japan had 
produced only 1% of the oil she required in 1933 and 
9% in 1935 and 1 9 3 6 . ^ ^ ^  Japan had been securing oil 
by exploiting her own oil reserves and later those of 
the Japan-Manchuria-China bloc, encouraging coal 
liquefaction and the synthetic fuel industry, and most 
importantly by importing oil from abroad. The reserves 
of oil in Japan proper and in the Yen-bloc were inadequate 
for Japan’s requirements. Her 1941 production from
wells and from synthetic plants covered less than 12% 
of Japan’s peacetime requirements. ^ Moreover producing
petroleum synthetically through coal liquefaction had 
little potential for Japan, for it required the 
consumption of large quantities of coal and in addition 
was a complicated technical p r o c e s s / ^ ^  At the 63rd
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Liaison Conference on 28 October 1941, the Director of 
the Planning Board, Suzuki, stated that "a project to 
produce 4 million tons of synthetic oil would require 
for construction of facilities 1 million tons of steel,
25 million tons of coal, and expenditures of ¥ 2.1 billion. 
The plant facilities would not be completed for three 
years. Obviously, the State would have to take extra­
ordinarily strong measures"• He then stressed that 
"although we plan to produce 340,000 tons in 1941,
550,000 tons in 1942, 1.61 million tons in 1943, and 
4 million tons in 1945, there are serious difficulties 
in achieving this’,’. ^ 0^  The "serious difficulties" were 
not only that it would take three years to complete the 
plant facilities and would cost ¥ 2.1 billion, but also 
that Japan would face severe problems in acquiring the 
raw materials to make synthetic oil. At the same 
Conference the Chief of the Navy Bureau of Supplies and 
Equipment, Yamada, commented that "if this synthetic
oil plan is undertaken, the Navy’s preparations will take 
twice as long. We can’t have this sort of thing done, 
which disregards international relations. It is difficult 
to carry out. Moreover, the oil shortage cannot be 
relieved by synthetic oil alone".
Table 83 illustrates the Japanese oil position in 
1937-41. The production of both crude petroleum and 
refined products fell after 1940. Oil stocks reached 
a peak of 51 million barrels in 1939 but declined to 
48 million barrels in 1 9 4 1 . The petroleum embargo 
imposed on Japan by the U.S. in August 1941, and the 
joint action by the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands 
the following October, caused this decline. On 23 October 
1941, the 59th Liaison Conference was held at which the 
Navy Chief of Staff, Nagano, disclosed that "the Navy is 
consuming 400 tons of oil an hour. The situation is 
urgent". He therefore urged the Conference to come
to a quick decision as to whether there would be war 
against the U.S.
254.
CN CO 00 r—1 CO
CO m 01 00 Oi
O CO CO in 00K *•
CO F^ rH 01 00
■d 'CF in -et
co
00
A
fd
Eh
I
r»
CO
01
£
o
•P
■H
(/)
O
CP
P•fH
O
(D
CO
CD
£
fCS
04
(d
h3
<d
P
P
id
A
4-1
0
>d
§
cn
£
o
5
£
■H
•d
CD
£
•P
4-1
<d
"d
£
id
<d
*d
£Pi
U
CD
£
Otsl
Pi
a)
£
£
He
CO
a)
•rH
Pi
O
•P
£
CD
>
£
a>
rH
OPi
■P
a>
a
<u
3
P
u
>d
CD in r—1 CO O co
£ OI 01 in 00 CO
•H in 00 P co o
4h *. *
CD CN Ip r—1 OI 00
Pd CO CO CO CN CN
CO
•P
u
£H3
OPi
P .
*d
CD
£
•rH
m
Q)cd
r -
co
CN
CN
01CN
co
LD
LDCO
O
CM
CN
LD
CO
^F
CO
00
r -
CN
CN
CN
CN
o ’
CN
O'!
oi
r~
m
CN
00
cn
CN CO
CO ^F
a i
co
oo
O
CN
00
rH
oo
m
r -
0
01
01
CO
in
CN
co
o
oo
CN
r^ -
inoo
O
CN
aico
CN
r^
o i
ai
CN
CN
H
r"
O
O in CN CO 1—1
t" co CO CO F^
<d< ■d* CO o OI*k
CN CN CN CN ip
CO (d CO
-p P F^ CO o o S •p
p CO O 'cF in co I
0 CN 00 O P >i 10
Pi v * * >* * a •p
& O 00 00 CN co p AH CN 1—1 p CN c -p
00 01 O P
CO CO CO •cF •d1
oi OI Oi Oi Oi
i—i p p i—1 i—1
4H
O
£
cd
a)
p£
PQ
TO
P
cd
o
m
O'£
•H£
9
rH
cp
+J
CD£
'■H
■a
o
■^F
CO
CP
£
CD
■g
U
PQ
§
O
p
CD
S
o
p
4-1
>d
CD
■p
B
cr*
CD
CO
CD
9
Pi
cd
h)
CD
d
P
£
O
CO
*d
o
•H
p
CDPi
4H
O
on
£
•P
£
£
•H
di
CD
A
-P
<
Admiral Nomura recalled in November 1945 that on 
the eve of the Pacific war, Japan was continually trying 
to accumulate oil. He said that this policy was 
similar to the storing of anthracite coal which had taken 
place during the Russo-Japanese war. Although Japan 
had built storage tanks in order to build up stocks of 
oil, the Government was fully aware that the oil would 
last for only a short t i m e . ^ ^ ^  On the eve of the 
Pacific war, under pressure of an acute oil shortage, 
another project to produce synthetic oil was introduced 
by the Director of the Planning Board, Suzuki. At an 
Imperial Conference on 5 November 1941 he suggested that 
"it is extremely difficult to overcome these shortages 
by means of the synthetic oil industry, in view of the 
present lack of hydrogenolysis, cracking capacity, iso­
octane (aviation gasoline), synthetic fuel (diesel oil) 
and polymerization (machine oil) ••••• In case (if) 
we seek to increase our synthetic oil capacity by 5.2 
million kiloliters, we will need 2.25 million tons of 
steel, 1,000 tons of cobalt, 30 million tons of coal, 
expenditure of ¥ 3.8 billion, 380,000 coal miners, and 
a minimum construction period of six months for low- 
temperature carbonization plants and about two years for 
synthetic hydrogenolysis plants. Therefore, we will need
tt (113)
more than three years to complete all plants. x '
Compared to the project which Suzuki had outlined at 
the 63rd Liaison Conference a mere 8 days earlier, he 
had now increased the proposed synthetic oil capacity 
from 4 million to 5.2 million tons, increased steel 
requirements by 1.25 million tons, coal by 5 million tons, 
and cobalt by 1,000 tons. Total expenditure had risen 
from ¥ 2.1 billion to ¥ 3.8 billion. Clearly in this 
latter Suzuki was unrealistic, however, later he argued 
realistically that
"if we examine closely the foregoing conditions, 
as well as the engineering skills necessary for 
their completion ••••• we must conclude that it
is well-nigh impossible to achieve self- 
sufficiency in liquid fuels in a short period 
of time, by depending only on synthetic oil.
It is estimated that even if we take strong 
measures, at least seven years will be 
required. Consequently, if we go forward 
with our national policy of depending solely 
on synthetic oil, there will be a very serious 
defect in our national defense picture within 
a certain period of t i m e . " ^ * ^
Suzuki was Minister of State from April-July 1941 and 
from October 1941-June 1942. He was also an influential 
military officer. He clearly indicated that Japan would 
not be able to survive were it to depend solely on 
synthetically produced oil. He strongly impressed upon 
the Government and the military authorities that Japan 
would have to acquire oil from the Netherlands East Indies 
in the event of war against the U.S.
U/ith the passage of the Synthetic Oil Industry Law 
in 1937 Japan undertook a seven-year programme for 
synthetic oil production. She aimed at an annual production 
of 14 million barrels by 1943, ^ ^ ^ a n d  of 43.6 million 
barrels of synthetic oil over the whole period 1937-43.
But Japan produced only 4.1 million barrels, 9% of planned
production. (See Table 84). Oil self-sufficiency in
Japan over the period 1937-41 was less than 10%. (See Table 85)
Oil consumption in Japan inevitably depended largely 
on imports from abroad. Imports of oil came principally 
from the U.S. and from the Netherlands East Indies.
Imports of petroleum from the East Indies increased from 
an annual average of 1.2 million Yen in the period 
1914-18 to 20.2 million Yen in 1932-36. Imports from 
the U.S. decreased from 83% to 32% of Japan’s total 
petroleum imports over the same period - although the 
absolute value of oil imports from the U.S. increased 
from 6.1 million Yen to 11.9 million Yen. (See Table 86).
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Table 86-A
Petroleum: General Imports Into Japan, by Principal Sources, 
1914-1941
_________ (Thousand Yen)__________
Year
All
Countries
Principal
Countries
All Other Countries
Dutch Indies U.S.A.
1914 8,657 2,255 6,402 0
1915 8,464 1,768 6,695 0
1916 5,571 588 4,983 0
1917 5,305 401 4,904 ---
1918 8,538 1,147 7,387 4
1919 21,674 3,245 18,426 3
1920 21,273 2,187 19,085 0
1921 16,721 5,086 11,609 26
1922 18,789 4,011 14,778 0
1923 15,281 2,687 11,358 1,237
1924 14,145 3,577 10,399 170
1925 13,290 3,020 9,856 414
1926 17,005 3,979 12,191 835
1927 24,240 11,221 11,448 1,571
1928 30,686 13,489 14,965 2,232
1929 34,682 14,728 16,622 3,332
1930 37,867 12,645 21,206 4,016
1931 35,993 12,636 19,522 3,836
1932 36,533 14,512 18,703 3,318
1933 34,774 15,789 14,568 4,416
1934 33,359 18,400 10,099 4,860
1935 37,185 24,575 6,267 6,343
1936 42 ,705 27,897 9,987 4,821
1937-41 NOT AVAILABLE
Source: 1914-1925, Nihon Teikoku Nenkan, Several Series,
1926-1941, Nihon Tokei Nenkan, Several Series.
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Imports of petroleum from the East Indies surpassed 
those from the U.S. throughout the period 1933-36. 
Following the Manchurian Incident, Japan had increased 
her dependence for oil on the East Indies rather 
than on a potentially more hostile nation.
It has been shown earlier that the production 
of iron ore in Malaya was almost entirely controlled 
by Japan. In contrast oil resources in the East Indies 
were exploited by the Western Powers. In 1930, 
foreign capital investments in the East Indies1 
oil resources were as follows: Netherlands 248,840,000 
guilder; Britain 123,600,000 guilder; U.S. 25,000,000 
guilder; Japan 2,000,000 g u i l d e r . I n  1940, 
oil production in the East Indies was controlled by 
the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij (B.P.M.), 
the Nederlandsche Koloniale Petroleum Maatschappij 
(N.K.P.M.) and the Nederlandsche-Indische Aardolie 
Maatschappij (N.I.A.M.). (See the following Table.).
In fact B.P.M. was a subsidiary of the Standard Oil 
Company of New Jersey, and N.I.A.M. was a joint 
venture by B.P.M. and the Dutch Government•
In short B.P.M. controlled three-quarters of oil 
production in the East Indies as N.I.A.M. was 
under its management. Before 1930, Japan had not 
invested in oil production in the East Indies, 
but in that year a number of Japanese concerns 
established the Borneo Olie Mij (the Borneo Oil 
Company) which was based in Surabaja. However,
oil production by the B.O.M. remained at a very 
low level. In 1940, the company produced only 
59 tons•^12°)
Oil Production in the East Indies (1940) (Unit: ton)
Company Production %
B.P.M. 4,544,255 57.2
N.K.P.M. 2,083,402 26.2
N.I.A.M. 1,306,867 16.5
Others 4,469 0.1
Total 7,938,993 100.0
Source: Hiroshi Nakano and others, Higashi indo
(The Netherlands East Indies) in Nanpo Nenkan
(A Yearbook of the Southern Region), Tokyo, 1953, P.158.
From the late 1930s Japan planned to import more 
oil from the East Indies. When America abrogated the 
American-Japanese Trade and Navigation Treaty in 
January 1940, Japan’s determination to secure oil from 
the East Indies became even stronger. Soon after the 
Netherlands was attacked by Germany in May 1940, the 
Japanese Foreign Minister, Arita, requested the 
Netherlands Government, through the Dutch Minister in 
Japan, General J.C. Pabst, to ensure that exports of 
crude oil from the East Indies to Japan would reach 
one million tons annually. This request embarrassed 
the Dutch Government for the East Indies had exported 
only 869,000 tons to Japan in 1937, 668,000 tons in 
1938 and only 573,000 tons in 1939. However, the Dutch 
were not in a position to enrage the Japanese by rejecting 
their request. General Pabst informed Arita on 6 June 
1940 that ”the oil companies in the Netherlands Indies 
may be able to supply the required quantities, provided 
the Japanese, on their part, concluded the contracts 
in time11. (122)
On 31 July 1940 the U.S. took the first steps in 
limiting the export of mineral oil and oil products, 
particularly aviation spirit, to Japan. Japan promptly 
raised her annual oil requirement from the East Indies
to 2 million t o n s . ^ 23  ^ Moreover, in order to secure 
oil from the East Indies, Tokyo undertook to send an 
economic delegation to the Dutch colony.
K o i s o ^ ^ ^ t h e  leader of the proposed delegation,
was not welcome to the Dutch. In a press interview on
3 August 1940 he argued that "the Netherland regime
always had been most oppressive towards the indigenous
population of the Indies". Moreover Koiso had
asked his Government to give him military powers to force
the Dutch administration in the Indies to accept Japanfs
demands, if negotiations failed. This request was
(126 ^opposed by the Navy Minister, Yoshida. '
In the middle of August 1940 a civilian delegation, ^ *2^
led by Tadaharu Mukai, the Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Mitsui, arrived in the East Indies. Mukai
was not only the head of Mitsui, but was also a central
(12B ^figure in Japan*s financial world.' 1 He was selected 
to lead the mission to the East Indies, partly because 
his company, Mitsui Bussan, was a participant in the 
B.O.M. but more particularly because of his political 
background.
Mukai, who was accompanied by several military 
specialists arrived in Batavia in August 1940 for 
negotiations with J.C. Van Panthaleon, Baron Van Eck 
(the Director of the Royal Dutch-Shell group) and 
Fred H. Kay (the Director of the Standard Vacuum group).
Then the Kobayashi Mission, with a staff of 24 
assistants, including one Army, one Air and two Naval 
officers, entered Tandjong Priok harbour on 12 September 
1940.^  ^ The civilian delegation under Mukai was soon
attached to the Kobayashi Mission in their negotiations 
with the Dutch. ^ 3^  The Dutch were then led by 
Dr. H.J. Van Mook.^132^
The most prominent item in the negotiations between 
the Japanese and the Dutch was oil. Kobayashi expressed 
v/ery great interest in securing oil concessions in 
the East Indies. He also asked the Dutch to guarantee 
that over the following five years they would export 
3.15 million t o n s ^ ' ^ o f  oil annually to Japan. In reply 
Van Mook argued that this was impossible, for at that 
time the East Indies was exporting only 600,000 tons 
annually to Japan. At this point the conference was 
left to Mukai and the Royal Dutch-Shell, and Standard 
Oil Companies. On 18 October 1940 Mukai accepted a 
proposal for exports of 909,500 tons annually from 
the East Indies.
The U.S. and Britain then attempted to prevent 
the Dutch from exporting more oil to Japan.
In addition the Tripartite Pact, concluded on 26 September 
1940 between Germany, Italy and Japan, prompted the 
Netherlands to reduce oil exports to Japan. The Dutch 
regarded the Pact as a hostile act against her by the 
Japanese. However on 16 October 1940 Kobayashi argued, 
in a joint statement by the Dutch and Japanese delegations 
in the East Indies,that ,!in spite of the Tripartite Treaty 
recently concluded among Japan, Germany and Italy, the 
strong desire of Japan for the maintenance and promotion 
of the friendly relations between Japan and the Netherlands 
Indies is not affected in the least. All that is wished 
for by Japan is co-existence and co-prosperity with 
neighbouring countries”.
Kobayashi was recalled to Japan on 20 October 1940 
and left Batavia two days a f t e r . M u k a i  left 
Batavia on 23 November. Kobayashi’s successor was 
Kenkichi Yoshizawa, who arrived in Batavia on 
28 October 1940. Yoshizawa was an experienced diplomat, 
and a Member of the House of Peers. He had been Minister 
for Foreign Affairs in the Inugai Cabinet (December 
1931-May 1932). From 1923-1929 Yoshizawa had served
as Japanese Minister in China, and in June 1932 had 
become Japanese Ambassador to France. With the 
establishment of a Japanese Embassy in French Indo-China 
in October 1941, Yoshizawa became the first Japanese 
Ambassador to that country.
Mukai’s successor was Yozaburo Ito, Managing 
Director of Mitsui Bussan Kaisha. He arrived in Batavia 
before the end of 1940. Negotiations continued and on 
14 and 22 May 1941, memoranda were presented to the 
Dutch by the Japanese delegation asking for mineral oil 
exports of up to 3.8 million tons per annum for at least 
five years.
On 6 June 1941 the Dutch replied that nthe increase 
of the exportation of mineral oil and oil-products to 
Japan remains a matter of negotiation between the Japanese 
importers and the oil-producing companies. The present 
situation concerning oil-reserves does not, in the 
opinion of the Netherlands Government, allow an increase 
of production"• Negotiations between the Dutch 
and the Japanese delegations thus came to nothing. On 
14 June 1941 Matsuoka instructed Yoshizawa to end the 
mission. Yoshizawa left Batavia on 27 June 1941.
There is little doubt that Japanfs southern expansion 
movement had seriously affected the negotiations between 
the Yoshizawa and the Dutch delegations. For example, 
Matsuoka had made a speech in the Diet on 21 January 1941 
in which he had asserted that for all practical purposes 
the Netherlands Indies was already within the Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, under the leadership of 
Imperial Japan. Moreover through her mediation in
the border dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China, 
Japan had been able to establish military bases in 
Thailand, thus laying a foundation for a southward advance. 
These factors made the Netherlands Government reluctant
to cooperate with Japan by allowing more oil to be 
exported from the East Indies.
However, through the Kobayashi and Yoshizawa 
negotiations in Batavia, Japan had been able to secure 
a base for expansion in the East Indies. During the 
period from the appointment on 27 August 1940 of 
Kobayashi to lead the delegation to the departure of 
Yoshizawa from Batavia on 27 June 1941, there were 
clear indications that Japan was prepared to include 
the East Indies in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. First, the Japanese delegations contained, 
apart from diplomats, a number of military tnen.^
Indeed the Second Konoe Cabinet initially intended to 
appoint Sawada, a civilian and ex-Ambassador to Brazil, 
as chief delegate; but later General Koiso was persuaded 
to take his place. Koiso was an extremist and a strong 
advocate of a Southward advance. His views were even 
unacceptable to the Navy. Kobayashi then replaced Koiso 
and this calmed the fears of the Dutch. However, Dutch 
suspicions were again raised when they saw that Kobayash 
was accompanied by a number of military personnel. 
Appointing military men to non-military delegations 
indicated that the Japanese military had designs on 
the East Indies. The chief Dutch delegate, Van Mook, 
was particularly concerned over the activities of the 
Japanese mission to the East Indies.
In Japan, both before and after approval was given 
to the "Main Principles for Coping with the Changing 
World Situation", issued by the Konoe Cabinet on 
27 July 1940, the Japanese military were preparing for 
Southern military operations. Research groups had been 
organized and intelligence officers had been sent to 
the south, either secretly or openly, to collect 
military information. Captain Shigemasa Horiuchi,
who was regarded in the Naval Ministry as an expert on
Southern problems travelled around the East Indies 
and then wrote an article entitled "The Whole View of 
Netherlands East Indian Resources", This strongly urged 
Japan to acquire raw materials from the East Indies.
A further example of military preparation was the case 
of Captain Yoshimasa Nakahara, who accompanied the 
Kobayashi Mission, He was the most prominent Southern 
expansionist in the Naval Ministry, Early in 193B he 
had worked with the then Chief of the Operations Section 
in the Army General Staff, Colonel Kanji Ishihara,^^^ 
in writing the Kokusaku no Kijun (the Principles of 
National Policy) and the Teikoku Gaiko Hoshin (the Foreign 
Policies of Imperial Japan), These two documents were 
later adopted by the Five Ministers1 Conference, held on 
7 August 1936, which then formed the basis for the 
Japanese Southern Policy, Therefore it was quite under­
standable for Nakahara to be appointed to the Kobayashi 
(145)Mission, 7 Indeed with his appointment, the Japanese 
delegations in Batavia now understood that Japan would 
soon move from negotiations to military advance.
The second indication of increased Japanese interest 
in the East Indies derives from the role of the Mitsui 
Zaibatsu, The B.O,M. was the only Japanese oil company 
in the East Indies, The Mitsui Bussan Company held 132 
out of a total of 200 stocks in the B.O.M., Mukai,
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Mitsui, and his 
successor, Ito, Managing Director of the Mitsui Bussan 
Company, had been negotiating with the Dutch, and 
particularly with B.P.M,, N.K.P.M. and N.I.A.M. for 
a long time.
On 24 September 1940, Mukai asked the Dutch to provide 
information on petroleum-oil production in the East Indies, 
oil refining equipment and its capacity, loading and 
shipping facilities at each port, the current situation 
of all concessions in the East Indies and the current 
situation with regard to mining reservations. On 7 October
1940, the Dutch provided a detailed answer to these 
questions• This valuable information no doubt 
satisfied both the Mitsui Zaibatsu and the Japanese 
military authorities.
On 20 May 1940 the Japanese Foreign Minister,
Arita, requested the Dutch to export 1 million tons 
annually of mineral oil to Japan; the Dutch were very 
reluctant to comply. Nevertheless the Japanese demand 
was increased to 3.8 million tons annually at the end 
of the negotiations in Batavia. But even if the Dutch 
had not taken political factors into consideration and 
had co-operated with the Japanese, the East Indies would 
have had serious difficulty in exporting 3.8 million 
tons of oil to Japan each year.^^®^ Why, then, did 
the Japanese expect the East Indies to export so large 
a volume of oil in 1941? There are two possible answers. 
First, Japan needed oil urgently. Matsuoka instructed 
Yoshizawa, when he was appointed successor to Kobayashi, 
that it would be in order if he could secure 50% of 
Japanfs oil requirements from the East Indies.
Second, the high Japanese demands were probably a 
diplomatic tactic to obtain oil concessions from the 
Dutch, Matsuoka instructed Mukai, through the Japanese 
Consul-General in Batavia, Saito, to acquire oil concessions 
in the East Indies. Japan demanded more oil shipments 
from the East Indies so that the Dutch would not be in a 
position to refuse Japanese demands for oil concessions.
It is difficult to judge whether Japan preferred oil 
shipments or oil concessions for both were urgently needed. 
Control of oil production in the East Indies was, in 
the long-term, important to the Japanese war economy. 
Moreover, were the Dutch to attempt to destroy the oil 
fields in the event of a Japanese invasion of the Indies 
those fields actually belonging to Japan could be better 
protected.
269.
The Japanese were persistent in demanding oil 
concessions, while the Dutch were not in a position 
to refuse. Furthermore, the Dutch probably regarded 
it as preferable to allow Japan to become directly 
involved in oil exploration and exploitation. In the 
middle of October 1940 the Dutch Government proposed 
to grant 16,363,000 hectares to Japan for oil 
exploration and exploitation. In reply, on
29 October 1940 Mukai requested 17,463,000 hectares 
from the D u t c h . O n  6 June 1941 the B.O.M. was 
granted concessions covering 278,000 hectares for oil 
exploration in the Sangkoelirang region. This area had 
been the subject of an application by the Company on 
17 February 1941. Furthermore, suggested the Dutch 
"consideration of applications for exploration in the 
Banggai block and North-East-New-Guinea will be held 
over until the activities of the B.O.M. shall be 
sufficiently developed to justify a further extension 
of its concessions. Before granting concessions in these 
areas to possible later applicants the Netherland Government 
will carefully examine the applications (17 February 1941) 
filed by the B.0.1*1.". (153)
- (154)The Japanese Consul-General in Batavia, Saito, ' 
suggested to Matsuoka that, because of these concessions, 
Japanese soldiers could be sent to the East Indies 
disguised as labourers. They could then start to build 
military bases. Saito also asked for information as
to the areas which the military authorities wished to
(155) occupy.v '
The third indication of Japanese interest in the 
East Indies concerns the sites selected for negotiations. 
Negotiations between the Japanese (the Navy and Fuel 
Departments) and oil companies (Standard Oil Company of 
New Jersey and Royal Dutch Shell Co.) had been held in 
Japan before the Japanese delegations were sent to 
Batavia. In fact the talks in Tokyo were suspended and
then replaced by the discussions in Batavia.
This change in venue was prompted by three considerations. 
First, the talks in Tokyo had come to a standstill.
Second, in the negotiations with the Dutch in Batavia, 
the Japanese hoped to force the N.I.A.M. to sell its 
stock to the B.O.M. Third, the Japanese wished
to further their economic penetration, and later 
military presence, in the East Indies.
Van Mook initially opposed the presence of Kobayashi 
when he was sent to negotiate with the Dutch Governor- 
General. ”As an ultimate concession the Netherland 
Government agreed to a strictly limited number of very 
general conversations between Kobayashi and the Governor- 
General, provided that in the actual negotiations his 
opposite number would be Van Mook, who was to be appointed 
Minister Plenipotentiary”• Japan’s clear intention
was to force the Dutch into making concessions. Further­
more, with the negotiations transferred to Batavia, it 
became possible for Japan to send non-diplomats to the 
East Indies to collect military information.
The fourth indication concerns the role of the 
Yokohama Specie Bank L i m i t e d ^ ^ ^  in the East Indies.
At the end of 1940, Japan proposed to use the Yen as 
the principal medium of exchange in the East Indies 
after occupation.
”The chief representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank 
in the Indies, Mr. Y. Imagawa, acting for the 
Japanese exchange control, approached the Japanese 
and Netherland delegations with a project to 
establish a free and unlimited exchangeability 
between the Yen and the Netherlands Indies 
guilder at fixed and agreed rates, instead of 
the customary mutual payments in dollars. The 
proposal was referred to direct discussion between 
the Yokohama Specie Bank and De Javasche Bank
(the bank of issue in the Netherlands Indies) 
and reduced to an arrangement for direct 
payment in Yen and guilders as long as credit 
balances stayed within certain narrow limits; 
any excess balances, however, were to remain 
collectable in dollars as before. The agreement 
was perfected a few days before the arrival 
of Mr. Yoshizawa” ^ ® ^ i n  the East Indies on 
28 December 1940. However, Japan did not really benefit 
from this currency agreement, for nthe oil deliveries 
had been contracted for in dollars and the remaining trade 
continued to show a negative balance for the Indies” • ^
The final indication of Japanese interest in the
East Indies concerns the fact that the delegations
used ships instead of aeroplanes to travel to Batavia.
Both the Kobayashi and Yoshizawa Missions travelled on
the ship Nissho Maru of the Nanyo Kaiun Kabushiki-gaisha
to Batavia, and on the ship Nichiran Maru of the same
— (162)company, on their return to Kobe.^ ' On 25 August 1940 
the Kobayashi Mission was considering whether to travel 
by sea or by air ^ ® ^ b u t  it eventually left Kobe on 
the Nissho Marrf.164*Tt took nearly two weeks from Kobe 
to Batavia by ship, but only one day by air. The Japanese 
Missions were certainly entitled to travel by air.
Moreover Japan was eager to secure strategic raw materials 
from the East Indies for the U.S. was at that time 
increasing economic sanctions against her. Although 
there is no report as to the Missions* activities during 
their voyages, it would appear that a principal object 
was to increase the delegates1 practical knowledge of 
the southern area in preparation for military expansion.
In short, it is difficult to deny that Japan had 
been planning to expand into the East Indies before 
delegations were sent to Batavia in August 1940. More 
precisely Japan sent delegations to Batavia with the 
decided intention of ultimately occupying the area.
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From the very beginning, Yoshizawa was pessimistic 
about negotiations with the Dutch, On 13 February 1941, 
he sent a report to Tokyo urging military occupation 
of the East Indies, as he judged that the talks with 
the Dutch were worthless .
On 26 July 1941 the U.S. and Britain froze Japan!s 
overseas assets. Two days later Japan moved into southern 
Indo-China. The Dutch then froze Japan’s overseas assets 
and suspended oil exports. On 1 August 1941, an oil 
embargo was imposed on Japan by the U.S.. Japan’s 
imports of crude petroleum dropped from 3,150,000 
tons in 1940 to 447,143 tons in 1941. Imports of 
refined oil products fell from 2,255,224 tons to
? 1 cc \
782,388 tons between the same years.' } This severely 
threatened the Japanese economy.
Konoe estimated in 1941 that if Japan occupied
the East Indies, then given the destruction of oil fields
by the Dutch and the difficulties of transportation from
the East Indies, Japan would acquire only 0.3 million
tons of oil from the area in the first year, 1.5 million
tons in the second year, and that it would take 5 or 6
years to secure 5 million tons annually. ^ I n  October
1941 Tojo replaced Konoe as Prime minister. Tojo still
hoped to import 6 million tons of oil annually from the
U.S. if relations between the two powers improved.
But he also announced that Japan was prepared to fight
( 108')
the U.S. if forced to. } The Imperial Conference, held 
on 1 December 1941, decided to declare war on the U.S. on 
8 December.
Although it cannot be argued simply that 2.5 million 
Japanese died in the ’East Asian War” in order to procure 
6 million tons of oil, ("^^undoubtedly one of the major 
causes of the Pacific war was the question of securing 
oil from the East Indies.
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Notes on Section Four
course, one person may represent more than 
one faction. For example, Kobayashi, Mukai and Kuhara 
were not only entrepreneurs, but also propagandists for 
Southern expansion. Both Tanaka (G,) and Koiso were 
military figures, southern expansionists and important 
politicians.
(2}v 'Russia consumed less crude rubber than the 
other five major industrial powers for she had started 
producing synthetic rubber early in 1932. Synthetic 
rubber production in Russia rose from 52 tons in 1932 
to 42,000 tons in 1936, In this last year, synthetic 
production met 40% of total Russian requirements, —  
Seiichi Kojima, To-a Keizai-ron (On East Asian Economies), 
1941, P.339, See also, ”U.S.S.R. to Expand Domestic 
Rubber Production”, in FES, 16-1-1935,
^^This assertion can be found, for example, in 
the articles written by Yoshihiko Taniguchi, Nanpo Gomu 
Shigen to Sono Taisaku (Rubber Resources in the South and 
its Policy), in To-a Keizai Ronso. 1942, PP. 296-337 and 
Seiichi Kojima, op. cit., PP, 395-403.
^^The 70th Liaison Conference argued that the 
Japanese occupation forces ”will establish controls over 
foreign trade and foreign exchange operations; they will 
especially prevent the flow to the enemy of certain 
vital materials, such as oil, tin, rubber, tungsten, 
cinchona, etc.”. Nanpo Senryo-chi Gyosei Zisshi Yoko 
(Essentials of Policy Regarding the Administration of 
the Occupied Areas in the Southern Region). (NKSG, 
a supplementary volume, op. cit., P. 587). See also 
Nobutaka Ike, Japan's Decision For War, Records of the 
1941 Policy Conference, 1967, P. 252.
(5)v 'E.B. Schumpeter ed., The Industrialization of
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Japan and Manchukuo, 1930-40, 1940, P.242.
(6 } —' 'Hiro Okuda and Kunio Kawamoto, HoZin Nanpo
Hatten-shi (A History of the Japanese Southern Development),
in NN, 1953, P.19.
(7)* Iwao Hino and S.Durai Raja Singam, Stray Notes 
on Nippon-Malaisian Historical Connections, Kuala Lumpur 
Museum, 1944, P.123; Toraji Irie, Hojin Kaigai Hatten-shi 
(Studies on Overseas Japanese), vol. 2, Tokyo, 1938, P.144.
(8 )v 'Hiro Okuda and Kunio Kawamoto, op. cit.. P.19;
Iwao Hino and Raja Singam, op. cit.. P.123.
(9)v 'Yuen Choy Leng, "Japanese Rubber and Iron 
Investments in Malaya, 1900-1941", in Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies, Volume V, No.l, March 1974, P.21.
(10)nir5 okuda and Kunio Kawamoto, op. cit.. P.19; 
Toraji Irie, op. cit.. vol. 2, PP.144-145.
^ ^ I w a o  Hino and Raja Singam, op. cit., P.123. 
According to Hiro Okuda and Kunio Kawamoto, op. cit.,
P.19 and Toraji Irie, op. cit.. vol.2, P.144, the 
rubber acreage owned by Japanese in 1911 was 83,789.
(12) —Hiro Okuda and Kunio Kawamoto, op. cit., P.19.
^ ^ T o r a j i  Irie, op. cit.. vol.2, P.145.
^ ^ M a s a y o s h i  Matsukata (1835-1924) was a 
distinguished politician* He became involved with the 
national finances of Japan as early as 1871. He was 
Minister of Finance in the First Ito Cabinet (1885-1888), 
in the Kuroda Cabinet (1888-1889), in the First Yamagata 
Cabinet (1889-1891) and in the Second Yamagata Cabinet 
(1898-1900). He was also Prime Minister in 1891-1892
and in 1896-1898, acting as his own Minister of Finance.
He spent altogether 16 years and 5 months, as Minister 
of Finance, a record never repeated in Japanese history, 
(see NRDJ, vol. 17, PP. 91-92; NKSJ, PP.569-570).
(15) T. . .
Ibid*
(■^Toraji Irie, op. cit.,vol. 2, PP. 145 and 148.
^ ^ T a i s u k e  Itagaki (1837-1919) was Minister of 
Interior in the Second Ito Cabinet in 1896 and in the 
Okuma Cabinet in 1898.
^18^NRDJ, vol. 1, PP. 326-327 and op. cit., vol. 18, 
P. 140.
(19)
v 'Toraji Irie, op. cit.. vol. 2, P. 145.
^ ^ T h i s  Association passed through successive 
reincarnations eventually to emerge in 1934 as the 
United Society of Zohore Planters. Its membership also 
included Johore rubber companies operating in the 
Netherlands Indies. - Virginia Thompson, ’’Japan Frozen 
Out of British Malaya” , in FES, 20-10-1941, P. 238.
(211)' 'The Bank of Taiwan was established in 1897.
Its role was to stimulate the economic development of 
Japan’s colonies and to promote Japanese Southern 
expansion. It contributed enormously to Japanese economic 
penetration in China, Taiwan and the Southern regions, 
particularly during the Sino-Japanese war and the 
Pacific war. In 1945, it was ordered to suspend business, 
(see NK5 J , P.358; Taiwan Ginko, Taiwan Ginko Nizyunen-shi 
(The Twenty Years History of the Bank of Taiwan), 1919 
and Taiwan GinkD? Taiwan Ginko Yonzyunen-shi (The Forty 
Years History of the Bank of Taiwan), 1939.
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(2 2 )
v 'See Part 3. The Acquisition of Oil, footnote 61.
(23)v 'Yuen Choy Leng, op. cit., P. 22.
( ^ ) nThe legislation prohibited the alienation 
of rubber land exceeding 50 acres except to British 
subjects, subjects of Malay rulers, companies registered 
in the British dominions and in the Malay States, and 
others who uiere resident in Malaya for at least seven 
years and intended to continue doing so. However, 
transactions were allowed between persons of the same 
nationality. Under this regulation, British economic 
supremacy was assured as British subjects were allowed 
to acquire more land, and the status quo of non-British 
control of the industry was maintained as foreigners 
could only transact land with others of the same 
nationality” - Yuen Choy Leng, op. cit.. PP. 20-21.
(In my opinion, "British control” should be substituted 
for ”non-British control” for the correct interpretation 
of this extract).
(25) -'£5, 5-8-1917. Itochu suggested to the Johore
Government that the Rubber Lands (Restriction) Enactment
applied only in the Federated Malay States (Perak,
Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang). Consequently, as
Johore was an Unfederated Malay State, his purchase of
the rubber estate in Johore should be approved. He added
that since January 1917, three British concerns had
acquired rubber estates in Johore amounting to more
than 50 acres each. (.AS, 5-8-1917).
<26>AS, 4-8-1917.
<27>AS, 28-8-1917.
(28)
' 'See Yuen Choy Leng, op. cit.. P. 21.
(29)jhe founder of the Fujita Gumi was Denzaburo 
Fujita (1841-1912). Fujita had served as a manager in 
the establishment of the Sensyu-gaisha of Kaoru Inoue 
in 1874. (inoue 1836-1915. Inoue was Foreign Minister 
in the First Ito Cabinet between December 1885 and April 
1888, Minister of Interior in the Second Ito Cabinet 
between August 1892 and September 1896 and Minister of 
Finance in the Third Ito Cabinet between January 1898 
and June 1898). Sensyu-gaisha was later taken over by 
Fujita and renamed Fujita Gumi and then in 1893 
Fujita & Company. It was concerned with mining, commerce, 
transport and banking. It was based in Osaka. Fujita & 
Company invested in forestry and mining in Taiwan and 
had rubber plantations in the South Seas. In 1917, 
with a capital of 30 million Yen, the Fujita Kogyo 
Kabushiki-gaisha (the Fujita Mining Industry Co.) was 
established. In 1937, Fujita Gumi and Fujita Kogyo 
were amalgamated, to become the Fujita Gumi Co. - 
See Osaka Shiyaku-syo, Mei.ji-Taisho Osaka Shi-shi 
(A History of Osaka in the Meiji-Taisho Period), 1933-35; 
Takao Tsuchiya, Nihon no Seisyo (Political Businessmen 
in Japan), 1956 and Seishu Iwashita, Fujita-ko Genqo-roku 
(A Memoir of Mr. Fujita), 1913.
^^Vurukawa Zaibatsu was founded by Ichibe Furukawa 
(1832-1903). In 1874, Furukawa established the Asakura 
and Ashio Copper Mines. The following year, he acquired 
the Innai and Ani Silver Mines. By 1897 he held 12 
copper mines, 8 silver mines and 1 gold mine: this formed
the foundation of the Furukawa Zaibatsu. Apart from mines, 
Furukawa Zaibatsu also had interests in copper manufacturing 
machinery manufacturing and chemicals. Fuji Denki 
(Fuji Electricity) and Asahi Denka (Asahi Electrification) 
were the two most important enterprises affiliated to 
the Furukawa Zaibatsu. The Zaibatsu did not have its 
own banking organization, but was financially supported 
by the Daiichi Bank and the National Trusts. - NRDJ, vol. 16
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P. 162; NKSJt P. 542. See also Itsuka-kai, Furukawa 
Ichibe-ko-den (A Memoir of Hr. Ichibe Furukawa), 1926 
and Mochikabu-gaisha Seiri Iin-kai, Nihon Zaibatsu to 
Sono Kaitai (The Japanese Zaibatsu and their Dissolution), 
1951.
^■^Okura Zaibatsu was founded by Kihachiro 
Okura (1837-1928). Okura was a famous munitions producer 
who had built his wealth through the Japanese military 
expansion in Taiwan in 1874, the Sino-Japanese war in 
1894-1895 and in the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-1905.
He later established the Okura Gumi which was the foundation 
of the Okura Zaibatsu. The Zaibatsu had substantial 
investments in the Southern region mainly in China.
Early in 1897 it made a loan to the Han Yang Iron 
Manufacturing Co. in China. In 1902, it became the first 
Japanese bank to make a loan to the Chinese Government.
Later in 1911, Okura Gumi established the first Manchurian 
iron ore processing plant - Honkeiko Seitetsu-syo 
(Ben Xi Hu Iron Manufacturing Co.), - which became the 
base for Japanese economic penetration of Manchuria.
Okura Zaibatsu eventually controlled 17 enterprises in 
Manchuria and 16 enterprises in other parts of China.
Okura Gomu Kabushiki-gaisha in Johore and Okura Sumatra 
Farm in Sumatra were also owned by the Zaibatsu. In 1940, 
Okura Gumi had capital assets of 50 million Yen, and 
controlled 15 directly affiliated companies and 17 
subsidiary companies in Japan. More than two hundred 
companies were affiliated either directly or indirectly 
to the Okura Gumi, Okura Gumi was the fifth largest 
Zaibatsu next to Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and 
Yasuda. - See NKSJ, PP. 53, 313, 458, 462 and 564;
Okura Koto Syogyo Gakko, Tsuruhiko-ko Kaiko-roku 
(Reminiscences of Mr. Tsuruhiko), 1940 and Teiji Katsuta, 
Okura-Nezu Kontsuerun Doku-hon (A Hand-book of
Okura-Nezu Concerns), 1938.
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(32^' 'Yuen Choy Leng, op, cit,, PP. 21 and 25,
voo^Kuhara graduated from the Keio Gizuku (the 
founding institution of the University of Keio in 
Tokyo) in 1890, He served with the Morimura Gumi 
and the Fujita Gumi, before establishing the Hitachi 
Mining Industry in 1905, He took over the Kosaka Mine 
from his uncle Densaburo Fujita, purchased the Hitachi 
Copper Mine, the Bine no Sawa Mine and the Higashiyama 
Copper Mine in 1912, and established the Kuhara Mining 
Industry in the same year, with a capital of 10 million 
Yen, During this period, he also established the 
Hitachi Seisakuzyo (Hitachi Manufacturing), the Kuhara 
Syoji (Kuhara Trading Company), the Godo Hiryo-gaisha 
(Godo Fertilizer Company), and the Kuhara Honten 
(Kuhara Head Office), In 1927, he entrusted his 
businesses to his brother-in-law, Yoshisuke Aikawa, 
and moved into politics. Aikawa soon reorganized and 
renamed the Kuhara Mining Industry, the Nihon Sangyo 
Kabushiki-gaisha (Nissan) which formed the foundation 
of the Kuhara Zaibatsu, The Nissan grew rapidly due 
to increased military expenditure after the Manchurian 
Incident, In 1938, the Nissan controlled 77 large 
companies with a total capital of 470 million Yen.
It soon overtook all the other newly-established (Sinko) 
Zaibatsu such as Nicchi, Nisso and Mori and became the 
third largest Zaibatsu next to Mitsui and Mitsubishi 
by the end of the 1930s. Kuharafs political activities 
were financially supported by the Nissan. - See NKSJ,
P. 135; NRDJ, vol. 6, P. 285; DJ J , P. 259; Mainichi 
Shinbun-sha, op. cit.t PP. 265-266; NGJ. P. 239;
K. Yamazaki, Kuhara Fusanosuke, 1939 and S. Dtaku,
Gendai Nihon Kaibutsu-den (A Life History of Monsters 
in Modern Japan), 1956.
^ ^ S e i y u k a i  was the short form of Rikken Seiyukai 
(August 1900-July 1940). It was established in 1900
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by Hirobumi Ito and became the largest political party 
in Japan together with the Rikken Miusei-to. In 1938, 
a power struggle between Kisaburo Suzuki (who had been 
President of the Seiyukai between 1932-1937), Ichiro 
Hatoyama (the younger brother of Kisaburo Suzuki,
Minister of Education in the Yonai and Saito Cabinets), 
Fusanosuke Suzuki and Chikuhei Nakajima (Minister of 
Railways in the Konoe Cabinet) split the Seiyukai.
In July 1940, the Seiyukai was dissolved.
(35}' 'Tasuku Noguchi (ed.), Nihon no Roku-dai 
Contsuerun (The Six Largest Concerns in Japan), Tokyo, 
1979, P. 54.
(36)^iichi Tana[<a (1863-1929) was a typical military 
man. He was on the General Staff of the Manchurian Army 
during the Russo-Japanese war. He later became the 
Chief Officer of the Department of liiar, Director of 
Military Affairs and then Vice-Chief of the General Staff. 
He was Minister of War up to June 1921 in the Hara 
Cabinet (September 1918-November 1921), and in this 
position carried out the dispatch of troops to Siberia 
in 1918. In 1921 he was promoted to the rank of General. 
He again became Minister of War in the Second Yamamoto 
Cabinet (September 1923-January 1924), In 1925, he 
became Prime Minister, serving also as Foreign Minister 
and Minister of Colonial Affairs. During this period, 
he dispatched troops to Shandong, instigated rebellion 
in China and pursued the acquisition of Manchuria and 
Mongolia. In July 1929, the Tanaka Cabinet collapsed. - 
See NKSJ, PP. 367-368; NRDJ, PP. 200-201; NGJ, PP. 520- 
521; Tanaka Giichi Denki Hensan-syo, Tanaka Giichi-den 
(Memoirs of Giichi Tanaka), 1929 and Tanaka Naikaku 
Hensan-syo, Tanaka Naikaku (The Tanaka Cabinet), 1928.
^37^Ikki Kita (15 April 1883-19 August 1937) was 
the mastermind of the Japanese nationalist movement 
during the inter-war years. At first he was an admirer
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of the Chinese revolution of 1911 but in 1913 he 
became a firm nationalist. On his return to Japan 
from China in 1919, he was greeted by Syumei Okawa.
KitaTs famous article which appeared in 1919, Nihon 
Kaizo Hoan Daiko (The Principal Measures of Reconstructing 
Japan) was widely praised by the right wing. He then 
joined several fascist associations including Roso-Kai 
(1918-21), and Yuzon-sha (1919-23). His political 
activities were financed by Fusanosuke Kuhara and 
Shizeaki Ikeda (1867-1950, the head of Mitsui).
In the 1930s he constantly undermined the loyalty of 
the young military staff to the army hierarchy. This 
eventually led to the 2.26 Incident. He was arrested 
in 1936 for his part in that affair: the following year 
he was sentenced to death and executed. - See NKSJ,
P. 110 and Mainichi Shinbun-sha, Nihon Zinbutsu Ziten 
(A Dictionary of Japanese Figures), Tokyo, 1952,
PP. 267-268.
(38)The 2.26 Incident (February 26 Incident:
26 February 1936-29 February 1936) was a coup led by 
young army staff. It was provoked by the ultra- 
nationalist Ikki Kita. In the course of the coup, the 
official residence of the Prime Minister and the 
Metropolitan Police Board were both attacked, and the 
Internal. Minister Saito, the Minister of Finance Takahashi 
and the Inspector General of Education Watanabe were 
murdered. The coup group later occupied the official 
residence of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of the 
Army, the General Staff Office and the House of Parliament. 
Through the Minister of War, Yoshiyuki Kawashima, they 
demanded increased military participation in government.
The Army authorities accepted part of their demands and 
placed Japan under martial law in order to prevent the 
spread of violence. But on 28 February, the Army 
authorities put down the rebel group as the coup leaders 
came to realize that they had the support of neither
the Navy nor the general population* Most of the coup 
participants were sentenced to death. However, by the 
coup, the right of the Army to be directly represented 
in Parliament was established. In addition the Army 
thereafter took the initiative in the Hirota Cabinet. - 
See NKS_J, P. A 68; Nihon Syuho-sha, 2.26 Ziken (the 
February 26 Incident), 1957; Aki Fujiuiara, 2.26 Ziken 
(the February 26 Incident), in Rekishi-qaku Kenkyu,
Nos. 169 and 171, 1954.
^ ^ S e e  footnote 32.
^ ^ Y u e n  Choy Leng, op. cit.. P. 21.
^ 1h b i d .. P. 22.
/ ^  ^ \
' 'Iwao Hino and Raja Singam, op. cit.. P. 124.
^ ^ K e e  Yeh Siew, op. cit.. PP. 54-55; Yuen Choy 
Leng, op. cit.. P. 23 and J.H. Drabble, Rubber in Malaya 
1876-1922. the Genesis of the Industry. Kuala Lumpur,
1973, P. 214.
^^^Yuen Choy Leng, op. cit.. P. 24.
^ ^ K e e  Yeh Siew, op. cit.. P. 55.
^ ^ SIA, No. 35, ’Rubber and Rubber Manufactures1, 
October 1945, P. 4; Virginia Thompson, op. cit.. P. 238.
^ ^ V i r g i n i a  Thompson, op. cit.. P. 238.
^ ^ Y u e n  Choy Leng, op. cit.. P. 24.
(49) -'See Hiro Okuda and Kunio Kawamoto, op. cit.. P.20.
(5°)jTS, P.219.
(51)
v 'Virginia Thompson, op. cit., P.238.
^ ^ S e i i c h i  Kojima, op. cit,, PP. 400-401.
(53^
' E.B. Schumpeter, ed., op. cit.. P. 242;
JTS, P. 219.
^ ^ I r o n  ore is the basic material for the
manufacture of iron and steel. The ore is converted
into pig iron in blast furnaces. Relatively small 
quantities of iron ore are also used in steel-making 
furnaces, to oxidize the impurities contained in pig 
iron, scrap and the other materials which are being 
charged. - U.S.T.C., J.T.S.: P. 107.
^ ^ S e i i c h i  Kojima, op. cit., PP. 326-329.
The average proportion of pig iron to scrap iron in 
the production of steel plates was 3 to 7, but could
reach the ratio 1 to 9. - Ibid., P. 329.
(56}' 'Jerome B. Cohen, Japans Economy in War and 
Reconstruction. 1949, P. 114.
^57^Ibid.. P. 115.
(58}' 'Alvin Barber, "British Malaya as a Leading 
Source of Japanese Iron” , in FES. New York, 15-3-1939, 
P. 66. For a discussion of Japanese investment in iron 
ore mining in Malaya, see Alvin Barber, op. cit.;
Helmut G. Callis, Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia.
New York, 1942, P. 56; Patricia G. Barnett, "Southeast 
Asia Increases Iron Exports to Japan" in FES. New York, 
3-7-1940; Yuen Choy Leng, op. cit.: and Taiwan, Taiwan 
Sotokufu Gaijibu, Nanyo Nenkan (Yearbook of the South 
Seas), vol. 1, Taiwan, 1941, PP. 1177-1182.
(59)v 'Virginia Thompson, op. cit.. P. 238.
(60)The i #s #c. began operations in Batu Pahat,
Johore, in 1921, the N.M.C. in Dungun, Trengganu, in 1925, 
the I.M.C. in Bukit Langkap, Endau, Johore, in 1935 
and the S.S.I.M.C. in Temangan, Kelantan, in 1937,
/ g i \
' 'Including the Machang Sa-tahun mine and other
enterprises owned by the Ishihara Sangyo Company.
^ ^ K o i c h i  Hamada, op. cit.. P. 96.
(53} _
' 'See Toru Yano, Nanshin no Keifu (Genealogy of 
Southern Penetration), 1975, PP. 107-109.
(®^Alvin Barber, op. cit.. P. 66; Helmut G. Callis, 
op. cit., P. 56; G.C. Allen and A.G. Donnithorne,
Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya. A Study in
Economic Development, London, 1962, P. 166.
/ 65 }
v 'Ishihara Sangyo Kaiun Kabushiki-gaisha was a 
subsidiary of the I.S.C.. "By 1936 most of the ore from 
Malaya was carried in ships owned or operated by the I.S.K. 
The one-sided character of the carrying trade was counter­
balanced to some extent by the carriage of Japanese 
manufactures, coal and cement outward from Japan to 
Singapore. Tonnage owned by the Company totalled nearly 
40,000 tons in 1936. One of the two services operated 
regularly to Malaya began at Yokohama; the second set 
out from the northern Kyushil ports". - N.S. Ginsburg, 
Japanese Prewar Trade and Shipping in the Oriental Triangle 
Chicago, 1949, P. 64.
/ 00 \ ^
 ^ 'The Shinko Zaibatsu were the new Zaibatsu, formed
at the time of the Manchurian Incident and stimulated 
by the expansion of the heavy chemical industry in Japan. 
Moreover, as a result of the formation of economic blocs 
throughout the world in the early 1930s, there had been 
a considerable development of import-substituting 
industries in Japan. These were the two primary reasons
for the establishment of the Shinko Zaibatsu from the 
beginning of the 1930s* Moreover these Zaibatsu were 
supported by the Military* The largest Shinko 
Zaibatsu were Nissan, Noguchi, Mori, Nisso and Riken*
Of these Nissan was the most important* They each had 
substantial investments in the Southern region*
(6 7 }
'Ishihara published a book called Minami Nihon 
no Kensetsu (The Creation of Southern Japan) in Tokyo 
in 1942* In it he supported the Japanese expansion 
into Southeast Asia. See James K. Irikura, Southeast 
Asia: Selected Annotated Bibliography of Japanese 
Publications * 1956, PP. 169-170.
(68)v 'Konoe was Prime Minister on three occasions;
June 1937-January 1939; July 1940-July 1941 (when 
Matsuoka was Minister of Foreign Affairs) and July 1941- 
October 1941 (when Toyoda was Minister of Foreign Affairs)
^ ^ S y u m e i  Okawa (1886-1957) was a jurist, politician 
philosopher and an ultra-nationalist, active in pre-war 
patriotic societies. He served for a time as director 
of the Research Bureau of the South Manchuria Railway 
Company. In 1919, he was involved in the establishment 
of an ultra-nationalist association, Yuzon-sha (1919-1923, 
fYet remaining* Society) in collaboration with the extreme 
nationalist Ikki Kita (1883-1937. See footnote 37).
In 1924, he formed another fascist association, Kochi-sha 
(1924-1932). Through the organ of this association, 
Nihonzin (the Japanese) and numerous other publications, 
he advocated extreme nationalist ideas. His teachings 
were influential with young military officers and with 
members of the Sakura-kai (Cherry Association) which 
planned several of the political assassinations of the 
1930s. He had a close relationship with the Army and 
was a prime mover in two military coups - Sangatsu Jiken, 
the March Incident in 1931 (see appendix 1) and Jyugatsu
Jiken, the October Incident in 1931. (This was an Army 
coup planned jointly by young army officers and Syumei 
Okawa. They planned to murder members of the Cabinet 
and to establish a new regime headed by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Sadao Araki, (Minister of War in the Inugai Cabinet, 
December 1931-May 1932, and Minister of Education in 
the First Konoe Cabinet, May 1938). They wished to 
institute a "national reformation". The plan failed 
due to disagreement among the coup leaders and hesitation 
in the Army hierarchy. However, the political power of 
the Army was nevertheless strengthened.) (see MKSJt 
PP. 259-260). In February 1932, Okawa reformed the 
Kochi-sha and established the Zinmu-kai (the Zinmu 
Society, February 1932-February 1935, it was named after 
the legendary Emperor Zinmu). It had 30,000 members 
and proclaimed Greater Asia doctrines. In 1932, Okawa 
was involved in a Naval coup, the 5.15 Incident, and was 
sentenced to five years imprisonment. - See NKSJ, PP. 51, 
162, 225, 259 and 297; Joyce C. Lebra, Japanfs Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II. Selected 
Readings and Documents. 1975, P. 36; Syumei Okawa,
Fukko Ajia no Syomondai (Problems of Reconstructing Asia), 
1922; Syumei Okawa, Nihon Seishin Kenkyu (A Study of 
the Spirit of Japan), 1938 and Syumei Okawa, Nihon Oyobi 
Nihonzin no Michi (The Choice of Japan and the Japanese), 
1925.
^ ^ K u n i s h i g e  Tanaka (1869-1941) was a typical 
military man. He graduated from the Army University, 
and first served as military attache and as a member 
of the general staff in the Japanese Embassies in 
Britain and America. He later became Commander of 
the Taiwan Army between July 1926-August 1928. In 1929 
he became an Army General. In May 1933, he formed the 
Meirin Association with himself as President. The principl 
of the Meirin Association were, (i) loyalty to the 
Emperor and love of one’s country, (ii) to destroy the
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existing political parties and to establish a political 
system centred on the royal family, (iii) forceful 
foreign diplomacy, (iv) to ensure the political supremacy 
of the Army and abrogate the London Agreement, (v) to 
reform Japan!s financial administration; to stimulate 
industrial development and to develop China* The Meirin 
Association advocated military interference in politics. - 
See NRDJ, vol. 12, P. 201; NKGJ, PP. 187, 593, 622,
722, and Kunishige Tanaka, Go.jin no Funki Shitaru Riyu 
(The Reason why I Provoked Matters), 1932.
^ ^ S e e  footnote 38.
(72) -'See NJKSJ, P. 24; Ishihara Sangyo Kabushiki-gaisha
Shashi Hensan Iin-kai, Soqyo Sanjyu-qo-nen o Kaiko Shite 
(Review for Thirty Fifth Anniversary), 1956 and NRDJ, 
vol. 1, P. 291.
(73)v 'Kee Yeh Siew, "The Japanese in Malaya Before 
1942” in Journal of the South Seas Society, vol. xx,
Parts I & II, 1966, P. 55.
(74)v 'With regard to the role of Kuhara, see footnote 33.
^ ^ T o r u  Yano, op. cit.. PP. 107-109.
( 76 ) —
' 'Koichi Hamada, op. cit., P. 97.
(77)v 'Yuen Choy Leng, op. cit.. P. 29.
(78 )' 'By the mid-1930s the I.S.C. iron mine in Johore 
was nearing exhaustion. However in 1935 Shigeru Iizuka 
established a new mine in Endau, also in Johore, though 
it yielded much less ore than the I.S.C. mine. - Ibid..
PP. 28-29.
(79)x 'The Kuhara Iron Mine was purchased from the I.S.C. 
by the Nippon Mining Company in 1930. - Ibid., P. 29.
(80)Aivin Barber & Patricia G. Barnett point out 
that the iron mines in Malaya were financed by Japanese 
capital, managed by Japanese business and exported their 
output almost exclusively in Japanese ships to the 
furnaces and smelters of Japan* (Alvin Barber, op* cit.,
P. 66 and Patricia G # Barnett, op* cit.. P. 166).
The export duty was charged at 10%, being 50 cents per 
ton in Johore, 40 cents in Kelantan and 40 cents in 
Trengganu* (L*L. Fermor, Report upon the Mining Industry 
of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1943, P. 48.).
/ 01 \
v 'See also L.L. Fermor, "Malayafs Mineral Resources 
and the War”, in The Asiatic Review, vol. 37, April 1941, 
P. 387.
/ 82)
K 'Catherine Porter, "An Independent Philippines and 
Japan", in FES, 14-4-1937, P. 85.
^ ^ P a t r i c i a  G. Barnett, op. cit*. P. 167.
^®^C.p., "Philippines Increase Iron Shipments 
to Japan", FES, 9-6-1937, P. 134.
^ ^ P a t r i c i a  G. Barnett, op. cit.. P. 167.
( 8 6 ^v 'Jack Shepherd, "Repercussions of the Australian 
Embargo on Iron Ore Exports", in FES. 21-12-1938, P. 297.
(87)v 'W.W.L., "Iron Mines as a Feature of Japanfs 
"Southward Drive", FES, 9-9-1936, P. 205; Jack Shepherd, 
op. cit*. P. 296. Japanese expenditure through to May 
1938 on the construction of roads, wharves and a pumping 
station, preliminary drilling and the installation of 
machinery, amounted to £A 70,000. - Jack Shepherd, 
op. cit.. P. 296.
( 8 8 ^
'Jack Shepherd, op. cit.. P. 296.
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^89^See YC, op, cit,, P. 264,
^ I b i d . , PP. 296-297; M.S.F., "Japan Faces Pig 
Iron Shortage" in FES. 3-2-1937, P. 32.
(91)' 'The Chinese were predominant in the labour 
force working in the Malayan mines. However at the end 
of 1937, the Chinese began to leave the Japanese-owned 
mines in protest against Japanese military expansion in 
China. On 8 December 1937, 800 Chinese workers walked 
out of the Sri Medan Mine, leaving a labour force of 
only 100 Javanese. - Stephen Leong, "The Malayan Overseas 
Chinese and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1941", in 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. September 1979, P. 298.
See also Patricia Glower, "Another Strike Wave in 
British Malaya", in FES, 28-2-1940, P. 61.
(92)'Kee Yeh Siew, op. cit.. P. 56.
(93)v 'Virginia Thompson, op. cit.. P. 238.
^9^ K e e  Yeh Siew, op. cit.. P. 56.
(95)v 'Alvin Barber, op. cit.. P. 68.
^"^Virginia Thompson, op. cit.. P. 238.
(97) Ibid.. P. 238; Kee Yeh Siew, op. cit., P. 56.
(98)'For example, during the Japanese occupation 
of Malaya, haematite was mined by the Japanese at Tambun 
near Ipoh to supply the local Japanese munitions industry. - 
Li Yu Rong, op. cit.. P. 128.
^"^Seiichi Kojima, op. cit.. P. 351.
(lOO)Asahi Sinbun-sya, Konoe Fimimaro-ko no shuki(Memoirs 
of Prince Konoe), Tokyo, 1946, PP.49-50.
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(101)ggg ^ Taiheiyo Senso (The Pacific War), vol. 5,
P. 718. See also U5SBS, Interrogations of Japanese 
Officials, Naval Analysis Division, vol. II, Interrogation 
No. 429, 8-11-1945, P. 388.
(102)g s s , Taiheiyo Senso (The Pacific War), vol. 5,
P. 659. See also USSBS, Interrogation No. 392, 20-11-1945, 
P. 353.
(■^^Seiichi Kojima, op. cit.. P. 352.
(104)jerOme b # Cohen, op. cit., P. 133.
^ ^ ^ S e e  Seiichi Kojima, op. cit.. PP. 353-354. 
"Synthetic oil in Japan was produced by three methods: 
from the low-temperature carbonization of coal; this was 
the most popular among the Japanese; the hydrogenation 
of coal tar and shale oil distillates; and the synthesis 
from coal by the Fischer-Tropsch process. The seven-year 
(1937-43) plan provided for the completion by 1943 of 
ten hydrogenation plants, eleven Fischer-Tropsch plants, 
and sixty-six low-temperature carbonization plants." - 
Jerome B. Cohen, op. cit.. PP. 137-138.
(1Q6)|\jk s G , A Supplementary Volume, P. 541; Takushiro 
Hattori, Dai To-a, Senso Zenshi (A History of the War 
in the Far East, 1941-1945), vol. 1, Tokyo, 1953, P. 203; 
Nobutaka Ike, op. cit., P. 195.
(107>ibid..
(108)it possible that this official is Takeo Tada 
rather than Yamada. In NK5G, A Supplementary Volume,
PP. 540-541 and in Nobutaka Ike, op. cit., PP. 192,195, 
the Chief of the Navy Bureau of Supplies and Equipment 
is said to be "Yamada". However, in NKSG, vol. 6 ,
P. 414 and in Takushiro Hattori, op. cit.. P. 203, the
official is said to be "Tada". The interpretation of 
Nobutaka Ike is based on NK5G, A Supplementary Volume, 
op, cit.
P, 541; Takushiro Hattori, vol. 1, 
op. cit., P. 203; Nobutaka Ike, op. cit.t P. 195.
(110)on eue ^he pacj[fic mar, oil stocks 
in Japan had fallen to 42.7 million barrels. It was 
estimated that this would last for 2 years. In fact 
the oil stocks lasted for only one and a half years.
Oil consumption in 1942 was 25.55 million barrels and 
in 1943 28.11 million barrels. - GS5. Taiheiyo Senso 
(The Pacific War), vol. 5, PP. 730-731.
(111)jsjKSG, A Supplementary Volume, P. 537;
Takushiro Hattori, op. cit., P. 202; Nobutaka Ike, 
op. cit., P. 186.
(112)gss, The Pacific War, vol. 5, P. 730;
USSBS, vol. II, Interrogation No. 429, 8-11-1945, P. 394.
(113)|\|k s g , A Supplementary Volume, P. 577; Nobutaka 
Ike, op. cit., PP. 221-222.
(114)|\IKSG, P. 578; Nobutaka Ike, op. cit., P. 222.
(115)jerome B. Cohen, op. cit.. P. 137.
(I16)japants imports of crude oil and petroleum 
benzine were principally from the U.S. and the East Indies
Japanese Imports,
(a) Crude Oil {% of total imports)
America N.E.I. Russia Borneo
1922 5.8 29.2 - -
1923 31.8 32.9 - -
1924 31.1 31.5 - -
1925 42.4 27.2 - -
1926 44.8 26.1 - -
1927 45.2 27.9 - -
1928 45.5 28.1 7,6 -
1929 56.0 22.0 10.2 -
1930 56.6 14.1 14.2 6.2
1931 56.7 8.5 18.2 4.4
1932 58.6 8.0 15.5 4.4
1933 58.2 8.8 13.8 6.1
1934 66.0 9.1 9.8 5.4
1935 76.1 11.1 0.1 5.1
1936 76.6 12.0 - 7.3
Source : Computed from YC, op. cit., P. 235.
(b) Petroleum benzine (% of total imports)
America N.E.I.
1922 11.0 68.1
1923 25.5 70.5
1924 33.8 66.2
1925 31.8 68.2
1926 44.2 55.1
1927 50.1 49.9
1935 65.5 29.4
1940 70.4 28.3
1941 82.8 17.2
Source: Computed from YC, op. cit,, P. 235
(117)Hiroshi Nakano and others, "Higashi Indo"
(The Netherlands East Indies) in Nanpo Nenkan (A Year­
book of the Southern Region), Tokyo, 1953, P. 157*
( H 8 )por more information, see Yoichi Itagaki, 
Taihei-yo Senso to Sekiyu Mondai (The Pacific UJar and 
the Petroleum Problem) in Nihon Gaiko Gakkai, Taihei-yo 
Senso Genin-ron (Studies on the causes of World War II 
in the Pacific), Tokyo, 1953, PP. 616-618; Hiroshi 
Nakano and others, op. cit.. P. 158.
^ 19^Helmut G. Callis, op. cit.. P. 33; Yoichi 
Itagaki, op. cit.. P. 617 and NYNJ. 1939, Chapter two. 
r,The Indies", P. 184. The B.O.M. was a company formed 
by Japanese companies and the authorities in the East 
Indies. It had a capital of 2 million guilder, and 
held oil exploitation rights for 75 years. It was engaged 
in working the Kaliorang(?) oil field in Borneo. Of its 
stock issue of 200, Mitsui Bussan held 132, Nihon Sekiyu 
(Japan Petroleum) held 66 and the East Borneo Company 
held 2. The B.O.M. possessed rights to three mining areas 
in Kutai and Kaliorang(?). - Yoichi Itagaki, op. cit.,
P. 617 and SS, DSKK, P. 366.
(120)yoichi Itagaki, op. cit.. P. 617.
(121)Apart from mineral oil, Arita listed twelve 
other important raw materials. The details may be 
found in Section Five, Part 2. "Implementation of Japan!s 
Southern Policy", footnote 65.
(1 2 2 )v 'H.J. Van Mook, The Netherlands Indies and 
Japan, London, 1944, P. 35.
(12^)ibid.. P. 37.
(124)Generai Koiso (1880-1950) was a typical military
man. He was born in Yamakata Prefecture, educated in 
the military Academy, and graduated from the military 
University in 1910. He played a very important role 
in Japanese Southern expansion. The concept of the 
"Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was derived 
from Koisofs writings, particularly his writings in 
1940 in which he advocated an "East Asian Economic 
Sphere". (NG5J, P. 634). He was a leader of the 
Sangatsu Jiken (The march Incident) (See Appendix l) 
of 1931, whilst he was serving as Director of military 
Affairs. Later he became the Chief Staff Officer of 
the Kwantung Army and then Commander of the Korean Army 
(December 1935-July 1938). Koiso became minister for 
the Colonies in the Hiranuma Cabinet (January 1939- 
August 1939). In the Yonai Cabinet (January 1940- 
July 1940) he was responsible for Japan’s foreign 
expansion. (See NRDJt vol. 7, PP. 189-190; NKSJ, P. 162 
and mainichi Sinbun-sha, Tokyo Saiban Hanketsu (The 
Judicial Decision of the Tokyo Trial, 1948). Koiso 
replaced Tojo as Prime minister in 1944 and formed a 
cabinet from July 1944-April 1945. After the Second 
World War, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He 
died in 1950.
(125)on August 1940 General Pabst lodged a 
strong protest with the Japanese against Koiso’s speech. 
The General also opposed Koiso’s arrival in the East 
Indies as head of the Japanese delegation. - See SS, 
DSKK, (2), PP. 343-344, 353.
(126)NKSG, vol. 6 , P. 87.
(127)v 'The members of this so-called civilian 
delegation were appointed by the ministry of Commerce 
and Industry. The Japanese Government was responsible 
for all its expenses, mukai was instructed by the 
minister of Commerce and Industry "to keep in close 
communication with the Imperial representatives and
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consulate; to avoid mentioning to the Dutch the 
members of the delegation who were appointed by 
the ministry of Commerce and Industry; to keep things 
secretly and to use the Foreign service for all 
communication"• (SS, D5KKt (2), P. 358). Therefore, 
it is clear that the mukai delegation was an official 
one.
(I28)jn j,945 mukai became the first President 
of the Boeki-cho (the ministry of Trade). He was 
minister of Finance in the Fourth Yoshida Cabinet 
(October 1952-may 1953).
(-^29)|Y]ukai was the Gikyodai (political "blood 
brother") of Zyotaro Yamamoto. Yamamoto (1867-1936) 
was a powerful financier as well as an expansionist 
politician. He was elected five times to the House of 
Representatives. He was also President of the Political 
Affairs Research Committee and Chief Secretary of the 
Seiyukai. In 1927-29, Yamamoto was President of the 
South manchurian Railway Company, and he played an 
important role in the Japanese penetration of manchuria.
He later became a consultant to the Seiyukai and a 
member of the House of Peers. (See DJJ. P. 669 and 
NKSJ, P. 604).
(130V j .  Van mook, op. cit.. PP. 39-41. The 
personnel of this mission - officials from the ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the Cabinet Planning Board, the 
ministry of Finance, the Army ministry, the Naval ministry, 
the ministry of Commerce and Industry, the ministry of 
Colonial Affairs and the ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry - can be seen in SS, D5KK. (2), P. 359.
(l31)or. h .J. Van mook, Director of Economic Affairs, 
was appointed chief Dutch delegate. The Dutch delegations 
also included Dr. K.L.J. Enthoven, Director of Justice, 
and Raden L. Djajadiningrat, a senior officer in the
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Department of Education, Dr, J.E. Van Hoogstraten,
Chief of the Bureau of Commerce, was to act as secretary, - 
H.J. Van Hook, op. cit,, P. 40.
(132)v 'Van Mook was mistakenly regarded by the 
Japanese as a ”Japanophile"• - AS3, 13-9-1940.
(133)£rude oil, 2,250,000 tons; aviation spirit 
(over 87 octane) 400,000 tons; and diesel oil 500,000 
tons •
(134)por details on American and British interference 
with the export of oil from the East Indies to Japan,
see Yoichi Itagaki, op. cit.. P. 616 and NKSG, vol. 6 ,
PP. 88-89.
(135)h .J. Van Mook, op. cit., P. 44.
(136)'He became a Member of the House of Peers 
after returning to Japan.
^137^See NKSJ, PP. 614 and 761; DJJ, PP. 728-729.
^138)h ,J. Van Mook, op. cit.. P. 96.
(139)ibid.. P. 71 and SS, DSKK, (4), P. 7.
(140)captain Nakahara, Lieutenant Commander Nakasuji, 
Colonels Ishimoto and Harada, Lieutenant Colonel Wakayama, 
and Major Kondo were each appointed to the delegations. 
Majors Shiho, Kondo, Okamura and Kato were also sent
to the East Indies but not as members of delegations.
(NKSG, vol. 6 , P. 176; SS, DSKK, (2), PP. 359 and 396). 
Military officers were also sent to the Philippines,
Malaya, Thailand, Burma and Australia to collect military 
information. (See NKSG, vol. 6 , P. 176). For a discussion 
of Japanese espionage in Southeast Asia, see Kee Yeh Siew, 
op. cit., PP. 71-73.
(141)\/an fvjoQk states that nthe continuously changing 
swarm of assistants remained in force and collected 
information where they could - not of a purely economic 
nature”. (H.J. Van Hook, op. cit.. P. 61); ”Stacks of 
information left Batavia for Tokyo by the ever more 
frequent couriers, and although it is rather improbable 
that the spying crowd of "experts” got hold of real 
secrets, they certainly amassed and sifted all the 
available data necessary for the landing expeditions 
that were to come. The Japanese ..••• must have regarded 
all this ant-like activity as a great achievement in 
military intelligence.” (Ibid.. PP. 64-65). ”It very 
obviously was a permanent source of information for 
their plotting Army and Navy headquarters, and the constant 
changes of personnel provided them regularly with 
messengers travelling under diplomatic immunities.
The moment would come when the benefits of gaining time 
would be outweighed by the capacity for mischief and 
nuisance of this inquisitive company". (Ibid., P. 78).
(1A2 )NKSG, vol. 6 , PP. 175-179.
^ 3>AS, 12-7-1940.
(144^ /v 'Kanji Ishihara (1889-1949) was an important 
member of the military. He contributed considerably to 
the Japanese military expansion in Manchuria, and was a 
leader of the right-wing To-a Renmei (the East Asian 
Association)•
(145>SS, DSKK, (2), PP. 359-361 and NKSJ, PP. 24 
and 408.
(146)ss, DSKK, (2), P. 395.
(14?)pu^  details may be found in H.J. Van Mook, 
op. cit., PP. 48-54. Van Mook later said that he had
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been a "fool11 to have given so much information to the 
Japanese delegation. (Ibid.. P. 65).
(l48)oii procjuction in the East Indies in 1936-1940 
was as follows (unit: thousand tons):
1936 - 6,437
1937 - 7,262
1938 - 7,398
1939 - 7,948
1940 - 7,938
Sources: Zhong Hua Shang Bao She, Yinfni Shanqye Nian.iian 
(The Commercial Year Book of Indonesia), Djakarta,
1955, P. 230; NN, P. 967.
(149) -v 7K. Yoshizawa, Itsuwari no Gaikoshi - Nichiran
Kosho no Shinso (An Untrue Diplomatic History - the 
Truth of the Japan-Netherland Negotiations), in 
Chuo Koron, December 1950, P. 176.
(150)yoichi Itagaki, op. cit.. P. 619 and SS, DSKK,
PP. 366-367.
(151)Y-ichi itagaki, op. cit.. P. 629.
(Hectares)
(a) Borneo, Sangkulirang area 1,300,000
(b) Celebes and an area opposite to Ceran
Island 163,000
(c) Dutch New Guinea:
North-eastern and South-eastern area 14,900,000
Total 16,363,000
^*^2)Mukai argued that Japan strongly wished to 
acquire oil concessions in the following areas:
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(a) Borneo - the districts of Kaliorang
and Koetai ................  about
- an area, opposite to
Tarakan Island, northward 
from the Bengara River to 
the boundaries of British 
North Borneo  ...........    about
(b) Celebes - the district opposite to
Pelang Island .......... .. about
(c) Dutch New Guinea:
North-eastern Shoreland .. about
Middle-eastern interior •• about
South-eastern Shoreland • • about
(d) Aroe Achipelago, South-east to Dutch
New Guinea  .................   about
(e) Schouten Archipelago, north-east to 
Dutch New Guinea .................... about
(f) Sumatra - an area extending south- 
eastwards from Medan and along the
River Asahan ........................  about
(hectares) 
1,300,000
400.000
163.000
1,200,000
3,500,000
9,000,000
850.000
350.000
700.000
Total .....................     about 17,463,000
- See H.J. Man Mook, op. cit.. P. 62; Yoichi Itagaki, 
op. cit.. PP. 631-632.
(15^)h .J. Man Mook, op. cit., P. 95.
(154)sait~ anc| p^rst Secretary of the Japanese
Consulate in Batavia, Ota, were both "enthusiastic and 
firm southern expansionists”. (SS, DSKK. (2), P. 375).
Major General Nakayama, who was a delegate with the 
Kobayashi Mission, recalled in February 1961 that "Ota 
had a viewpoint similar to the military, he acted even 
more positively than a militarist as regards the Indies* 
problems. Consul Ota had right-wing views. That is why 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had selected them (Saito 
and Ota) to participate in the negotiations". (SS, DSKK,
(2), P. 375). In November 1940 Saito became the first 
Director of the newly-established NanyO Kyoku (The
Department of the South Seas), which was attached to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo*
(155)Y”ichi itagaki, op* cit., P. 630; SS, DSKK,
PP. 394-395.
(156)y^e transfer of the negotiations to Batavia 
was suggested by Kobayashi on 18 September 1940 and 
later taken up by Matsuoka. (SS, DSKK * (2), P* 371). 
Kobayashi felt that if the negotiations were transferred 
to the East Indies, Japan would secure her demands only 
if the threat of military pressure was used against the 
Dutch. On 12 October 1940 he suggested to Matsuoka that, 
before the war in China was concluded, Japan would have 
to move into the East Indies to forestall America and 
Britain. (See Ibid., PP. 377-378).
(157)ibid.. P. 621.
(158)h .J. Van Mook, op. cit.. P. 40.
(159)Yokohama Syokin Ginko (The Yokohama Specie 
Bank Limited) was established in 1880 with assistance 
from the Government and later from the Bank of Japan.
The main functions of the Bank were to hold reserves of 
foreign and domestic currency, and to deal with foreign 
banks and other foreign enterprises in order to develop 
Japanese trade and finance. The Bank also financially 
supported domestic enterprises which were externally 
orientated. In the later years of the Meiji era, the 
Bank played an important role in the Japanese penetration 
of Manchuria and Mongolia. In the Taisyo era it was 
particularly active in making loans to China. In short, 
the Bank played an important role in developing Japanese 
foreign trade and economic expansion overseas. The Head 
Office was in Yokohama, and there were branches and 
agencies throughout the Far East and indeed in Europe 
and the U.S.. In 1945, the Bankfs dissolution was
ordered by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 
However in 1947 the bank was reformed and renamed the 
Bank of Tokyo. - See NKSJt P. 613; Yokohama Syokin 
Ginko, Yokohama Syokin Ginko-shi (The History of the 
Yokohama Specie Bank Limited), 1920 and Iwao Hino and 
Raja Singan, op. cit., P. 108.
(IBO)h .J. Van Mook, op. cit.. P. 65.
<16l)Ibid., P. 65.
(162>AS, 28-8-1940; 2-11-1940 and 1-12-1940.
Mukai’s passage to and from Batavia was also by ship.
He arrived in Batavia on 26-8-1940 (AS, 26-8-1940) and 
left on 23-11-1940 (AS, 23-11-1940). The Nanyo Kaiun 
was formed in 1935, by the amalgamation of services 
previously operated by the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N.Y.K., 
a Mitsubishi affiliate), the Osaka Shosen Kaisha (O.S.K., 
a Sumitomo affiliate), the Ishihara Sangyo Kaiun 
Kabushiki-gaisha and the Nanyo Kisen.
The Nanyo Kaiun held a monopoly of scheduled Japanese 
shipping services between Japan and the Netherlands East 
Indies. There were from four to seven scheduled sailings 
a month. The regular ports of call were Surabaja, 
Semarang, Cheribon and Batavia. In addition the Nanyo 
Kaiun operated a monthly service between Taiwan and 
the East Indies. Regular stops were made at Hongkong, 
Ta-wao in North Borneo, and Macassar, as well as Java. 
These services were subsidized, the first by the Ministry 
of Communications, the second by the Japanese Governor 
in Taiwan. (N.S, Ginsburg, Japanese Prewar Trade and 
Shipping in the Oriental Triangle, Chicago, 1949, PP. 45- 
47 and 62).
(163>AS, 25-8-1940.
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(164>AS, 28-8-1940•
(165>SS, DSKK, (4), PP. 12-13.
(1GB\
' 'An oil barrel contains 42 U.S. gallons or 
35 Imperial gallons. To convert barrels of crude oil 
(36 gravity API) or fuel oil (16 gravity API) to metric 
tons (of 2,204.6 lbs.), divide U.S. barrels by 7 and 
Imperial barrels by 6.7. To convert barrels of 60 
gravity gasoline to metric tons, divide by 8.5. - 
S.E. Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, U.S.A.,
1951, P. 63.
(167)
K 'Asahi Sinbun-sya, Konoe Fimimaro-ko no Shuki 
(Memoirs of Prince Konoe), op. cit., P. 50.
(168) — _
' 'Tokisaburo Shiobara, Tojo Memo, Kakute Tenno
uia Sukuwareta (A Verbatim report on General Tojo!s 
replies to questions put by the prosecution at his trial 
in 1946, shedding light on Japan!s conduct of the war), 
Tokyo, 1952, P. 94.
(^^9)Production of crude oil in the East Indies was
7,262,008 tons in 1937, 7,398,144 tons in 1938 and 
7,948,694 tons in 1939. (Zhong Hua Shang Bao She,
Yinni Shang Yie Nian Jian (The Commercial Yearbook of 
Indonesia), Djakarta, 1955, P. 230. Both Takushiro Hattori 
(op. cit., P. 92) and Seiichi Kojima (op. cit., P. 29) 
stress that before Japan advanced into the East Indies, 
this country was the oil treasury of East Asia.
Appendix 1.
Sangatsu Jiken (the March Incident) was an Army 
coup planned by Kuniaki Koiso, Syumei Okawa and other 
right-wing leaders in March 1931. The overwhelming 
majority of the participants were General Staff Officers. 
They included Ninomiya, Vice-Chief of Staff; Takekawa, 
Chief of the Second Division of the General Staff; and 
Shigeto and Hashimoto, Chiefs of the Chinese and Russian 
sections of the General Staff. The coup leaders planned 
to mobilize 10,000 civilian sympathizers to surround 
the Houses of Parliament, and to disrupt Tokyo city 
before placing it under martial law. Finally troops 
were to be sent to force the resignation of the entire 
Cabinet. The new regime was to have been led by the 
Minister of War, Kazushige Ugaki. But the coup miscarried 
due to planning deficiencies, disagreement among the 
planners, and hesitation on the part of the Minister of 
War. However, no legal action was taken against the 
coup leaders, and this encouraged further coups, notably 
the October Incident in October 1931, the Ketsumei-dan 
Incident in February-March 1932 and the 5.15 Incident 
on 5 May 1932. - See IMK5J, P. 225 and Yale Candee Maxon, 
Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, A Study of Civil- 
Military Rivalry 1930-1945. U.S.A., 1975, PP. 78-79.
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Section Fiv/e
Japanese Southward Expansion.
Part 1. Preparations for the Southward Advance.
The Japan-Manchuria bloc was formed after the 
Manchurian Incident in September 1931. The Japan- 
Manchuria-China bloc was formed after the China 
Incident in 1937. However neither Manchuria nor China 
(and in particular North China) could supply sufficient 
raw materials to Japan. Neither were these markets able 
to absorb large quantities of Japanese goods. In short, 
Japan found that she could not establish a Jikyu-ken 
(self-sufficiency area) within the Japan-Manchuria-China 
bloc. In addition, the prolonged war in China forced 
Japan to import more materials from outside the bloc. 
Consequently Japan soon found it necessary to create 
a supplementary area in Southeast Asia in order to meet 
all her requirements.
In addition, although Japan had had a trade surplus
with America between 1922-32, by the early 1930s the
surplus had given way to a deficit. The trade deficit 
increased from 90.9 million Yen in 1932 to 678.5 million 
Yen in 1937. It stood at 700.6 million Yen in 1940. 
Meanwhile Japan had had a trade deficit with Europe from 
1920. In contrast, Japanfs trade surplus with Asian 
countries increased from 232.5 million Yen in 1932 to
350.8 million Yen in 1937, and stood at 980.0 million 
Yen in 1940. The trade deficit with America and Europe,
and the trade surplus with Asian countries arose in the
following manner. First, Japan imported a large quantity 
of raw cotton from America (in order to produce cotton 
goods for export to Asia), despite the fact that exports 
of Japanese raw silk to America had diminished 
substantially from the late 1920s. Second, war in China 
and the rapid development of the Japanese munitions
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industry made it necessary for Japan to import munitions 
and heavy industrial goods from America and Europe.
In time, Japan had to import more raw materials from 
Asian countries in order to correct the trade deficit 
with America and Europe.
Under these circumstances, Japan became increasingly 
concerned with Southeast Asia. Early in 1936 the Japanese 
Navy began to argue that Southeast Asia was an important 
source of critical resources for Japan. From that point, 
through its network of research groups, the Japanese 
Navy took the initiative in studying contemporary Southeast 
Asia. The research groups were supported by the Army 
as well as by the Navy. They were staffed by scholars, 
individuals with experience of Southeast Asia, professional 
military men, businessmen and bureaucrats. The papers 
which flowed from their research often formed the basis 
for Governmental policy decisions. ^  Among the leading 
research groups, the Kokusaku Kenkyukai (National Policy 
Research Group), the Sogo Kenkyukai (General Affairs 
Research Group), the Navy Ministry Chosaka (Research 
Section) and its predecessor the Rinji Chosaka (Provisional 
Research Section) appear to have been the most influential.
The N.P.R.G. was established by the Director of 
Military Affairs at the Army Ministry, Tetsuzan Nagata 
(1884-1935), and a prominent politician, Kazuo Yatsugi.
At that time Nagata was, together with Hideki Toio, 
leader of the Tosei-ha (Control Faction) in the Military.
The Tosei Faction favoured the introduction of a 
controlled economy. In June 1934, the N.P.R.G. produced 
the Sogo Kokusaku Taiko (the General Principles of 
National Policy) which laid the basis for the introduction of 
a controlled economy. In August 1934 the information 
bureau of the Ministry of the Army re-worked this document 
as Kokubo no Hongi to Sono Kyoka no Teisho (the Principles 
of National Defence and Proposals for its Intensification).
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This was generally called "the Pamphlet of the Army”, 
and it was widely distributed both inside and outside 
the Army. The establishment of Tai Man Jimu-Kyoku 
(the Secretariat Towards Manchuria, December 1934- 
November 1942) and Naikaku Chosa-Kyoku (the Investigation 
Bureau of the Cabinet, the predecessor of the Cabinet 
Planning Board) were both prompted by this Pamphlet.
The Pamphlet also proposed a number of policies which
( 3 )
were adopted by the Government in the late 1930s.
Apart from the N.P.R.G. there were many other 
research organizations and institutes which operated 
with Army and Navy support. The Mantetsu Chosabu- 
South Manchurian Railway Company Research Bureau
( 4 )
(S.M.R.C.R.B.) - was one of the largest of these.
The S.M.R.C.R.B. was a research organization established
_ (5)
in 1907 by Shinpei Goto, as First President of the
South Manchurian Railway Company (S.M.R.C.).
The S.M.R.C.R.B. was the first and the most firmly-
established research bureau directly attached to a 
Japanese enterprise. It was funded by the Government
( 7 )
and by a number of other bodies including the Army.
In 19D8 it was renamed the Mantetsu Chosa-ka (South 
Manchurian Railway Company Research Department). The 
Research Department investigated principally Asian and 
European economic and political matters. In August 1935 
Yosuke Matsuoka became President of the S.M.R.C., and 
in this capacity he brought together a number of research 
organizations, including the East Asia Economic Investi­
gation Bureau, the Dairen Library, the Overseas Office 
and several natural science institutions (including 
the Central Experimental Station, the Geological 
Research Institution and the Industrial Experimental 
Office), to form the East Asia Economic Investigation 
Bureau (E.A.E,I.B .). The Bureau produced numerous
valuable publications which facilitated the Japanese
(8)Southern expansion.
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Another important research group, the Nanyo 
Kyokai (South Seas Association), was secretly supported
(9)
by the Army and the Navy Ministries. The South Seas 
Association (S.S.A.) contributed greatly to the 
Japanese southern expansion. Tracing the origins and 
development of this Association would help considerably 
towards an understanding of the Japanese southward 
advance•
The S.S.A. was first established in 1913 but was 
soon dissolved due to financial difficulties. It was 
re-established in January 1915 by eighteen influential 
Japanese politicians and industrialists. Its head 
office was in Tokyo and there were branches both 
inside and outside Japan. Among the e i g h t e e n f o u n d e r s  
of the S.S.A., Shigeyoshi Yoshikawa, Eiichi Shibasaua, 
Renpei Kondo and Kenjiro Ta were members of the nobility. 
Masayoshi Uchida was Director of Civil Administration 
of the Governor-General in Taiwan. Masaji Inoue and 
Suzu Hoshino were industrialists with rubber plantations 
in Malaya. Akimasa Yoshikawa was appointed first 
President of the S.S.A. though he was later replaced 
by Kenjiro Ta. The Association promoted trade between 
Japan and the South Seas. It staged overseas exhibitions 
of Japanese commodities, sent Japanese to Southeast Asia 
and generally encouraged the export of Japanese goods.^11  ^
In addition through its organ, the Nanyo Kyokai Zasshi 
(South Seas Association Magazine, which was later renamed 
the Nanyo, i.e. the South Seas, first published in August 
1915), and through its publications dealing with Southeast 
A s i a , t h e  S.S.A. created a popular understanding within 
Japan of the Southern areas and encouraged Japanese 
Southern expansion.
Finally reference should be made to the impact to 
the Showa Kenkyukai (Showa Research Association). This 
was Premier Konoe’s brains trust on Japan's policy towards 
Southeast AsiaJ13  ^ The Showa Research Association (S.R.A.)
was first organized on an informal basis in 1933.
Its formal establishment came in November 1936. It had 
as its objective the formulation of Japanese national
policy, including the evolution of a new statement on
(14)
Japan’s role in Asia. The members of the Association
anticipated that Konoe would soon be elected premier.
The key members were Masamichi Royama, Teiji Yabe,
Hiro Sasa, Shintaro Ryu, Kiyoshi Wiki, Ryunosuke Goto,
Teizo Taira, Shigeru Yoshida, Akira Kazami, Okinori 
_ _ (15)
Kaya, Fumio Goto and Hachiro Arita. The S.R.A. did not
itself issue publications advocating Japanese southern
expansion, as was the case with the S.M.R.C. and the
S.S.A.. The S.R.A. was in fact, similar to the N.P.R.G.
in formulating national policies towards Southeast Asia.
The members of the S*.R.A*. were inclined to accept that
Japan was the dominant power in East Asia. They assumed
that the preservation and enhancement of this dominance
constituted the basic goal of Japanese national policy.
Members of the Association published a number of
(17)
influential articles which proposed the formation of 
a New Asian Order. It was argued that Japan should not 
only remove the Western presence from Asia, but take 
over European colonialism by including East Asia within 
the Japanese sphere of influence. The East Asia Economic 
Bloc Research Association, one of the many subcommittees 
of the S.R.A., published a paper in 1939 entitled 
MAn Outline of the East Asian Economic Bloc from the 
Standpoint of Resources and Trade Relations”. It was 
argued that Japan should expand her influence southwards 
because Southeast Asia was geographically adjacent to
the Japan-Manchuria-China bloc, and also had natural
(18)resources which were absent in the Yen-bloc.v
Therefore the S.R.A. was an early advocate of the 
inclusion of the South Seas region in an Asian economic 
bloc. This economic concern led to the view that the 
U.S. and Britain should be removed from Southeast Asia
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under the cloak of anti-imperialism. Thus the 
S.R.A.'s view approximated closely with Japanese 
military thinking on Southeast Asia. Indeed the 
Association contributed to the formation of the
Southern policies which were adopted by the Japanese
(19)
Army and Navy.
As a result of the research undertaken by the
above institutions, associations and groups, the Army
and Navy began to form their southern policies in the
193Qs. In mid 1936 the Navy Headquarters enacted
_ _ , (20) 
Kokusaku Yoko (General Principles of National Policy).
This stressed that ’’the Southern countries are the
areas we should regard as most important for strengthening
our national defence and solving the population problem
and economic development. The administration of this
area is necessary to complete our policies toward
Manchuria, China and Russia. This means it is our
country’s inevitable mission to expand our power, based
on the Imperial spirit, in the Southern area, and to
improve the peoples* welfare and realize co-existence
and co-prosperity”.
On 7 August 1936, the ’’Five Ministers’ Conference”
enacted Kokusaku no Kizun (The Fundamentals of National
(211
Policy)• This argued that ”in view of the situation 
of Japan domestically and externally, the basic policy 
Japan should establish is to secure the position of 
Japan on the East Asiatic continent in both diplomacy 
and national defence, and at the same time to advance 
and develop in the Southern area •••••• especially the
outer Southern area”. ’The Fundamentals of National 
Policy’ was the first official Japanese document which 
expressed interest in the expansion of Japanese influence 
in the Southern area. From this time Japan regarded 
the Southern area, together with the East Asiatic main­
land, as within the Japanese economic sphere.
In April 1939, under the guidance of Yatsugi 
Kazuo, the Director of the National Policy Research 
Association, the Navy National Policy Research Committee 
prepared ’’The Summary Draft of a Policy for the South”.
This described in full Japanese policy towards the 
Southern area. The main objective was to drive Western 
political and economic power from the region, and 
to increase its raw materials production in order to 
meet Japan’s needs. In short, Japan proposed to 
establish an Asian ’’self-sufficiency sphere” under 
Japanese protectorship and leadership. ^ 22^
On 1 August 1940, Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka 
proclaimed that "our present foreign policy will aim 
at establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere, linking Japan, Manchuria and China” . It would
also "include French Indo-China and the Netherlands
(23)
East Indies”.
On 22 August 1940,‘with guidance from the 
Government, the Nanyo Kankei Dantai Rengo-kai (United 
Association of Bodies Related to the South Seas) was 
established in Tokyo. The Association was formed by 
the Nanyo Kyokai (South Seas Association), the Nanyo 
Saibai Kyokai (South Seas Agricultural Cultivators’ 
Association), the Nanyo Suisan Kyokai (South Seas 
Fisheries’ Association), the To-a Kenkyu-zyo (East Asia 
Research Institute), the To-a Keizai Chosa-kyoku 
(East Asia Economic Investigation Bureau), the Nanyo 
Keizai Kenkyu-zyo (South Seas Economic Research Institute) 
the Nanpo Kyokai (Southern Association - Taiwan), the 
Taiheiyo Kyokai (Pacific Association) and the Mitsui 
Tai-sitsu (Mitsui Thai Office). Hideo Kodama^24^was 
appointed President of the new Association. Its main 
office was in the headquarters of the S.S.A.* The Foreign 
Minister, concurrently the Minister for Colonies, Yosuke
Matsuoka, delivered a speech on the establishment of
(25)
the Association. This indicated that the Japanese
authorities were now eager to implement the Southern policy
Part 2» Implementation of Japan!s Southern Policy
Trade between Japan and the Nanyo (the South Seas) 
developed slowly from the beginning of the Meiji era 
(1868-1912)«26  ^ The years in which trade with the region 
first appeared in Japanese trade statistics, were the 
Philippines in 1887, French Indo-China in 1894, the 
Netherlands East Indies in 1898 and the Straits 
Settlements in 1902^.27  ^ But the trade as it appears in 
the statistics was fragmentary. By the end of the Heiji 
era, although Japanese activity in the Nanyo had increased^28) 
it was still relatively unimportant. In other words, 
although there had been some interest in Japan in Nanyo
affairs, and some Japanese economic involvement in the
(29) —region, foreign trade between Japan and the Nanyo
was on a relatively small scale. Then, during the Taisho
era (1912-26), no major reference to the Nanyo appeared
in the speeches of a Japanese prime minister or minister.
References to the Nanyo rarely appeared in works by Japanese
politicians in this periodi30  ^ This, of course, does
not mean that the Nanyo was completely ignored by Japan.
Indeed there was a gradual increase in Japanese exports
to the Nanyo, and public interest in the area was
stimulated by a magazine called Zitsugyo no Nihon (the
Industrial Japan)i31  ^ Trade between Japan and the Nanyo
was also encouraged by the South Seas Association after
(32) —1915. Exports of Japanese goods to the Nanyo,
principally exports of cotton tissues, increased sub­
stantially during and after the First World War.
As noted earlier the acute shortage of Western 
goods in the Far East during the First World War led 
to an expansion of Japanese exports. However, Japan 
faced considerable trading difficulties when Western 
trade re-emerged in the East after 1918. Moreover, 
tariff barriers imposed against Japanese goods by 
European colonies in the East severely restricted Japanfs 
export trade. With the onset of the World economic
crisis from the late 1920fs, both the Japanese and the 
Western economies faced almost unprecedented difficulities 
which provoked them into erecting tariff barriers in order 
to protect their national interests. Japanese trade 
expansion in the East was particularly restricted after 
the creation of the British Empire economic bloc follow­
ing the Ottawa Conference in 1932. Japan moved into 
Manchuria in 1931 and, in turn, created the Japan-Manchuria 
economic bloc. But Japan’s expansion into Manchuria 
faced not only Chinese resistance but was also opposed 
by the West. Japan widened its sphere of influence into 
the Japan-Manchuria-China bloc following the China Incident 
in 1937. Japan’s military expansion into China inten­
sified her confrontation with the West. A Nine-Power 
Pact Conference (the Brussels Conference), involving 
Britain, America, France, Russia and 5 other powers, 
was held in November 1937. The Conference was concerned 
with the Japan-China war, and attempted to restrict 
further Japanese expansion in China. In particular 
America applied a series of economic measures against 
Japan. These included stopping the purchase of Japanese 
gold, suspending credit to Japan, abrogating the American- 
Japanese Trade and Navigation Treaty and controlling 
foreign exchange transactions with the Japanese. Furthermore, 
in December 1938, America and Britain gave Chiang Kai- 
Shek 25 million dollars and 10 million pounds in credit.
In January 1939 America, Britain and France made a joint 
declaration against the ”East Asia New Order.”
To discuss Japanese expansion into the Southern 
region in the face of Western opposition, Nettai Sangyo 
Chosa-Kai (A Meeting to Investigate Tropical Industries) 
was held in Taiwan in May 1935. Taiwan was at that 
time a Japanese colony and had played an important role 
in the initial Japanese southern advance. A number of 
institutions, notably the Taiwan Nanpo Kyokai (the Taiwan 
Southern Association), and Japanese banks, notably the
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Taiwan Ginko (the Taiwan Bank) and the Kanan Ginko (the 
South China Bank) had been established by the Japanese 
in Taiwan. The Taiwan Southern Association provided 
valuable information to Japan, while the banks provided 
financial assistance to Japanese concerns operating in 
the Southern region. In addition the Taiwan Sotoku-Fu 
(the Taiwan Governor-General) was important in both 
these respects .^ 33  ^ In December 1940, the Taiwan Gun 
Kenkyu-bu (the Taiwan Army Research Division), attached 
to the Taiwan Military Headquarters, was established.
It was led by General Itagaki. It was to contribute 
greatly to the Japanese southern advance by collecting 
military information and by organizing military manoeuvres'3^
At the Meeting to Investigate Tropical Industries 
in 1935, it was argued that the Southern region was 
simply an extension of the Japanese economy, and that
( 3 5 )trade and economic cooperation with the region be expanded. '
Southern expansion did not form an important part 
of Japanese ’’National Policy” until the Five Ministers' 
Conference in August 1936. The Conference was attended by 
the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Secretary of State 
for War, Secretary of the Navy and the Minister of Finance 
in the Hirota Cabinet. The Conference laid down "the 
Fundamentals of National Policy" which included the 
policy for Southern expansion and for securing the 
Japanese presence in the East Asian mainland.^36^
The Japanese Southern policy became increasingly 
important following the outbreak of war in Europe in 
September 1939. This was essentially due to three reasons. 
First, Japan was entangled in China, particularly from 
late 1938. Second, from late 1939 Japan's economic 
dependence upon the United States increased, for her trade 
with Germany and Britain was sharply curtailed. Moreover, 
imports from British and French colonies in Asia were 
also affected. Third, in contrast to the British policy
of appeasement towards Japan, the United States had become 
strongly opposed to Japanese ambitions in Eastern Asia.
This was particularly the case following the abrogation 
of the American-Japanese Trade and Navigation Treaty in 
July 1939, at which point the United States tightened her 
trade embargo on Japan. She also began to assist the 
Kuomintang, both financially and militarily, from the end 
of 19 3 9 i37)
The Japanese war economy faced tremendous difficulties. 
The first Busshi Sodoin Keikaku 3^8  ^(Resources Mobil­
ization Plan) was drawn up in January 1938 and soon 
became the most important element in administering the 
Japanese war economy. The main purpose of the plan was 
to ensure preferential distribution of raw materials to 
the munitions industry. When Japan became engaged in 
her long war in China, the need for increased munitions 
production became acute. As a result the domestic 
distribution of imported raw materials was centrally 
planned. However Japan found it impossible to implement 
the Plan accurately and therefore inevitably, the Southern 
policy was accelerated in order to acquire additional 
raw materials from the Southern region.
Early in September 1939 the Cabinet Planning Board 
argued that the Southern region would be the prime source 
of raw materials for Japan.^39  ^ Almost at the same time, 
the strong possibility of severe economic pressure from 
the U.S., and the implementation of export restrictions 
by the British and French colonies in Asia was considered 
by the Japanese. But the situation was not yet critical 
for Japan hoped that these dangers could be removed 
through d i p l o m a c y H o w e v e r ,  by April 1940, a complete 
economic blockade by the U.S., Britain and France was 
almost inevitable,^41  ^ As a result, Japan realized that 
she had to bring French Indo-China, the Philippines and 
Borneo into her possession 4^2  ^as the first step in her 
Southward expansion.
In 1939, Japanese policy was to reduce dependence . 
on American and British resources, and to resolve 
conflicts with the U.S. in Asia through diplomacy!43^
However, by June 1940, Japan was determined to declare 
war on the U.S., and to invade the Netherlands East 
Indies to secure her economic requirements.^44*
In 1940, following Germany’s successes in Europe, 
Japanese opinion was in favour of the use of force to 
secure the Southern region. Opinion was led by the military, 
particularly by the Army. In July 1940 the Yonai Cabinet 
was overthrown by the Army and replaced by the Konoe 
Cabinet. Yonai, and Arita, his Foreign Minister, had 
been opposed to Japanese support for Germany in Europe, 
and they had also called for a peaceful Southern advance.
At the same time the Japanese Ambassador to Britain,
Mamoru S^&witsu, and the Ambassador to Germany, Saburo 
Kurusu, were dismissed by the new Foreign Minister, Yosuke 
Matsuoka. The two Ambassadors were considered too 
’’discreet”. They had suggested that Japan should await 
Britain's defeat by Germany and then occupy the Southern 
region. But one elder statesman, Ko Saionzi, believed 
that Britain would eventually defeat Germany. However, 
Saionzi was in a minority and his views were soon drowned 
by the demands of the war party.
Japan's approach to securing the resources of the 
Southern area, changed from peaceful diplomacy to war 
for the following reasons. First, it was crucial for 
Japan to secure further resources from this area to 
continue the war in China. Second, the Netherlands 
East Indies and French Indo-China had come within the 
Japanese orbit when Germany had defeated Holland and 
France in 1940. Third, the U.S. had become an intractable 
opponent of Japanese ambitions, particularly her ambitions 
in the Netherlands East Indies.
With support from the Army, the second Konoe
Cabinet was formed on 22 July 1940. Before this, on
4 July 1940, the Army and Navy had discussed the "Main
Principles for Coping with the Changing World Situation11.
At this Conference, Colonel Shigeki Usui, Captain Takezi
Ono and the head of military operations, Kazunari Ui,
had each argued that Japan should establish, by military
force if necessary a self-sufficiency bloc, to include
the Southern region. It was acknowledged that by this
act, war with Britain would be inevitable and that Japan
(45)would also have to prepare for war against the U.S.
In fact a draft of the "Principles11 had been prepared 
by the Army on 3 July 1940. The Navy had revised 
them and presented an amended version on 9 Julyi46* The 
final document was approved by the Konoe Cabinet on 
27 July. This firmly established the direction of Japanese 
foreign policy!,47* From this point Southeast Asia, 
rather than China, constituted the central issue!48* A 
number of military staff were secretly sent to Southeast 
Asia to collect informationi49* Japan was prepared for 
military advance.
France surrendered to Germany in June 1940 and soon 
after Japan moved into Northern Indo-China. The 
immediate objective of this move was to prevent materials 
from Britain, the U.S., Russia and France reaching 
Chiang Kai-Shek through Indo-China. At that time Chiang 
Kai-Shek was receiving foreign assistance through four 
routes —  Russia, Indo-China, Burma and from the China 
coast. In June 1940, supplies through French Indo- 
China and Burma ammounted to 48% and 31% of the total 
foreign supplies reaching Chiang Kai-Shek^.50* In short, 
before embarking on territorial expansion in the south, 
Japan was eager to finish the war in China. In addition 
Japan needed rice, rubber, coal and tin from French 
Indo-China. Moreover if Japan could install her armed
forces in Indo-China, this would assist her operations 
against China, and also provide a base for a movement
Southwards should Britain suffer the same fate as Holland 
and France**51* Indeed the main purpose behind Japan*s
move into Indo-China was to initiate military expansion
(52)into the Southern region*
In September 1940 the U*S. imposed an embargo on 
scrap iron exports to Japan. This action was very 
damaging to the Japanese war economy, as local steel 
production was based essentially on scrap iron. Imports 
of scrap iron from the U.S. accounted for 86% of Japanfs 
total scrap iron imports in 1939. Then in October 1940 
Britain re-opened the Burma-China trade route in order 
to give more material support to Chiang Kai-Sheki53*
This embarrassed Japan as she was anxious to settle the 
war in China, before moving into the Southern region.
On 3 and 24 September 1940, Japan announced that 
French Indo-China now formed part of the Greater East 
Asia economic bloc, and that Japan would acquire important 
raw materials from this region. Japan would import rice, 
coal, apatite, manganese, industrial salt, tin, crude 
rubber, zinc and iron ore from Indo-China.*54*
In November 1940 there was a border dispute between 
Thailand and French Indo-China. Japan wished to mediate 
between the two states in order to advance her own 
interests in the area. At that time the Japanese military 
were aware that the Netherlands and Britain could not 
be politically separated. Britain would declare war 
if Japan launched an attack on the Netherlands East 
Indies. Therefore an attack on Malaya and Singapore 
was inevitable. To mount such an offensive it was first 
necessary to establish military bases in Southern Indo- 
China and in Thailand. Japan also realized that even 
if she did not occupy Malaya and the East Indies, to 
include French Indo-China and Thailand within her self- 
sufficiency bloc was critical to her war economy*.55* With 
these considerations in mind, Japan adopted a forceful
attitude towards the dispute between Thailand and 
French Indo-China. A Japanese colonel, Tamura, who was 
based in Thailand and who knew the pro-Japanese Thai 
Prime Minister, Luang Pibul, made considerable efforts 
to influence the Thai administration. The American 
Minister in Thailand, Grant, reported to the Secretary 
of State on 4 October 1940 that nthe military and political 
leader of Thailand is virtually a prisoner and certainly 
a puppet of a military clique”.*56* Japan exerted influence 
over the Thai military authorities to the extent that she 
supported them in the war against French Indo-China. 
Although Japanese weapons were sent to Thailand in December 
1940*,57* Japan1 s offer of mediation was rejected by both 
Thailand and French Indo-China oh 20 December 1940.
The rejection was basically the result of an intervention 
by Britain and America who were greatly concerned at 
Japan’s expansionist ambitions in the region.
In spite of this, on 27 December 1940 the Japanese 
Government stressed that it would force French Indo- 
China to settle its conflict with Thailand. Japan also 
argued that she would soon commence negotiations with 
Thailand for military and economic agreements^58* On 19 
January 1941 Japan again made it clear that she was 
prepared to use military force in French Indo-China to 
settle the border dispute. Japan also stressed that she
/ eg)
wished to establish a ”New Order in East Asia”. This 
policy was re-iterated by the Japanese Government on 
30 January 1941.*60*
It was clear that Japan was defending Thailand 
against Indo-China. Japan realized that building military 
bases in Thailand, would be far easier than establishing 
them in Indo-China.*61* Thailand eventually agreed to 
Japan’s military requests whilst France submitted to 
Japanese pressure. Franco-Siamese negotiations were
held in Tokyo on 7 February 1941. Agreement was reached
(62)on 11 March and a peace treaty between French Indo-
China and Thailand was concluded in Tokyo on 9 May.
During the negotiations Japan exacted from Vichy France 
the right to first purchase of the Indo-Chinese rice 
crop, and the right to occupy the airport at Saigon 
from which Japanese bombers could reach Singapore*.63*
Japan also benefitted by obtaining guarantees from both 
French Indo-China and Thailand that neither would enter 
into agreement with a third power that would involve 
them in a political, economic or military alliance 
against Japan.*64*
Imports into Japan from the Netherlands East Indies 
became particularly important when trade embargoes were 
imposed against her by the Western powers, particularly 
the U.S..Germany attacked the Netherlands on 10 May 1940.
On 20 May the Japanese Foreign Minister, Arita, demanded 
that the Dutch permit the export of some 13 important 
raw materials *65* from the East Indies to Japan. The 
Dutch, offering no resistance, accepted Japan’s demands 
on 6 Junei66  ^ However, trade negotiations in Batavia 
between Japan and the Netherland East Indies were 
unsuccessful. On 13 February 1941, Yoshizawa, the 
leading Japanese delegate in Batavia, told the Foreign 
Minister, Matsuoka, that he doubted whether it would be 
possible to import the 13 materials from the East Indies 
without the use of military force. In fact, whilst 
America and Britain were placing pressure on the Netherlands 
not to compromise with Japan, the Dutch themselves were 
worried about Japan’s possible southward expansion.
It was also understood by the U.S. and Britain that
rubber and tin exported to Japan from Asian sources
were being passed to Germany through Dairen and the Manchuria-
Siberian route.*67* This fact encouraged the Dutch to
reduce the export of raw materials from the East Indies
to Japan.
Although Japan had succeeded in bringing French 
Indo—China and Thailand into her ’’Greater East Asia Sphere,”
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she failed in her initial efforts to incorporate the
(68)
Netherlands East Indies. This was because a direct 
attack upon the Netherlands East Indies would almost 
certainly have involved Japan in hostilities with 
Britain, since the British and Dutch were allies. The 
Japanese Navy was prepared to attack Malaya and Singapore 
only when Britain was under German control or when there 
was a political division between Britain and America!69*
A second reason for the initial failure of Japan to 
incorporate the Netherlands East Indies was the strong 
possibility of war with the United States which had a 
large economic interest in the Indies. In particular 
the U.S. automobile industry and the rapidly expanding 
armaments industry demanded large quantities of rubber 
and tin from the East Indies as well as from Malaya.
Following the German blitzkrieg in 1940, on 15 
April the Japanese Foreign Minister, Arita, expressed 
ndeep concern” over the position of the Netherlands
East Indies. *70*The U.S. reacted promptly to Japanese
(71)announcements concerning the East Indies. The possibility 
of a Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies 
was bound to prey on the minds of American statesmen.
Not only would the occupation greatly enhance Japan’s 
fighting power and make Japan almost completely independent
of American supplies. In addition the U.S. herself
(72)depended on exports from the Indies. The Konoe govern­
ment believed that it could create the Co-Prosperity 
Sphere by means of an Axis pact, and without having to 
go to war against the United States. However, this 
view was rapidly undermined by the American decisions
to impose an embargo on raw material exports to Japan
(73)and to expand the U.S. fleet; There also existed 
the possibility that the natural resources of the 
Netherlands East Indies and in particular oil wells,
would be destroyed in a Dutch ’scorched earth* policy.
The Dutch had considerable forces^74) in the East Indies 
and could fight a delaying action that would enable such
a policy to be implemented. The Japanese Navy, in 
particular, was anxious to avoid*75* such a development.
Public opinion in Japan overwhelmingly believed 
that Britain would eventually fall under German occupation 
Furthermore, the Japanese Army believed that Britain and 
the U.S. could be politically separated. Before Yonai 
was replaced as Prime Minister by Konoe, he, together 
with the Foreign Minister, Arita, argued that America 
would become involved militarily in Asia if Japan moved 
into the Southern region. However, their view was 
overruled by Konoe, who was supported by military, 
political, bureaucratic, and industrial groups!76*
Konoe planned to force the Netherlands East Indies to 
declare its independence from the Dutch and become a 
Japanese protectorate, so avoiding the destruction of 
its natural resources.*77* But the fact that Japan would 
almost certainly face war against the U.S. if she 
mounted a direct attack on the Netherlands East Indies 
remained the major problem. The Japanese Navy was 
opposed to war against the U.S. for Japan’s military 
strength was far below that of the U.S*.78* The Navy 
Minister, Yoshida, disclosed in August 1940 that "the
Japanese Navy would not be able to fight against the U.S.A
longer than a year".^79  ^ Moreover the Navy would be 
destroyed if the U.S. imposed a complete oil embargo 
against Japan. UJar with the U.S. would entail the 
loss of petroleum, iron ore, tin, rubber, bauxite and 
Manila hemp imports from the U.S. and British colonies; 
though presumably these materials would then be secured 
from within Asia. Japan’s degree of self-sufficiency 
(including supplies from the Yen-bloc) was at that time, 
10% for petroleum, 40% for iron ore and 20% for tin.
She was almost entirely without her own supplies of
rubber, bauxite and Manila hemp. In the meantime, Japan 
tightened her economic ties with the Netherlands East 
Indies in order to draw the Dutch colony into the 
Japanese orbit.
On 5 November 1940 the Konoe Cabinet argued that 
the Netherlands East Indies was an important part of 
the Greater East Asia Sphere*80* and that Japan was 
prepared to break the economic ties between the East 
Indies and America!81* Japan proposed to exploit local 
raw materials in partnership with the East Indies.
Japan was eager to control tin,crude rubber and quinine 
production*,82* but undoubtedly her greatest interest 
lay in petroleum.*83*
Japan’s southern penetration provoked Western 
retaliation, which in turn prompted further Japanese 
expansion. The American Government had been exerting 
growing economic pressure upon Japan from July 1940.
Exports of high-grade aviation fuel, lubricants and certain 
types of scrap iron and steel from the U.S. to Japan, 
were made subject to official licence from 26 July 1940l84^
A complete embargo on exports to Japan of scrap iron 
and steel was announced on 26 September; of iron ore, 
pig iron, iron alloy, several iron and steel products 
and semi-manufactures, on 10 December; and of copper, 
brass and bronze, zinc, nickel and potash on 10 January 
1941.*85* Shortly thereafter an embargo was imposed on 
exports of oil-drilling equipment and oil storage tanks^86) 
Later lead, jute, burlap, borax, phosphate, carbon black, 
cork and all animal and vegetable fats were added to 
the embargo.*87* On 5 February radium and uranium exports 
were hanned by the U.S.^88^
Japan suffered an extreme shortage of war materials. 
Moreover in the early summer of 1941 the Japanese 
Government foresaw that in the near future Japanese 
funds in America might well be frozen and supplies of 
oil to Japan cut off. At the same time Japanese attempts 
to negotiate control of the oil resources of the Neth­
erlands East Indies were being rebuffed by the Dutch.^89)
On 28 November 1940 Kobayashi was replaced as leader of 
the delegation by Yoshizawa (a former Foreign Minister)
in order to negotiate more forcefully with the Dutch 
for raw materials from the Netherlands East Indies.
However, Yoshizawa’s diplomatic efforts failed and on 
13 February 1941 he told his Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, 
that it would be impossible to acquire raw materials from 
the East Indies by negotiation. The only way to secure 
supplies was by military force.*90* On 14 June 1941 
Matsuoka instructed Yoshizawa to end the mission*.91* Then 
in July 1941, Japan moved into Southern Indo-China in 
preparation for an assault upon the East Indies. The 
U.S., Britain and the Netherlands froze Japan’s foreign 
assets in response to her military expansion*.92* Confront­
ation between Japan and the Western powers had now entered 
a new and more critical phase.
The Gozen Kaigi (a Council in the presence of the 
Emperor) was held in July 1941 and again in September.
The Council decreed that Japan was now prepared to 
declare war on the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands in 
order to establish the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere." All war preparations were to be completed by 
the end of October!93*
In September 1941 the Army prepared for military 
operations in the Southern region. In October the 
U.S., Britain and the Netherlands imposed an embargo 
on petroleum to Japan. On 20 November the Japanese 
military outlined their plans for the Southern region. 
Strategic materials were to be exported to Japan: petroleum, 
crude rubber, tin, tungsten and quinine exports to hostile 
nations were to be halted.*94* On 26 November Japan 
decided that she would divide those parts of the Southern 
region which were to come under her military administration 
(the A Region) into two parts. The Army would administer 
Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaya, the East Indies 
(Sumatra and Java), British Borneo and Burma. The Navy 
would administer the Netherlands Borneo, Celebes, the
Molucca Islands, the Small Sunda Islands, New Guinea,
♦ (95)
Bismarck Islands and Guam. On 12 December Japan
categorized French Indo-China and Thailand as the 
B regioni96  ^ Japan would not impose a military administ­
ration in the B region. Rather she would recognize 
the sovereignty of French Indo-China and Thailand, 
though military pressure would be used to manipulate 
the policies of the two states^97)
By this stage, Japan’s plans for the military
administration of the Southern region were complete. 
However, before military operations were actually begun 
there were frequent disputes between the Japanese Army 
and Navy, and within the Government. The Army assumed 
that the U.S. and Britain could be politically separated. 
They therefore did not wish to attack the Philippines 
or Guam in an attempt to avoid American involvement.
The Navy, in contrast, assumed that the U.S. and Britain 
were united, and therefore they persisted in preparing 
for war against the U.S. In addition the Army was con­
vinced of Germany’s imminent victory over Britain and
therefore was determined to occupy the British colonies 
in Southeast Asia as well as the East Indies. But the 
Navy was rather pessimistic in this respect and insisted 
on avoiding Hong Kong and Singapore in order not to 
provoke British involvement. Finally, even on the eve 
of the Pacific war, the Army still insisted on attacking 
the Southern region through the west route (Malaya- 
Sumatra- Java) while the Navy insisted on the east 
route (the Philippines- Borneo- Java- Sumatra- M a l a y a K 98^
In fact from the end of the Meiji era, the Japanese 
Army and Navy had held different views on foreign 
expansion. "Rikugun wa Hokusin, Kaigun wa Nansin”
(the Army marches North, the Navy sails South) was a 
fixed theme in Japanese foreign policy in this period. 
This difference of ambition produced conflict between 
the two forces. But at the Five Ministers’ Conference 
in August 1936 it was decreed that China (the North) 
and the Southern region were equally important. The
Army strengthened its defences against Russia whilst 
the Navy strengthened its defences against the U . s / " )
But the Army became particularly concerned over the 
proposed Southern expansion when the war in China continued 
with no end in sight. In June 1941 the Foreign Minister, 
Matsuoka, criticized the Army for not preparing for 
operations in the Southern region^100* But he opposed 
the expansion into Southern Indo-China, for he felt 
that it would result in war with the U.S. and Britain 
for which Japan was not yet prepared. However, the 
Minister of war Tojo, the Chief of the General Staff, 
Sugiyama, and the Chief of Military Operations, Tsuchii, 
each believed that the U.S. would not react to Japanfs 
relatively minor move into Southern Indo-China^.101  ^ Matsuoka 
advocated collaboration with the Axis powers against 
Britain and an improved diplomatic relationship with Russia. 
His aim was to prevent American interference in Japan’s 
Southern expansion]102  ^ Matsuoka opposed Konoe’s negot­
iations with America. But on 18 July 1941 the Second 
Konoe Cabinet resigned and the third Konoe Cabinet was 
formed. In the new cabinet Matsuoka was replaced by 
Toyoda (the former Naval Minister). Negotiations with 
America continued but on 28 July 1941 Japan moved into 
Southern Indo-China. The already strained relations 
between Japan and America deteriorated further. In 
September 1941 the Imperial Conference decided on war 
against the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands. In 
October America was prepared to continue negotiations 
with Japan only if Japan would withdraw from China and 
French Indo-China. This withdrawal was strongly opposed 
by the Minister of Uiar, Tojo. His views led to the 
resignation of the Third Konoe Cabinet on 18 October 
1941, whereupon Tojo became Prime Minister, Minister of 
War and Interior Minister. And it was Tojo who led 
Japan into the Pacific war on 8 December 1941.
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340.
Kokusaku Yoko,” (An Outline of the Imperial National 
Policy Relative to the Changing Situation); and, ”Teikoku 
Kokusaku Tsuiko Yoryo,” (Outline for Effecting the 
Imperial National Policy), in NKSG. a special volume,
PP.463-469 and 507-523.
(94) See, ”Nanpo Senryochi Gyosei Jisshi Yoryo,”
(An Outline of Administrative Enforcement in the Southern 
Occupied Territories); and ”Senryo-Chi Gunsei Zisshi ni 
Kansuru Rikkai-gun Chuo Kyotei,” (The Central Agreement 
of the Army and Navy Regarding Enforcement of the Military 
Administration in Occupied Territories). In Waseda 
Daigaku (Waseda University), Indoneshia ni Okeru Nihon 
Gunsei no Kenkyu (Studies in the Japanese Military 
Administration of Indonesia during World War II),
Tokyo, 1959, PP.531-537.
(95) Ibid., P.534
(99) ibid., P.538. Full details of, ”Nanpo Keizai 
Taisaku Yoko,” (An Outline of Southern Economic Policy), 
which was enacted by the Governmental Liaison Conference 
on 12 December, may be found in Ibid.. PP.537-541.
(97) Akira Hara, op. cit.. P.9.
See, NKSG. vol.6, PP.179-181, 273; Takushiro 
Hattori, op. cit.. PP.104-106, 133-139.
(99) NKSG. vol.6, P.148
(100) Takushiro Hattori, op. cit.. P.75.
(101) NKSG. vol.6, PP.265-266.
(102) NKSJ. P.206; W.L.Langer & S.E.Gleason, The 
Undeclared War. 1940-1941. London, 1953, P.625.
Conclusion
Although the close economic relationship between 
Japan and Southeast Asia in the years 1914-1941 should 
not be exaggerated, their complementary trade relations 
were nevertheless important. During the inter-war period 
Southeast Asia was at first regarded by Japan simply 
as a region that could supply raw materials and consume 
Japanese manufactures. JapanTs economic expansion into 
Southeast Asia was particularly rapid after the First 
World War and after the World economic crisis of 1929- 
31. But in the 1930’s Southeast Asia became critically 
important to Japan as the tensions between Japan and 
the Western Powers, particularly the U.S. and Britain, 
increased. The suspension of exports of machinery and 
raw materials from the Western world, including the 
European colonies in Asia, was a major fear for the 
Japanese. Moreover, trade with the Western world had 
created a considerable balance of payments deficit for 
Japan, particularly after 1931. Consequently Japan 
attempted to extend her political and economic influence 
in Southeast Asia in order to reduce her dependence on 
Western supplies and markets, as well as to reduce her trade 
deficit. However, Japanese expansion into Southeast 
Asia jeopardized the relationship between Japan and the 
Western Powers, for the Philippines, Indo-China, Malaya 
and the Netherlands Indies were American, French, British 
and Dutch colonies. Thailand was an independent state, 
but it could be argued that it was within the British 
sphere of influence. The economies of Southeast Asia 
were closely integrated with the economies of the 
Western world. Southeast Asia produced raw materials 
required by the West and in turn was an important market 
for western manufactured goods. (See Appendices C 
to I inclusive). Therefore, in the 1930!s the Western 
Powers commanded their Asian possessions to apply 
discriminatory trade restrictions against Japan. Nevertheles 
to some extent Japan succeeded in penetrating these
Asian markets through her increased industrial productivity 
and by the depreciation of the Yen. However, it proved 
impossible for Japan to create a self-sufficiency area 
in the China-Manchuria-bloc. Moreover in the 1930’s 
Japan could not reduce her trade deficit with the West.
Japan largely succeeded in excluding British,
Indian and Chinese cotton goods from Asian markets.
But Japan could not meet her own raw cotton requirements 
solely from Asian sources. Indian raw cotton was 
increasingly consumed by the Indian spinning industry. 
Chinese raw cotton was increasingly consumed by the 
Chinese spinning industry and by the Zaikabo. Raw cotton 
supplies from India and China were also occasionally 
threatened by the local boycott campaigns against 
Japan. In addition, Japan- had to import fine quality 
raw cotton from America in order to make the better- 
quality cotton goods that could compete against Indian 
and Chinese products. Therefore American cotton supplies 
were critical. But this jeopardized Japan’s trade 
balance with the West, for the price of American raw 
cotton rose substantially in the 193C!s, whilst the price 
of Japanese raw silk exports to America fell. In addition, 
dependence on Westerr\ notably American, machinery and 
engines further undermined Japan’s trade balance.
In order to reduce her trade deficit, Japan increased 
local machine production and expanded her trade with 
Southeast Asia.
After the China Incident in 1937 Japan came to 
regard Southeast Asia as a ’’Complementary Sphere” 
to the China-Manchuria-bloc. Southeast Asia became 
increasingly important to Japan as a market for Japanese 
cotton goods and as a supplier of agricultural and 
industrial raw materials. Prior to the Pacific War 
Japanese investments in Southeast Asia included invest­
ments in commerce, industry, mining, agriculture and 
stock farming, forestry, marine products, communications, 
shipping, and harbour depots and facilities (See Appendix
J). However Japanese investment in Southeast Asia could 
not of course compare with American, British and Dutch 
investment in the region.
Japan dominated iron ore production in Malaya.
Her investment in the industry was considerable, due 
in part to the fact that British capital in Malaya 
had a far greater interest in tin than in iron. Through­
out the inter-war period, exports of Malayan iron ore 
to Japan contributed greatly to the Japanese iron and 
steel industry. Nevertheless, particularly after the 
Manchurian Incident in 1931, the production of Japanese- 
owned mines in Malaya had been interrupted by Chinese 
miners in protest against Japanese military expansion 
in China.
Japanese investment in Malayan rubber was stimulated 
by the boom of 1910-11. Japanese investment expanded 
rapidly until 1917, when the Rubber Lands (Restriction) 
Enactment was introduced. This restrictive policy 
coupled with severe fluctuations in rubber prices, 
limited the growth of Japanese investment in Malayan 
rubber.
Japanese investment in Netherlands Indies oil 
fields began in 1930 but it was on a much smaller scale 
than Dutch, British and American investment. (See 
Appendix K). Japan regarded the East Indies as the most 
resource-rich country in Southeast Asia, but apart 
from her small investment in oil she invested very 
little in the Indies. (See Appendix L),
The production of raw materials in Southeast Asia 
was firmly under Western control. Japan was unable to 
import sufficient raw materials from the region to 
meet the demands of her war economy. Nevertheless she 
increasingly came to regard Southeast Asia as a potential 
saviour should supplies from the West be suspended.
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In the later 1930fs the war in China dragged on and 
economic and political pressure from the West increased. 
Negotiations with the U.S. were unfruitful. Prompted 
by the Army, Japan increasingly considered the extension 
of her political and military influence into Southeast 
Asia in order to secure her raw material supplies.
In the 1930’s the business community in Japan also 
became very aggressive. It had always had an influence 
on the Government through organizations such as the Nihon 
Kogyo Kurabu (Japan Industrial Club), the Nihon Keizai 
Renmei (Japan Economic League), the Shoko Kaigisho 
Rengokai (Federation of Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry), and the Tokyo Clearing House Association, as 
well as through a host of more specialized organizations 
such as the Nikka Jitsugyo Kyokai (Japan-China Business­
mens’ A s s o c i a t i o n ) . ^  The proprietors of major concerns? 
for example Fusanosuke Kuhara, Koichiro Ishihara and
Tadaharu Mukai, each enjoyed a close relationship with
(2 )
the Government, the Military and ultra-nationalists.
They themselves were influential in Government circles, 
in military coups and in right-wing movements. The 
Ishihara Sangyo Company, a Sinko Zaibatsu, had major 
interests in the Southern region including the largest 
single investment in the Malayan iron industry. Ishihara 
himself was the leader of two ultra-nationalist societies, 
T5a Kensetsu Doshi-Kai (The Association of Comrades for 
Establishing East Asia) and Sumera-juku (The Private 
School of the Emperor)• He also provided financial support 
for Syumei Okawa of the Jinmu Association and Kunishige 
Tanaka of the Meirin Association. By the 1930’s Kuhara 
Zaibatsu (Nissan) had become the third largest Zaibatsu 
after Mitsui and Mitsubishi. Its investments were 
concentrated in China and Manchuria, although it also 
invested in Malayan iron ore and rubber. Kuhara himself 
was President of the Seiyukai and an influential politician. 
He provided financial support for Giichi Tanaka 
(Prime Minister from April 1927 to July 1929) and for
Ikki Kita of the Roso-Kai (The Young and Old Association) 
and of the Yuzon-sha (The ’Yet Remaining * Society).
Mukai, head of Mitsui Zaibatsu, was a powerful financier.
In 1940 he led a ’civilian* delegation to the East Indies 
for trade negotiations, and in general played an import­
ant role in the Japanese penetration of the East Indies.
His predecessor as head of Mitsui, Shigeaki Ikeda, was 
President of the Bank of Japan in 1937. In 1938 he 
became Minister of Finance and Minister of Commerce and 
Industry. Together with Kuhara he provided the financial
support for Ikki Kita and the ultra-nationalist movement
(3)
in Japan in the 1930*s. Cooperation between on the 
one hand Ishihara, Kuhara, Mitsui and the Jinmu Association, 
the Meirin Association, the Roso«kai and the Yuzon-sha, 
and on the other the Military, notably Kuniaki Koiso,
Giichi Tanaka, Yoshiyuki Kawashima and Sadao Araki, 
resulted in a series of military coups in the 1930’s.
The main aim was to strengthen the power of the military
over the civilian administration and so facilitate
(4)military expansion overseas. The Zaibatsu, which had 
substantial interests in China, Manchuria, Korea and 
Southeast Asia, had a close relationship with the Army, 
authorities. They participated in several right-wing 
coups, aimed at the establishment of the "Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” . By this the Zaibatsu 
hoped that they would be able to protect and develop 
their economic interests ^  in areas outside Japan, 
in an environment free of Western influence. Ultimately 
this led to the outbreak of the Pacific war in 1941, 
and then the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia.
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Notes
^  A.E.Tiedemann, ”Big Business and Politics in 
Preuiar Japan” , in Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan. 
J.U.Morley (ed.), Princeton, 1974, P.279.
(2 ) —It is widely held, that the Minseito was
associated with Mitsubishi, whilst the Seiyukai was 
associated with Mitsui. Moreover by examining the 
membership of the Japanese Diet in the 1930’s, it is 
possible to appreciate the high degree of interpenetration 
that existed between the business and political elites.
For example in the fifty-eighth Diet in 1930, the largest 
single occupational group in both the House of Represent­
atives and the House of Peers was ”businessmen”. In 
the lower house, thirty-two percent, end in the upper 
house, thirty-four percent of members were businessmen.
If one includes those who, though primarily engaged in 
another occupation, also held positions in business, 
the percentages rise to fifty-five percent in the lower 
house and forty-five percent in the upper house. Members 
of the House of Representatives held positions in 492 
companies; members of the House of Peers, in 641 companies.
—  Ibid., PP.279-281. See also Tasuku Noguchi, Nihon
no Roku-dai KontsuerOn (Japan’s Six Largest Enterprises), 
Tokyo, 1979, PP.51-55.
(3) Shigeaki Ikeda was involved in the 26 February 
coup in 1936. His connections with Ikki Kita and Zei 
Nishida were later investigated by the military police.
—  See A.E.Tiedemann, op. cit., P.301. (Shigeaki Ikeda 
is referred to as Ikeda Seihin in Tiedemann’s article).
(4) Maxon suggests that after 1930 the dominant 
expansionist force in Japan was not the Navy but the 
Army. This is not to say that the only expansionist 
forces were military ones. —  See Y.C.Maxon, Control 
of Japanese Foreign Policy, A Study of Civil-Military
Rivalry 1930-1945. Westport, Greenwood Press, 1973, P.30.
(5)
During the Japanese occupation of Southeast 
Asia, the Ishihara Sangyo Company was appointed by the 
Military authority to manage more than 30 mining companies 
involved in the exploitation of local iron, bauxite, 
tin and manganese. —  See Toru Yano, Nanshin no Keifu 
(Genealogy of Southern Penetration), Tokyo, 1975, PP.110-111.
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Statistical Appendices
A. Exports and Imports by Principal Commodities.
B. Iron and Steel Production and the Import of 
Raw Materials (1914-41).
C. The Percentages of Major Exports to Total 
Exports of Southeast Asia, 1910-39.
D. The Percentages of Major Imports to Total 
Imports of Southeast Asia, 1910-39.
E. The Philippines: Trade with Principal Countries,
F. French Indo-China: Trade with Principal 
Countries.
G. Thailand: Trade with Principal Countries.
H. British Malaya: Trade with Principal Countries.
I. Netherlands India: Trade with Principal 
Countries
J. Total Investment of Japanese Enterprises in 
Southeast Asia.
K. Foreign Investment in the Oil Industry of the 
East Indies (1930).
L. Foreign Investment in Netherlands East Indies 
Agriculture (1931).
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Appendix B.
Cron and Steel Production and the Import of Raw Materials (1914-41) (Unit: thousand tons)
Year Output Imported Raw Materials
Pig Iron Steel Steel Materials Iron Ore Scrap Iron
1914 300 328* - 461 2
1915 318 376* - 511 4
1916 389 466* 381.1 470 37
; 1917 451 773 533.3 418 70
1 1918 583 813 537.5 598 120
1919 596 813 548.7 955 46
1920 521 811 533.8 995 40
1921 473 832 565.6 769 9
1922 551 909 662.0 908 54
1923 . 600 959 754.4 989 52
1924 586 1,100 841.9 1,202 42
i 1925 685 1,300 1,043.0 1,212 44
1926 810 1,506 1,256.0 892 80
1927 896 1,685 1,415.0 1,107 224
1928 1,093 1,906 1,721.0 1,843 364
1929 1,087 2,294 2,034.0 2,259 488
1930 1,162 2,289 1,921.0 2,261 489
1931 917 1,883 1,664 1,727 296
1932 1,011 2,398 2,113 1,634 559
1933 1,437 3,198 2,793 1,779 1,013
1934 1,728 3,844 3,423 2,312 1,413
1935 1,907 4,704 3,978 3,646 1,692
1936 2,008 5,223 4,547 4,023 1,497
1937 2,308 5,801 5,071 3,313 2,420
1938 2,563 6,472 5,489 3,212 1,358
1939 3,179 6,696 5,438 4,949 2,555
1940 3,512 6,856 5,216 5,129 1,391
1941 4,173 6,844 5,047 5,676 203
Source: Hiroma Arisawa ed., Gendai Nihon Sangyo Koza (Studies on Modern 
Japanese Industry), vol. II, Tokyo, 1959, PP. 2-5; 8-9.
*Represents only the production of the Yawata Iron Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
Appendix C .
The Percentages of Major Exports to Total Exports of Southeast Asia, 1910-1939.
Country Principal Articles Percentage
1910-14 1925-29 1930-34 1935-39
Sugar 19.5 30.0 53.2 40.5
Abaca 39.4 20.0 8.7 11.5
Philippines Copra 23.4 1.1 8.3 11.0
Coconut Oil - (a) 15.7 10.5 10.7
Total 82.3 66.8 80.7 73.7
Rice 61.8 66.4 55.4 43.6
French Indo-China Maize 5.6 2.0 8.7 16.3
Rubber 0.3 5.6 4.6 16.1
Total 67.7(b) 74.0 68.7 76.0(c)
Rice 82.3 68.8 59.6 51.7
Thailand Tin Ore - 9.0 12.5 16.7
Rubber and 
rubber waste _ 2.4 1.8 10.4
Total 82.3(d) 80.2(e) 73.9(f) 78.8(g)
Rubber (dry) 33.9 50.6 34.3 46.8
British Malaya Tin 21.9 17.4 18.6 20.2
Petroleum products 0.4 5.6 13.1 7.7
Total 56.2 (h) 73.6 66.0 74.7
Petroleum and its 
products 14.6 10.3 18.8 20.2
Netherlands Rubber 24.9 12.0 21.94.5Indies
Sugar 28.4 21.0 16.9 7.3
Total 47.5 56.2 47.7 49.4
Source: Compiled from Joseph D. Phillips, "Foreign Trade", in An Economic Survey 
of the Pacific Area, F.V. Field (ed.), New York, 1942, PP. 178, 186,
194, 198 and 200.
Notes: (a) Practically no exports prior to 1913.
(b) Only the year 1913.
(c) The average of the years 1935-38.
(d) The average of the years 1909/10-1913/14.
(e) The average of the years 1925/26-1929/30.
(f) The average of the years 1930/31-1934/35.
(g) The average of the years 1934/35, 1935/36, 1936/37, 1937/38 and 1938/39.
(h) Only the year 1915.
Appendix D .
The Percentages of Major Imports to Total Imports of Southeast Asia, 1910-39.
Country Principal Articles Percentage
1910-14 1925-29 1930-34 1935-39
iron and steel and
resultant manufac­
tures . 12.8 13.3 13.9 16.2
Philippines Cotton goods 
Petroleum and its
20.1 21.0 17.7 16.2
products 2.9 6.9 8.2 7.1(a)
Total 35.8 41.2 39.8 39.5
Cotton tissues 15.5 11.0 16.7 14.1
Petroleum and its
products 3.2 7.3 9.2 6.3
French
Indo-China Silk tissues 
Machines and
5.2 4.9 2.8 4.3
machinery 2.0 5.3 6.9 5.0
Total 25.9(b) 28.5 35.6 29.7(c)
Cotton manufactures 17.4 14.0 15.2 16.3
Thailand Petroleum products 3.0 5.6 10.4 10.2
Metal manufactures 6.7 6.8 7.7 9.0
Machinery 1.9 4.6 2.8 4.7
Total 29.0(d) 31.0(e) 36.1(f) 40.2(g)
Rubber (wet and dry! 1.7 15.4 7.2 17.0
Petroleum and its
products 2.5 10.5 19.7 14.0
British Tin ore 7.1 6.7 6.5 6.5
Malaya Rice 16.9 9.8 10.7 8.3
Cotton piece goods 6.8 5.4 4.9 3.5
Total 35.0(h) 47.8 49.0 49.3
Appendix D . (continued)
Country Principal Articles Percentage
1910-14 1925-29 1930-34 1935-39
Textiles 27.2 26.0 27.1 28.5
Machinery and tools 5.9 8.3 8.0 10.8
Netherlands
Indies
Iron and Steel and 
their manufactures 7.1 7.6 7.0 9.4
Rice 15.4 9.3 8.4 4.2
Vehicles and parts 1.5 4.0 3.6 5.8
Total 57.1 55.2 54.1 58.7
Source: Compiled from Joseph D. Phillips, op. cit., PP. 178, 186, 194, 
198 and 200.
Notes: (a) During the years 1935-38.
(b) The average of the year 1913.
(c) During the years 1935-38.
(d) The average of the years 1909/10-1913/14.
(e) The average of the years 1925/26-1929/30.
(f) The average of the years 1930/31-1934/35.
(g) The average of the years 1934/35, 1935/36, 1936/37, 1937/38
and 1938/39.
(h) Only the year 1915.
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Weights and Measures
1 Koli = 400 Pounds (cotton yarn)
1 Kin = 0.601 kg = 1.323 lb.
1 Cho (bu) = 99.15 areas = 2.45 acres = 10 tan. 
1 Picul = 60 kg = 100 Kin = 132.3 lb.
369.
Select Bibliography 
(A) Japanese Sources:
(i) Official Publications
(1) Boeki Kumiai, Chuokai (Foreign Trade Association, 
Central Committee), Taikoku ni Okeru Honpo Shohin no 
Genkyo (The Present Status of Japanese Goods in Thailand), 
Tokyo, 1941.
(2) Gaimusho, Oakyoku (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
European and Asian Affairs Bureau), Nanyo-shi Taikei 
(Outline History of Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1940.
(3) Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Nanpo 
Busshi ni Kansuru Oboegaki (Memorandum on the Resources 
of Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1943.
(4) Gaimusho Gaikoshiryo-kan (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Materials Section of the Diplomatic Service), 
Nihon Gaiko-shi Jiten (A Dictionary of Japanese Foreign 
History), Tokyo, 1979.
(5) Gaimusho, Tsushokyoku (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Trade Bureau), Shamu Shi.io ni Okeru Nihon Shohin 
ho Chii (The Status of Japanese Goods in the Thailand 
Market), Tokyo, 1932.
(6) Nanyocho, Chokan Kanbo, Chosaka (South Seas 
Agency, Office of the Director, Secretariat, Research 
Section) , Sen Kyuhyaku Sanjyuku nendo Ranryo Indo Keizai 
Jotai Gaikan (Economic Conditions in the Netherlands 
Indies in 1939), Tokyo, 1940.
(7)  , Gai-Nanyo Keizai Shigen Gaikyo
(Major Economic Resources of the South Seas), Tokyo, 1940.
370.
(8) Nihon Boeki Shinko Kabushiki Kaisha, Kikakubu 
(Japan Trade Promotion Company, Ltd., Planning Division), 
Boeki Taisaku Shiryo (Foreign Trade Policy Material), 
Tokyo, 1942.
(9) Nanfyocho, Naimubu, Kikakuka (South Seas Agency, 
Domestic Affairs, Planning Section), Ranryo Hiqashi
Indo no Shiqen Chosa (Resources of the Netherlands 
East Indies), Tokyo, 1941.
(10) Naikaku, Kikakuin (Cabinet, Planning Board), 
Nanpo Shiqen Kankei Shiryo (Materials on the Resources 
of Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1939.
(11) Nanpo Kaihatsu Kinko, Chosaka (Southeast Asia 
Development Fund, Research Section), Toa Kyoeiken ni 
Okeru Nanpo Chiiki no Tsuka Hiritsu no Mondai (The 
Problem of Currency Ratios in the Southern Region of 
the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere), Tokyo, 1942.
(12) Naikaku, Johokyoku (Cabinet, Information 
Bureau), Toa Kyoeiken no Ikkan to Shiteno Futsuryo 
Indo Shina (French Indo-China, A Link in the Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere), Tokyo, 1941.
(13) Nanyo Kyokai, Shingaporu Shohin Chinretsujyo 
(South Seas Association, Singapore Japanese Commercial 
Museum), Eiryo Mare ni Okeru Menpu (Cotton Fabrics in 
British Malaya), Singapore, 1935..
(14) Nanyo Kyokai (South Seas Association), Nan1yo 
Keizai Kondankai Hokoku-sho (Report on the Southeast 
Asia Economic' Round-Table Conferences), Tokyo, 1940.
(15)  , Ran-In Keizai Gaikan (Economic
Outline of the Netherlands Indies), Tokyo, 1940.
(16)   , Ranryo Indo no Keizai Gensei
(Economic Conditions in the Netherlands Indies), Tokyo, 1936.
(17) Nihon Boeki Kyokai (Japan Foreign Trade Association), 
Waqa tai Nanyo Boeki Gen.jyo to sono Kaizensaku (Japan’s
Trade with Southeast Asia and Measures for its Improvement), 
Tokyo, 1930.
(18) Noshomusho, Shomukyoku (Ministry of Agriculture 
and Commerce, Commercial Affairs Bureau), Mare Hanto 
Gomu Saibaigyo Shisatsu Hokoku (Field Report on the 
Rubber Industry of the Malay Peninsula), Tokyo, 1912.
(19) Osaka-shi Yakusho, Sangyobu, Chosaka (Osaka 
Municipal Office, Industrial Division, Research Section),
Ran-In Shijyo ni Okeru Honpo Menpu (Japanese Cotton Fabrics 
in the Netherlands Indies), Osaka, 1934.
(20) Shokosho, Shomukyoku (Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, Commercial Affairs Bureau), Ranryo Indo 
no Kenkyu (Research on the Netherlands East Indies),
Tokyo, 1928.
(21) Sanbo Honbu (Army General Staff Headquarters),
Nanpo Kowan Yomoku Ichiran: Hirippin. Eiryo Mare. Taikoku. 
Futsuryo IndoShina. Dyobi Biruma (Survey of the Ports
of Southeast Asia; Philippines, British Malaya, Thailand,
French Indo China and Burma), Tokyo, 1941.
(22) ----------  , Ran-In Jijyo (Netherlands Indies
Affairs), Tokyo, 1941.
(23) ---------- , Hirippin Shiqen Yoran (The
Resources of the Philippines), Tokyo, 1941.
(24) Shokosho, Boekikyoku (Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, Foreign Trade Bureau), Nichi Ran-In Mondaj 
Shiryo (Materials on the Japan-Netherlands Indies 
Question), Tokyo, 1934.
(25) -----------------------------------------------
----------- :------------------------- , Nichi Ran-In Mondai
Shiryo (Materials on the Japan-Netherlands Indies Question), 
Tokyo, 1934.
(26) Taiwan Sotoku Kanbo, Gaijika (Formosa Govern­
ment-General Secretariat, External Affairs Section),
Qrimono Shi.io to Shite no Ranryo Indo (The Netherlands 
Indies as a Textile Market), Taihoku, 1935.
(27) -------------------------------  , Nanyo ni Taisuru
Nihon no Keizaiteki Shinshutsu (The Economic Expansion 
of Japan into Southeast Asia), Taihoku, 1935.
(28 ) ------------------------------- , Nanyo Kakuchi
Ho.jin Saibai Kiqyo Yoran (Japanese Agricultural Enterprises 
in Southeast Asia), Taihoku, 1935.
(29) Toa Kenkyu-syo (East Asian Research Institute), 
Sekai Kosan Tokei. 1925-40 (Statistics of Mineral 
Productions of the World, 1925-40), Tokyo, 1942.
(30) ---------------- , Nanpo Shochiiki no Tekko
(iron Ore in Southeast Asia), 2 vols, Tokyo, 1941-42.
(31) Taiwan Sotoku Kanbo, Johoka (Formosa Government- 
General Secretariat, Public Information Section), Nanpo 
Hattenshi (History of Japan’s Southern Expansion),
Taihoku, 1944.
(32) Taiwan Sotokufu Gaijibu, Nanyo Nenkan (Year­
book of the South Seas), vol. 1, Taiwan, 1941.
(33) Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki-gaisha, Chosaka 
(Formosa Development Company, Research Section), Nanpo 
ni Okeru Eikoku no Keneki (British Interests in 
Southeast Asia), Taihoku, 1940.
(34) Taiwan Ginko, Chosaka (Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., 
Research Section). Nanshi Nanyo No Menshifu (Cotton 
Textiles of South China and Southeast Asia), Taihoku, 1919.
373.
(35) Taiwan Sotoku Kanbo, Chosaka (Formosa Government- 
General Secretariat, Research Section), Mare Hanto to 
Sumatora to’no Saibai Kiovo Hikaku (Comparison of the 
Agricultural Enterprises of Sumatra and the Malay 
Peninsula), Taihoku, 1929.
(35) Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki-gaisha, Chosaka 
(Formosa Development Company, Research Section), Mare 
Honto no Shiqen to Keizai (The Resources and Economy 
of the Malay Peninsula), Taihoku, 1941.
(37) Taiwan Ginko, Chosaka (Bank of Formosa, Ltd., 
Research Section), Eiryo Mare Keizai Ji.jyo (Economic 
Affairs of British Malaya), Taihoku, 1941.
(38) ------------------------------------------------
------------------  , Ranryo Hiqashi Indo no Keizai Ji.jyo
(Economic Affairs of the Netherlands East Indies),
Taihoku, 1940.
(39) Tokyo Furitsu Shoko Shoreikan, Nanyo Boeki 
Shinkokai (Tokyo Metropolitan Commercial and Industrial 
Museum, South Seas Trade Promotion Society), Nanyo ni 
Okeru Honpo Shohin Gaikyo (Conditions of Japanese Trade 
Goods in Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1919.
(40) Yokohama Shoko Kaigisho (Yokohama Chamber of 
Commerce), Dai To-a Kyoeiken Shigen Zukai (Outline of 
the Resources of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere), Yokohama, 1941-42.
(41) Yokohama Shokin Ginko, Chosaka (Yokohama 
Specie Bank, Ltd., Research Section), Ranryo Hiqashi 
Indo (Netherlands East Indies), Yokohama, 1919.
(ii) Books
(1) Akashi, Yozi, Nanyo Kakyo to Manshu Zihen 
(The Nanyang Chinese and the Manchurian Incident), 
Tokyo, 1971.
(2) Ando, Yoshio (ed.), Kindai Nihon Keizaishi 
Yoran (A Survey of Modern Japanese Economic History), 
Tokyo, 1978.
(3) Akamatsu, Y., Toa Boeki no Rekishi-teki Ruikei 
(Historical Patterns of East Asian Trade), Tokyo, 1942.
(4) Aki, Hisa, Chiiki Keizai Riron (A Theory on 
Regional Economies), Tokyo, 1940.
(5) Asaka, Sueki, Dai Nanpo Keizairon (Economic 
Outline of Greater Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1944.
(6) ------------  , Nanyo Keizai Kenkyu (Economic
Study of Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1941.
(7) Asahi Sinbun-sha, Konoe Fimimaro-k5 no Shuki 
(Memoirs of Prince Konoe), Tokyo, 1946.
(8) Chugai Shogyo Shinposha, Keizaibu (Chugai 
Shogyo Publishers, Economic Division), Nanpo Keizai to 
Kaihatsu (The Economy and Development of Southeast 
Asia), Tokyo, 1942.
(9) Chuo Keizai Shinposha, Chosabu (Chuo Keizai 
Publishers, Research Division), Nanpo Sekiyu Yushi- 
.ji.jo (Petroleum and Fatty Oils in Southeast Asia), 
Tokyo, 1942.
(10) Chugoku Kenkyu-syo Boeki Iinkai, A.jia Boeki 
no Tenbo (A Prospect of Asian Trade), Tokyo, 1948.
(11) Fukuda, Kaname, Nanpo Shiqsn Keizairon (Economic 
Resources of Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1942,
(12) Fukuzawa, Akira, Shin Nanpo Shigenron (Study 
of the Resources of Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1942.
(13) Goto, Isamu, Nanyo Koboshi (History of the 
rise and fall of Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1941
(14) Hattori, Takushiro, Dai To-a Senso Zenshi 
(A History of the War in the Far East, 1941-1945), 
vols. 1-3, Tokyo, 1953.
(15) Hara Keiichi, Hara Kei Nikki (A Diary of Kei 
Hara), 5 vols., Tokyo, 1950-51.
(16) Harada, Kumakichi, Saion.ji-ko to Seikyoku 
(The Political Situation and Saionji), 8 vols.,
Tokyo, 1950-56.
(17) Hasegawa, Satoshi. Nichi-Bei Kaisen no Shinso 
(A Japanese Version of the Circumstances Of Japan's 
Entry into the Second World War), Tokyo, 1942,
(18) Higuchi, Hiromu, Nanyo ni Dkeru Nihon no 
Toshi to Boeki (Japanese Trade and Investment in 
Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1941.
(19) Hamada, Koichi, Ran-In no Shihon to Hinzoku 
Keizai (investments and National Economy of the Dutch 
Indies), Tokyo, 1941
(20) Haga, Takeshi, Toa Kyoeiken to Nanyo Kakyo 
(The East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the Chinese 
in Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1941.
(21) Heibon-sha (Heibon-sha Pubishers), Ajia Rekishi 
Jiten (Encyclopaedia of Asian History), 10 vols., Tokyo, 
1959-1962.
(22) ------------------------------------- , Nihon Jinmei
Dai Jiten (Japanese Biographical Dictionary), Tokyo, 1979.
(23) Ishihara Sangyo Kabushiki-gaisha Shashi 
Hensan Iin-Kai, Sogyo Sanjyu-go-nen o Kaiko Shite 
(Review for Thirty Fifth Anniversary), Tokyo, 1956.
(24) Ide, Kiwata, Nanpo Kaihatsu-shi (History of 
the Development of Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1942.
(25) Ishii, Kenzaburo, Nanyo Zakki (Notes on Southeast 
Asia), Singapore, 1926.
(26) Ishihara, Koichiro, Minami Nihon no Kensetsu 
(The Creation of Southern Japan), Tokyo, 1942.
(27) Inoue, Kiyoshi, Nanyo to Nihon (Southeast 
Asia and Japan), Tokyo, 1913.
(28) Itani, Zen'ichi, Nanpo Keizairon (Economic 
Outline of Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1940,
(29) Inoue, fflasaji, Nanpo Kaitaku o Kataru (On 
the Colonization of Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1942.
(30) Iijima, Honshi, Nihon Boseki-shi (The History 
of the Japanese Spinning Industry), Osaka, 1941.
(31) Irie, Toraji, Hojin Kaigai Hatten-shi (Studies 
on Overseas Japanese), vols. 1 & 2, Tokyo, 1937 & 1938.
(32) —' 1 , Meiji Nanshin Shiko (A Draft
History of Southern Penetration During the Neiji Era) 
Tokyo, 1943.
(33) Itagaki, Yoichi, "Taiheiyo Senso to Sekiyu 
Mondai" (The Pacific War and the Petroleum Problem), 
Taiheiyo Senso Genfin-ron (Studies on the Causes of 
World War II in the Pacific), Tokyo, 1953.
(34) Kokusai Keizai Gakkai (international Economics 
Society), Firippin no Seiji Keizai Honda! (Political and 
Economic Problems of the Philippines), Tokyo, 1940.
(35) Kyoto Daigaku Tonan-ajia Kenkyu Senta (The 
Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University), 
"Kindai Nihon no Nanpo Kanyo” (Historical Patterns of 
the Commitment to Southeast Asia of Modern Japan),
Tonan A.jia Kenkyu (Southeast Asian Studies), vol. XVI, 
No.l, June 1978.
(36) Kyoto Daigaku Bungaku-bu (Kyoto University, 
Department of Arts), Nihon Kindai-Shi Jiten (A Dictionary 
of Modern Japanese History), Tokyo, 1958.
(37) Kawade Shobo (Kawade Publishers), Nihon Rekishi 
Dai Jiten (A Historical Dictionary of Japan), 20 vols., 
Tokyo, 1956-60.
(38) Koma, Jutaro, Karukatta Oyobi Nanyo Homen 
Shuccho Hokokusho (Field Report on Calcutta and the 
Southeast Asian Region), 1919.
(39) Kusaha Yorinao. Ho.jin o Matsu Futsu-In no 
Hoko (The Wealth Awaiting The Japanese in French Indo­
china), Tokyo, 1942.
(40) Kido Nikki Kenkyukai, Kido Koichi Nikki (A 
Diary of Koichi Kido), Tokyo, 1966,
(41) Kojima, Seiichi, To-a Keizai-ron (On East 
Asian Economies), Tokyo, 1941.
(42) Kobayashi, Hideo, Dai To—a Kyoei-ken no Keisei 
to Hokai (The Formation and Subsequent Collapse of
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere), Tokyo, 1975.
(43) Kimura, Matsutaro, Nichi-Man-Shi Keizai-Ron 
(A Discussion of Japanese, Manchurian and Chinese 
Economics), Tokyo, 1936.
(44) Kajinishi, Mitsuhaya (ed.), Nihon Keizai-shi 
Taikei (An Outline of Japanese History), Modern, vols.
5 & 6, Tokyo, 1965.
(45) Kamimura, Kanji, Manira Asa (Manila Hemp),
Tokyo, 1913.
(46) Kobayashi, Midori and Masuda, Naohiko, Nanpoken 
no Shigen (The Resources of Southeast Asia), Tokyo,
1942-43.
(47)Ka’nan Ginko (The Ka’nan Bank, Ltd.-), Flare 
Hanto ni Okeru Ho.iin no Keizaiteki Hatten ni tsuite 
(The Economic Development of the Japanese in the Malay 
Peninsula), Taihoku, 1930.
(48) ------------ , Shamu Keizai Jijyo (Economic
Affairs of Thailand), Taihoku, 1931.
(49) Kaigai Jijyo Kenkyukai, Honpo Boeki Nenkan 
(The Trade Year Book of Japan), Tokyo, 1924.
(50) Kobe Syogyo Daigaku Syogyo Kenkyu-sho 
(Commercial Research Institute, Kobe Commercial University), 
Jyuvo Keizai Tokei ('Important Economic Statistics),
Vol.8, 1913-1932, Kobe, 1932.
(51) Kido Nikki Kenkyukai, Kido Koichi Nikki (A 
Diary of Koichi Kido), Tokyo, 1966.
379.
(52) Kokusai Jyosei Kenkyukai (World Affairs 
Research Association), Sekai ua Nihon no Nanshinsaku
o Kaku miru (World Opinion on Japan's Policy of Southern 
Expansion), Tokyo, 1937.
(53) Moriya, Fumio, Keizai-shi (Economic History
of Modern Japan), Tokyo, 1961.
(54) Murobuse, Koshin, Nanshinron (Southern 
Expansion), Tokyo, 1936.
(55) Masufuchi, Sahei, Nanpo no Hoko; Ran-In-Sumatora
(The Treasury of Southeast Asia; The Netherlands Indies __
Sumatra), Tokyo, 1941.
(56) Matsumoto, Tadao, Ran-In to Nihon (The Netherlands 
Indies and Japan), Tokyo, 1940.
(57) Miyoshi, Tomokazu, Toa Kyoeiken to Hirippin 
(The East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the Philippines) , 
Tokyo, 1941.
(58) Matsui, Kiyoshi (ed.), Kindai Nihon Boeki-shi
(Trade History of Modern Japan), vols. 1,2 & 3, Tokyo, 1959.
(59)    , Nichi-in Mengyo Kosho-shi
(Studies in the History of Japanese-Indian Economic 
Relations in the Cotton Trade), Tokyo, 1960.
(60) ---------------------- , Nihon Boeki-ron (Trade
of Japan), Tokyo, 1954.
(61) Masuda, Naohiko, Sekai Syokuminchi no Shigen
to Keizai (Resources and Economics of the World Colonies), 
Tokyo, 1938.
(62) Mitsubishi Keizai Kenkyu-syo (Mitsubishi 
Economic Research Bureau), Toyo nyobi Nanyo Syokoku no 
Kokusai Boeki to Nihon no Chii (International Trade
of the Far East and Countries of the Pacific, and the 
Position of Japan), Tokyo, 1933.
(63) ---------------------------------------------
—  ----  , Nihon no Sanqyo to Boeki no
Hatten (Japanese Industry and the Development of Foreign 
Trade), Tokyo, 1935.
(64) Minami Manshu Tetsudo Kabushiki Kaisha, Toa 
Keizai Chosakyoku (South Manchurian Railway Company,
East Asia Economic Investigation Bureau), Dai Toa no 
Shigen to Keiei (The Resources of Southeast Asia and 
their Exploitation), Tokyo, 1942.
(65) Mainichi Shinbun-sha, Nihon Zimbatsu Jiten 
(A Dictionary of Japanese Figures), Tokyo, 1952.
(66) Misuzu Shobo (Misuzu Publishers), Gendai-shi 
Shiryo (Collection of Source Materials Relating to Modern 
Japanese History), 44 vols., Tokyo, 1962-1974.
(67) Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Taihei-yo Senso 
e no Michi (Studies on the Origins of World War II in 
the Pacific), 8 vols., Tokyo, 1963
(68) Nanpo Mondai Kenkyujyo (institute for Southern 
Region Problems), Nanpo Mondai to Kokumin no Kakugo 
(The Problem of Southeast Asia and Japan’s Resolution), 
Tokyo, 1941.
(69) Nanpo Keizai Kenkyukai (Southern Region Economic 
Research Committee), Nanpo Kaihatsu no Tebiki (Guide to 
the Development of Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1942.
(70) Nanyo Kyokai (South Seas Association), Nanyo 
Kosan Shiqen (Mineral Resources of Southeast Asia),
Tokyo, 1942.
(71) Nanyo Saibai Kyokai (South Seas Agricultural 
Cultivators' Association), Nanyo ni Dkeru Shuyo Saibaibutsu 
no Genkyo (Major Agricultural Produce Conditions in 
Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1938.
(72) Nanyo Keizai Kenkyujyo (South Seas Economic 
Research Institute), Nanpo Gunsei Kensetsu no Hoshin 
(Military Government Policies in Southeast Asia), Tokyo 
1942.
(73) Nomura Gomei Kaisha (Nomura and Company),
Hiqashi Indo Keizai no Kenkyu (Research on the Economy 
of the East Indies), Tokyo, 1944.
(74) Nawa, Toitsu, Nihon Bosekigyo no Shiteki 
Bunseki (A Historical Analysis of the Japanese 
Textile Industry), Tokyo, 1948.
(75) -------------- , Nihon Bosekigyo to Genmen Mondai
Kenkyu (The Japanese Textile Industry and the Problem
of Raw Cotton), Tokyo, 1937.
(76) Narasaki, Toshio, Gaikoku Boeki no Riron to 
Mondai (A Theory and Problem of Foreign Trade), Tokyo, 1941.
(77) ------------------  , Koiki Keizai to Nanpo
Kaihatsu (Regional Economies and the Development of 
Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1942.
(78) Nakata, Senpo, Nittai Kankei tn Yamaha Nagamasa 
(Japan- Thailand Relations and Yamada Nagamasa), Tokyo, 1943.
(79) Narasaki, Toshio, Gaikoku Boeki no Riron to 
Mondai (The Theory and Problem of Foreign Trade),
Tokyo, 1941.
(80) Nakamura (T.) and Hara (A.) (ed.), Gendai-shi 
Shiryo (Source Materials on Modern Japanese History), 
vol. 43, Tokyo, 1970.
(81) Noguchi, Tasuku (ed.), Nihon no Roku-dai 
Contsuerun (The Six Largest Concerns in Japan), Tokyo, 1979
(82) Nakamura, Momotaro, Kaikyo Shokuminchi Shi.jyo 
ni Okeru Nihon Shohin no Ichi (The Position of Japanese 
Goods in the Straits Settlements' Markets), Singapore, 1927
(83) Nanyo Saibai Kyokai (South Seas Agricultural 
Cultivators Association), Hiqashikuni no Miya Oden ni 
OKeru Nanyo Jiqyo Koenshu (Lectures on Southeast Asia 
given at the Residence of Prince Higashikuni), Tokyo, 1930*
(84) Nihon Menka Saibai Kyokai (Japan Cotton
Growers Association), Hito Mensaku Ji.jo (Cotton Cultivation 
in the Philippines), Tokyo, 1942.
(85) dkawa, Syumei, Fukko A.jja no Syomondai (Problems 
of Reconstructing Asia), Tokyo, 1922.
(86 ) .........  , Nihon Seishin Kenkyu (A Study
of the Spirit of Japan), Tokyo, 1938.
(87)   , Nihon Oyobi Nihonzin no Michi
(The Choice of Japan and the Japanese), Tokyo, 1925.
(88) Oka, Yoshitake and Hayashi, Shigeru, Taisho 
Demokurashi-Ki no Seiji; Matsumoto Gokichi Seiji Nisshi 
(Diary of Matsumoto Gokichi), Tokyo, 1959.
383.
(89) Ono, Kazuichiro, Daiichiji Taisen Zengo no 
Gaikoku Boeki (Foreign Trade Around the First World War) 
in Nihon Shihon-Shugi Hattatsu-Shiron (History of the 
Development of Japanese Capitalism), 1972.
(90) Dkabe, Toshiyoshi, Nanpo Sen'i Genryo no Seisan 
ni Tsuite (on the Production of Textile Materials in
the Southern Region) in Toyo Keizai Ronso (Eastern 
Economic Review), 1942.
(91) Orai, Saburo, Shigen no Nai Nihon to Sekai 
(Without Natural Resources of Japan and the World),
Tokyo, 1975.
(92) Omura, Ichizo, Nanyo no Yuden (The Oil Fields 
of Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1942
(93) Ono, Takashi, Tonan Ajia Shisatsu Hokoku 
(Field Report on Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1940.
(94) Ogasawara, Nagahiro, Ran-In Ji.jyo (The 
Netherlands Indies), Tokyo, 1941.
(95) Rekishi-gaku Kenkyu-Kai, Taiheiyo Senso-shi 
(A History of the Second World War in the Far East),
4 vols., Tokyo, 1953-1954.
(96) Sanseido (Sanseido Publishers), Nanpo Bunka 
Koza: Rekishi-hen (Lectures on the Civilizations of 
Southeast Asia: History), Tokyo, 1943.
(97) Shirasaka, Yoshinao, Dai Nanyo-shi (History 
of the Greater South Seas), Tokyo. 1942.
(98) Shimizu, Yasushi, Sekai no Hoko: Nanyo no 
Fugen (The Natural Resources of the South Seas;
Wealth of the World), Tokyo, 1916.
(99) Shimoda, Hiroshi, Nanyo Keizairon (Economic 
Outline of the South Seas), Tokyo, 1942.
(100) Shinohara, Miyohei, Nihon Keizai no Seicho to 
Junkan (Growth and Cycle of Japanese Economy), Tokyo, 1961.
(101) Shiobara, Tokisaburo, To.jo Memo, Kakute 
Tenno wa Sukuwareta (A Verbatim Report on General Tojo's 
replies to questions put by the prosecution at his trial 
in 1946, shedding light on Japan’s conduct of the war), 
Tokyo, 1952.
(102) Sanpei, Takako, Nihon Mengyo Hattatsu-shi 
(Studies on the Development of the Japanese Cotton Industry) 
Tokyo, 1941.
(103) Syoda, Kenichiro (ed.), Kindai Nihon no 
Tonan-Ajia-kan (The Modern Japan’s View Towards 
Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1979.
(104) Sawada, Ken, Taiheiyo Shiqen-ron (The Resources 
in the Pacific), Tokyo, 1940.
(105) Shibata, Kenichi, Hakujin no Nanyo 
Shinryakushi (History of the White Man’s Aggression in 
the South Seas), Tokyo, 1940.
(106) ------------------  , Nanyo no Rekishi to Gen.jitsu
(Historical and Contemporary South Seas) Tokyo, 1942.
(107) Shimonaka, Yasaburo, Shinsen Dai Jinmei 
Jiten (Japanese Biographical Dictionary), 9 vols.,
Tokyo, 1937-41.
(108) Sawada, Ken, Yamada Naqamasa to Nanshin Senkusha 
(Yamada Nagamasa and other Japanese Pioneers of Southern 
Expansion), Tokyo, 1942.
(109) Sugimoto, Naojiro and Kim, Yong-Kon, Indoshina 
ni Okeru Ho.jin Hatten no Kenkyu (Research on the Japanese
in IndoChina), Tokyo, 1942.
(110) Takei, Juro, Ranryo Indo 0 Kataru (The 
Story of the Dutch Indies)
(111) -------------  , Tosa Ni.jyusannen. Fuqen no
Nanyo (The Natural Resources of the South Seas, a 23
year Exploration), Tokyo, 1930.
(112) -------------  , Nanyo wa Nihon 0 ika ni Miru
(How the South Seas Regards Japan), Tokyo, 1937.
(113) -------------  , Waga Nanyo Boeki 0 Sogai Suru
Kakyo no Shinso (The Chinese in Southeast Asia, a 
Hindrance to Our Trade), Tokyo, 1932.
(114) Takahashi, Kamayoshi, Nihon Koqyo Hatten-Ron
(A Study on Japanese Industrial Development), Tokyo, 1936.
(115) Tanaka, Kunishige, Goiin no Funki Shitaru 
Riyu (The Reason Why I Provoked Matters), Tokyo, 1932.
(116) Tsurumi, Yusuke, Goto Shinpei (Shinpei Goto),
4 vols., Tokyo, 1937-1938.
(117) Tateno, T o ’nan, Nanpo Keirin (Diplomacy in 
Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1936.
(118) Tanaka Giichi Denki Hensan-syo, Tanaka Giichi- 
den (Memoirs of Giichi Tanaka), Tokyo, 1929.
(119) Ui, Ushinosuke, Nanpo Sekiyu Keizai (The 
Petroleum Economy of Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1942.
(120) Uchida, Ginzo, Nihon to Taikoku to no Kankei 
(Relations Between Thailand and Japan), Osaka, 1941.
(121) Waseda Daigaku (UJaseda University), Indoneshia 
ni Okeru IMihon Gunsei no Kenkyu (Studies in the 
Japanese Military Administration of Indonesia during 
World War II), Tokyo, 1959.
(122) liiatanabe, Takeshi, Nanpo Kyoeiken to Kakyo 
(The Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere and the Overseas 
Chinese), Tokyo, 1942.
(123) Yoshimura, Masaharu, Nihon Boeki-ron 
(On Japan*s Trade), Tokyo, 194B.
(124) Yukizawa, Kenzo, Kokusai Keizaiqaku Zyosetsu
(An Introduction of International Economy), Tokyo, 1957.
(125) ------------------
* Nihon Boeki no Choki Tokei
(The Long Term Statistics of Japanfs Trade) , Tokyo, 1978
(126) Yamada, Moritaro, Nihon Shihonshuqi Bunseki
(An Analysis of Japanese Capitalism), Tokyo, 1934.
(127) Yoshida, Goro, Nanyo Shoto no tomi (The Wealth 
of Southeast Asia), Tokyo, 1927.
(128) Yamada, Fumio, Higashi Indo Keizairon (Study 
of the Economy of the East Indies), Tokyo, 1943.
(129) Yoshida, Eitaro, Taikoku Shiqen Keizairon 
(The Economy and Resources of Thailand), Tokyo, 1942.
(iii) Articles
(1) Fujiwara, Aki, ”2.26 Jiken" (The February 
26 Incident), Rekishi-qaku Kenkyu. no. 169 and 171,
Tokyo, 1954.
(2)Goto, Kenichi, "Sen Kyuhyaku Sanjyu Nendai no 
Nihon Indonishia Kankei-Shi-ron Jyosetsu" (A Preliminary 
Study on the History of Japanese-Indonesian Relations 
during 1930s), Aziya Kenkyu (Asian Studies), vol. 26,
No.l, Tokyo, April 1979.
(3) Hara, Akira, Nicchu Senso-Ki no Kokusai Syushi 
(international Balance during the Sino-Japanese liiar 
Period) Syakai Keizai-shi Gakkai. vol. 34, No.6, Tokyo, 1969.
(4) --------------, Nicchu Senso-Ki no Gaika Kessai
(Foreign Settlement during the S|no-Japanese War Period) 
Keizai-qaku Ronsyu. vol. 38, No. 2, Tokyo, 1972.
(5) ------------ , Senji Tosei Keizai no Kaishi (The
Beginning of the Controlled Economy in War Time)
Nihon no Rekishi. vol. 20, Kindai 7 Tokyo, 1976.
(6) ------------ , Daito-a Kyoeiken no Keizai-teki
Jittai (The Economic Realities of the Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere), Tokyo, 1974.
(7) Hara, Kakuten, "Nihon ni Okeru Ajia KenkyC no 
Rekishi. Mantsu Chosabu no Rekishi to Ajia KenkyO"
(A History of Asian Studies in Japan: Part II History
and Activities of the Research Department, South Manchurian
Railway Company). Aiia Keizai. vol. XXI, Nos. 1-7,
Tokyo,January - July 1980.
(8) Kishi, Koichi, "Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi to 
Site no Nanpo Seisaku Kettei to Syowa Kenkyukai"
388.
(The Contribution of the Syowa Research Group in the 
Determination of Southern Policy which led to the War 
in the Pacific), Toyo Kenkyu, Tokyo, February, 1964.
(9) Matsui, Kiyoshi, Nihon Keizai to Nanyo Boeki 
(The Japan Economy and South Sea Trade, To-a Keizai 
Ronso (East Asian Economic Review), Kyoto, 1942.
(10) Matsuoka, Masao, "Waga Shihon to Mare Hanto 
Tochi Seigen-rei,f (Japanese Capital and the Rubber Lands 
Restriction Enactment in the Malay Peninsula), Keizai 
Jiron, Tokyo, July 1917.
(11) Yoshizawa, K., "Itsuwari no Gaikoshi - 
Nichiran Kosho no Shinso" (An Untrue Diplomatic History 
The Truth of the Japan-Netherland Negotiations), Chuo 
Koron, December 1950.
(B) English Sources:
(i) Official Publications
(l) Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade: 
Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in the 
Philippine Islands, London, 1938.
Economic Conditions in the Netherlands Indies, 
1933-5, London, 1936.
Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in 
the Netherlands East Indies, London, 1938.
Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in 
Siam, London, 1937
389.
(2) Great Britain, His Majesty's Stationary Dffice, 
Statistical Abstract for the British Commonwealth for 
each of the ten years 1936 to 1945 (Trade and Commerce 
Section), October 1947.
(3) International Labour Office, The World Textile 
Industry: Economic and Social Problems, Studies
and Reports, Series B, Economic Conditions, 2 vols.,
Geneva, 1937.
(4) Philippines Commonwealth, Department of Agriculture 
and Commerce, Atlas of Philippine Statistics, Manila, 1939.
(5) Tokyo Association For Liberty of Trading. A 
Brief Analysis of Japan's Foreign Trade. Tokyo, 1935.
(6) United States, Tariff Commission, Japan: Trade 
During the Mar. Washington, 1919.
(7 ) -------------------   — -------- , Thp ,fgx.gjL.Qfl.
Trade of Japan, Washington, 1922.
(8)   ■ ■ - ..........   ■ , Cotton cloth «
report to the President on the differences in costs of 
production of cotton cloth in the United States and in 
the Principal Competing Country. Washington, 1936.
(9) ■ ......    , "Annotated Tabular
Survey of the Trade of Japan Proper", Japanese Trade 
Studies. Washington, 1945.
(10) -------------------------------- , The Japanese
Cotton Industry and Trade, recent development and 
future outlook. Washington, 1921.
(11)  , Recent Develop­
ments in the Fore ion Trade of Japan particularly in 
Relation to Trade with the United States, Report No. 105, 
Second Series, Washington, 1936.
390.
(12) United States Imports from
Japan, and their Relation to the Defence Program and to 
the Economy of the Country. Washington, 1941.
(13) United States, Department of State, The 
Importance of Japanese Trade to the Countries of 
Southeast Asia, Washington, 1946.
(14) . ■ ■ ■ ■ ■   ... .............. ....— , The Japanese
Textile Industry. 1928-36. DIR Report No. 4529, Washington 
1947.
(15) ------------------------------------f The Place of
Foreign Trade in the Japanese Economy. DIR Report OCL - 
2815, 2 vols., Washington, 1946.
(16) United States, Strategic Bombing Survey,
Coals and Metals in Japan's War Economy, Washington 1947.
Japan's Struggle to End the War, Washington, 1946.
(18) United States, Bureau of Mines, "Mineral 
Resources of Japan", Foreign Minerals Survey. Washington ,
(ii) Books
(l) Allen, G.C., Japan: The Hungry Guest. London,
1938.
(17)
1945
(2) , Japan's Economic Expansion. London, 1965.
(3) , Japan's Economic Recovery. London, 1958.
(4)  , A Short Economic History of Modern
Japan: 1867-1937. London, 1962.
391.
(5) Allen, G.C. & Donnithorne, A.G., Western 
Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya: A Study in Economic 
Development, London, 1962.
(6) Akashi, Yozi, The Nanyanq Chinese National 
Salvation Movement. 1937-1941. Kansas, 197D.
(7) Beasley, UJ.G., The Modern History of Japan.
London, 1975.
(8) Benda, Harry J. and others, Japanese Military 
Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents. New 
Haven, 1965.
(9) Boeke, J.H., Structure gf the Netherlands 
Indian Economy. New York, 1942.
(10) Bergamini, David, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy,
New York, 1971.
(11) Broek, J*0.M., Economic Development of the 
Netherlands Indies. New York, 1942.
(12) Butow, R.J.C., To.jo and the Coming of the War. 
Stanford, 1961.
(13) Cohen, Jerome B., Japan's Economy in War 
and Reconstruction. New York, 1949.
(14) Carus, C.D., and McNichols, C.L., Japan:
Its Resources and Industries, New York, 1944.
(15) Cowan, C.D., (ed.), The Economic Development 
of Southeast Asia. London, 1964.
(16) Crowley, James B., Japan's Quest For Autonomy. 
National Security and Foreign Policy 1930 - 1938. Princeton,
1966.
(17) Cady, John F., Southeast Asia; its historical 
development, New York, 1964.
(18) Callis, H.G., Foreign Capital in Southeast 
Asia, New York, 1942.
(19) Chaudhuri, Rohinimohan, The Evolution of 
Indian Industries. Calcutta, 1939.
(20) Drabble, J.H., Rubber in Malaya 1876-1922, 
the Genesis of the Industry, Kuala Lumpur, 1973.
(21) Fermor, L.L., Report Upon the Mining Industry 
of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1943.
(22) Feis, Herbert, The Road to Pearl Harbour, 
Princeton, 1950.
(23) Ginsburg, Norton Sydney, Japanese Prewar 
Trade and Shipping in the Oriental Triangle. Chicago, 
1949.
(24) Gandhi, M.P., The Indian Cotton Textile 
Industry, Calcutta, 1930.
(25) de Fellner, F.V., Communications in the Far 
East, London, 1934.
(26) Duus, P., Party Rivalry and Political Change 
in Taisho Japan. Cambridge, Mass., 1968.
(27) Einzig, P., The Japanese "New Order" in 
Asia, London, 1943.
(28) Hino, I. and Raja Singam, S.D., Stray Notes 
on Nippon-Malaisian Historical Connections, Kuala Lumpur, 
1944.
(29) Huh, Kyung-Mo, Japan's Trade in Asia, New 
York, 1966.
(30) Hall, D.G.E., A History of South-East Asia, 
(Chapter 46, The Japanese Impact), London, 1964.
(31) Harrison, Brian, Southeast Asia; A Short History, 
London, 1957.
(32) Hishida, Seiji, Japan Among the Great Powers.
A Survey of Her International Relations, New York, 1940
(33) Ike, Nobutaka, Japan's Decision For War.
Records of the 1941 Policy Conference, Stanford, 1967.
(34) Irikura, James K., Southeast Asia: Selected 
Annotated Bibliography of Japanese Publications, New 
Haven, 1956.
(35) Jones, F.C., Japan's New Order in East Asia: 
its rise and fall, 1937-1945, London, 1954.
(36) Kennedy, PUD.-, A History of Japan. London,
1963.
(37) Lebra, Joyce C., Japanese-Trained Armies in 
Southeast Asia: Independence and Volunteer Forces in 
World War II. New York, 1977.
(38) ....   ■' , Japan's Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II, Selected Readings 
and Documents. Kuala Lumpur, 1975.
(39) Lockwood, William W . , The Economic Development 
of Japan, Growth and Structural Change. 1868-1938, 
Princeton, 1954.
(40)  , Trade and Trade Rivalry Between
the United States and Japan. New York, 1936.
(41) Langer, W.L. & Gleason, S.E., The Challenge 
to Isolation 1937-1940. London, 1952.
(42) ------------------------- , The Undeclared War,
1940-1941, London, 1953,
(43) Moulton, Harold G .. Japan. An Economic and 
Financial Appraisal. Washington, 1931.
(44) Morris, Ivan (ed.), Thought and Behaviour in 
Modern Japanese Politics, London, 1963.
(45) Morison, S.E., The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 
Boston, 1951.
(46) Mitsubishi Economic Research Bureau, Japanese 
Trade and Industry. Present and Future. Tokyo, 1936.
(47) Moser, Charles K., The Cotton Textile Industry 
of Far Eastern Countries. Boston, 1930.
(48) Morley, James Williams (ed.), Dilemmas of 
Growth in Prewar Japan. Princeton, 1974.
(49) ------------------------------- , Japan's Foreign
Policy, 1868-1941, New York, 1974.
(50) Maxon, Yale Candee, Control of Japanese Foreign 
Policy, A Study of Civil-Military Rivalry 1930-1945, 
Westport, 1975.
(51) Nish, Ian, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1862-1942: 
Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka. London, 1977.
(52) , The Story of Japan, London, 1968
(53) Orchard, J.E., 3apanTs Economic Position, New 
York, 1930.
(54) Ohkawa, Kazushi, The Growth Rate of the Japanese 
Economy Since 1878, Tokyo, 1957.
(55) Ohkawa (K) & Rosovsky (H), Japanese Economic 
Growth: Trend acceleration in the twentieth century, Stanfo 
1973.
(56) Phillips, Joseph D., "Foreign Trade", in
An Economic Survey of the Pacific War. Field, F.V. (ed.),
New York, 1942.
(57) Purcell, Victor, The Chinese in Southeast Asia. 
Edinburgh, 1966.
(58) Remer, C.F., The Foreign Investment in China,
New York, 1968.
(59) Schroeder, P.W., The Axis Alliance and Japanese-
American Relations; 1941. New York, 1958.
(60) Shinohara, M., Growth and Cycles in the 
Japanese Economy. Tokyo, 1962.
(61) Storry, G.R., The Double Patriots. London, 1957.
(62) Schumpeter, E.B. (ed.), The Industrialization 
of Japan and Hanchukuo, 1930-40. New York, 1940.
(63) Silverstein, Josef (ed.), Southeast Asia in 
World War II: four essays, New Haven, 1966.
(64) Ter Braake, Alex L., Mining in the 
Netherlands Indies, New York, 1944.
(65) Uyeda, Teijiro, The Recent Development of 
Japanese Foreign Trade, With special Reference to 
restrictive policies of other countries and attempts 
at trade agreements. Tokyo, 1936.
(66) Uyehara, Shigeru, The Industry and Trade of 
Japan» London, 1936.
(67) Van nook, H.J., The Netherlands Indies and 
Japan, London, 1944.
(68) Vakil (C.N.) and others, Growth of Trade 
and Industry in nodern India, Calcutta, 1931.
(69) Whyte, A.F., The Rise and Fall of Japan, 
London, 1945.
(70) Wilson, George M., Radical Nationalist in 
Japan: Kita Ikki 1883-1937. Cambridge, nass., 1969.
(iii) Articles
(1) Akashi, Yozi, "The Nanyang Chinese Anti- 
Japanese and Boycott novement, 1908-1928, —  A Study' 
of Nanyang Chinese Nationalism — " The Journal of the 
South Seas Society, volume XXIII, Singapore, 1968.
(2) --------------, "Japanese Policy Towards the
Malayan Chinese 1941-1945", Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies, vol.l, No.2, Singapore, September 1970.
(3) Copping, V.P., "Expansion of Japanfs Foreign 
Trade and Industry", Trade Information Bulletin, No.836, 
Washington, 1937.
39 7.
(4)Drabble, J.H., "Investment in the Rubber Industry 
in Malaya C. 1900-1922", Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies, vol.Ill, No.2, Singapore, September 1972.
(5) Ellinger, Barnard, "Japanese Competition in 
the Cotton Trade", Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society. 93,2 (1930), 185-231.
(6) Emerson, Rupert, "The Dutch East Indies Adrift," 
Foreign Affairs, vol.18 (Nos. 1-4), July 1940.
(7) Flood, E.Thadeus, "The 1940 Franco-Thai Border 
Dispute and Phibuun Sonkhrran^s Commitment to Japan", 
Journal of Southeast Asian History, vol.X, No.2, Singapore, 
September 1969, PP.304-325.
(8) Fermor, L.L., "Malayafs Mineral Resources and 
the War", The Asiatic Review, vol.37, No.130, April, 1941.
(9) Far Eastern Survey (American Council Institute 
of Pacific Relations, New York):
"Philippines to Revive cotton growing", 16-1-1935.
"Japan as a consumer of American cotton", 3-7-1935.
"Japan seeking further Sakhalin oil concessions", 
8-5-1935.
"Brazil now a ranking source for Japanese cotton", 
14-2-1940.
"The American stake in Netherlands India", by Ellen 
V/an Zyll de Jong, 19-6-1940.
"Far Eastern Trade .... 1948", by Field, J.E., 
22-S-1948.
"Repercussions of the Australian Embargo on Iron 
ore Exports", by Jack Shepherd, 21-12-1938.
"Iron Mines as a Feature of JapanTs Southward 
Drive 1", by U.W.L., 9-9-1936.
"Philippines Increase Iron Shipments to Japan," 
by C.P. , 9-6-1937.
"Iron as the fFirst Fruits1 of the Japanese Advance", 
2-3-1938.
"Australia Cancels Japanese Iron Exploitation 
Contracts", by Eliot Janeway, 13-7-1938.
"British Malaya as a Leading Source for Japanese 
Iron" by Alvin Barber, 15-3-1939.
"Manchurian Iron and Steel Output Expanding 
Rapidly", by J.R.S., 9-11-1938.
"Southeast Asia Increases Iron Exports to Japan", 
by Patricia Glover Barnett, 3-7-1940.
"Manchoukuo to Get More Foreign Exchange from 
Japan", by John R.Stewart, 3-7-1940.
"Japan Faces Pig Iron Shortage", by M.S.F., 3-2-1937.
"Manchuria Expanding Cotton Textile Industry", 
by J.R.S., 3-2-1937.
"Australia and Japan Reach Trade Agreement", by 
M.S.F., 20-1-1937.
"Manchoukuo Setting up New Five-Year Plan", by 
J.R.S., 20-1-1937.
"Japan Frozen Out of British Malaya", by Virginia 
Thompson, 20-10-1941.
(10) Gatica, R.F., "Japanese Trade in the Philippines" 
Far Eastern Review, October 1939.
(11) Goodman, Grant K ,1"Anti-Communism" in Japanese- 
Philippine Relations during the 1930sf, Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies, vol. IX, No.2, September 1978.
(12) Kee Yeh Siew, "The Japanese in Malaya Before 
1942", Journal of the South Seas Society, vol. XX,
Parts I & II, Singapore, 1966.
(13) Le Clair, J.C., "Japan’s Trade with the 
Netherlands Indies", Foreign Affairs, January 1937,
(14) Leong, Stephen, "The Malayan Overseas Chinese 
and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1941", Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies, September 1979.
(15) Ogata, Shigeyuki, "The Control of Export 
Trade in Japan", Journal of the Osaka University of 
Commerce, 2, 1934.
(16) Orchard, J.E., "Oriental Competition in 
World Trade," Foreign Affairs. July, 1937.
(17 )------- --- — — , "Japan!s Economic Invasion of
China", Foreign Affairs. April 1940.
(IB) Ono, Kazuichiro, "Japanese Capitalism and Foreign 
Trade 1945-1970, (l)," Kyoto University Economic Review,
April - October 1977.
(19) Smith, Ralph B., "The Japanese Period in
Indo China and the Coup of 9 March 1945." Journal of .Southeast 
Asian Studies, vol.IX, No.2, Singapore, September 1978.
(20) Tokyo Association For Liberty of Trading,
"A Brief Analysis of Japan’s Foreign Trade", Liberty of 
Trading Bulletin. No.4, Tokyo, 1935.
(21) Thavenot, A.F., "Japan and Thailand", The 
Asiatic Review, vol.37, October 1941, PP.849-856.
(22) Tarling, Nicholas, "A Vital British Interest": 
Britain, Japan, and the Security of Netherlands India
in the Inter-war Period, Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies, vol.IX, no.2, Singapore, September 1978,
(23) Thamsook Numnonda, ”Pibulsongkramfs Thai 
Nation-Building Programme during the Japanese Military 
Presence, 1941-1945” , Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 
vol.IX, No.2, Singapore, September 1978.
(24) Yuen, Choy Leng, "Japanese Rubber and Iron 
Investments in Malaya, 1900-1941”, Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies, volume V/, No.l, Singapore, March 1974.
(25 )------------------ , ”The Japanese Community in
Malaya before the Pacific War: Its Genesis and Growth” , 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, volume IX, No.2, 
Singapore, September 1978.
(C) Chinese Sources:
(i) Official Publications
(1) Zhongguo Guomin Jingji Yanjiu-suo (The National 
Economic Institute of China) (ed,), Riben Dui Hu Touzi 
(Japanese Investments in Shanghai), Shanghai, 1937.
(ii) Books
(1) Dai Ji-tao, Riben-lun (A Discussion on Japan), 
Shanghai, 1928.
(2) Eidus (Kh.T.), Riben Jindai Xiandai Jianminq-shi 
(Brief History of Modern and Contemporary Japan) Translated 
from the Russian by Xie Jia and Wang Guan, Peking, 1958.
(3) Fang Xian-ting, Zhongguo Zhi Mianfanqzhi-Yie 
(The Chinese Cotton Textile Industry), Shanghai, 1934.
(4) Imura, Fusao, Zhongguo Zhi Fangzhiye Ji Qi 
Chupin (Chinese Textile Industry and Products), Translated 
from the Japanese by Zhou Pei Lan, Shanghai, 1933.
(5) Li Chin-qing, Riben Wenti Gailun (The Japanese 
Problem), Peking, 1955.
(6) Longxi Shu-she, Rizhong liJenti Zhongyao Guanxi 
Z iliao-ii (Collection of Facsimiles dealing with Sino- 
Japanese Relations), Tokyo, vol. I & II, 1972.
(7) Nanyang Siang Pau Press Ltd., Nanyang Nien Jian 
(A Southern Yearbook), Singapore, 1939 and 1951.
(8) Qian Yi-shi, Jindai Zhongguo Jinqji-shi (Economic 
History of Modern China), Hong Kong, 1939.
(9) Yie Du-Zuang, Huabei Mianhua Ji Qi Zhengchan 
Wenti. (The North China Cotton Industry and the Problem 
of Increasing Production), Nanking, 1948.
(10) Yan Zhong-ping, Zhongguo Mianfanqzhi Shiqao 
(History of the Chinese Textile Industry), Peking, 1963.
(11) Zou Kai-Qing, Kangzhan Yiqian Zhi Zhongri 
Guanxi (Sino-Japanese Relations before the War of 
Resistance), Taipei, 1962.
(12) ZhongHua Shangbao-she, Yinfni Shangye
Nianjian (The Commercial Year Book of Indonesia), Djakarta, 
1955.
(iii) Articles
(1) Hsieh Chun-tu, "Liangci Shijie Dazhan-jian de 
Ying Su Malaiya” (British Rule in Malaya, 1919-1939), 
Journal of the South Seas Society, vol.XVIII, Parts
I & II, 1964. (Translated by Yen Ching-huang)•
(2) Tsui Kuei-Chiang, "Hai Xia Zhimindi Huaren dui 
wusi Yundong de Fanxiang” (The Response of the Straits 
Chinese to the May Fourth Movement), Journal of the South 
Seas Society, vol.XX, Parts I & II, Singapore, 1966.
402.
Main Sources of Statistics:
(i) In Japanese:
(1) Arisawa, Hiroma ed., Gendai Nihon Sanqyo Koza 
(Studies on Modern Japanese Industry), vol. 2, 5 and 7, 
Tokyo, 1959-1961.
(2) Fujino, Shozaburo and others ed., Sen'i Koqyo 
(Textiles), No. 11, Tokyo, 1979.
(3) Ishii, Takashi ed., Yokohamashi-shi: Shiryo-hen 
(Source Materials Relating to the History of Yokohama), 
vol. 2, Tokyo, 1962.
(4) Kojima, Seiichi, To-a Keizai-ron (On East Asian 
Economies), Tokyo, 1941.
(5) Naikaku Tokei-Kyoku (Cabinet Bureau of Statistics), 
Nihon Teikoku Tokei Nenkan (Statistical Yearbook of the 
Japanese Empire: 1882-1941), Tokyo, several volumes.
(6) Nihon Ginko Tokei-Kyoku (The Bank of Japan, 
Statistics Department), Mei.ji Iko Honpo Shuyo Keizai Tokei 
(Hundred-year Statistics of the Japanese Economy),
Tokyo, 1966.
(7) Nanyo Kyokai (The South Seas Association) (ed.), 
Nanpo-ken Boeki Tokei-hyo (Trade Statistics of the 
Southern Region), Tokyo, 1943.
(8) Gkurasho (The Department of Finance), Nihon 
Gaikoku Boeki Nenpyo (Annual Return of the Foreign 
Trade of Japan), Tokyo, Several Series.
(9) Toyo Keizai, Shinpo-sha, Toyo Keizai Keizai 
Nenkan (Far Eastern Economic Yearbook), Tokyo, Several 
volumes *
(in) ■ ■ -.... , Nihon Boeki Seiran (Foreign Trade
of Japan, Statistical Survey), Tokyo, 1975.
(ll) Yamazawa, Ippei and Yamamoto, Yuzo, Boeki to 
Kokusai Syushi (Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments), 
Tokyo, 1979.
(ii) In English
(1) Bureau of the Census and Statistics, Foreiqn 
Trade Statistics of the Philippines, several series.
(2) Brode, John, Tables of Japanese Foreign Trade: 
1868-1965. mimeographed, 1967.
(3) Government Printing Office. Summary of Foreign 
Imports and Exports of the Straits Settlements and 
British Malaya. 1915-19.
(4) Government Printing Office, Department of Stat­
istics, Straits Settlements, Short Statistical Summary. 
1930-40.
(5) Government Printing Office, The Foreign Trade 
of Malaya. Singapore, Several Series.
(6) Joseph D.Phillips, "Foreign Trade” , in An Economic 
Survey of the Pacific Area. F.V.Field (ed.), New York, 1942.
(7) The Government of the Philippines Islands, 
Department of Finance, Bureau of Customs, Annual Report
of the Insular Collector of Customs. Manila, Several Series.
(8) The Office of the Commissioner, Trade and 
Customs, British Malaya. Malayan Trade Facts and Figures. 
Kuala Lumpur, 1929.
(iii) In Chinese
(1) Zhongguo Kexueyuan Jingji Yuanjiu-suo 
(Chinese Academy, Institute of Economic Research),
Zhuyao Ziben Zhuyi Guojia Jingji Tongji Ji, 1848-1960 
(Economic Statistics of Principal Capitalist Countries, 
1848-1960), Peking, 1962.
(2) Zhonghua Mianye Tongji-hui (Chinese Cotton 
Statistics Association), Zhongguo Mianchan Tongji (Cotton 
Production in China), Shanghai, 1935.
